Iran – on a Violent Collision Course with the United States and Israel

The Palestinian Arena – Fracturing Institutions and Paradigms

Fissures in the National Resilience

Will Israel Win the Next War?

United States-Israel Relations: Put to the Test

The Middle East – Instability, Uncertainty, Volatility

Israel’s Relations with Sunni-Arab World – the Glass Ceiling

Great Power Rivalry, the Global Economy, and Israel

Russia – Friend or Foe?

Possible Turning Points and Game-Changers
Navigating Stormy Waters
Time for a New Course

Herzliya, January 2020
In recent years, Israel is experiencing a relatively improved and stable security situation. Terror has been contained to a tolerable level, the Middle East has not nuclearized, the economy is growing, and foreign relations are improving, including with Arab countries.

Nevertheless, Israel faces a complex and challenging horizon that presents three basic interlocking trends:

• Mounting strategic challenges in the region – topped by the Iranian threat along three dimensions (nuclear, long-range missiles, and dangerous force build-up in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen) and troubling processes in the Palestinian arena.

• Widening fissures in Israel’s domestic national resilience – while domestic cohesiveness and resilience are crucial for withstanding the strategic challenges facing Israel.

• Potential erosion of Israel’s relations with the United States – an alliance that is a major pillar of Israel’s national security.

The external and domestic threats reinforce each other in different contexts and intensify the multidimensional challenges facing Israel.
In this intricate setting, Israel needs to leverage its political, military, societal, and economic power and assets, and carry out a comprehensive effort with the following priorities:

- Acquire independent capabilities to foil Iran’s nuclear program.
- Contain Iran’s expansion and empowerment and that of its proxies while accelerating the pace of preparedness for a long multifront war accompanied by severe damage to life and property on the homefront.
- Create a turning-point and a positive horizon in the Palestinian arena.
- Strengthen Israel’s alliance with the United States along all its dimensions – within the administration and beyond.
- Devote urgent attention to addressing domestic challenges that undercut national resilience.
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In keeping with its tradition, the 19th Herzliya Conference focused its deliberations on two main pillars: the defense and strategic challenges and threats facing Israel in the region and domestic risks to Israel’s national resilience.

The Herzliya Conference was held in early July. In the short time since, some of the assessments examined during the Conference are already being witnessed across the region. The escalatory potential between Iran and the United States is growing, especially in the aftermath of Soleimani’s targeting. Iran’s efforts against Israel have not been contained at the strategic level despite operational gains in obstructing Iran’s entrenchment in Syria. The Middle East remains in a state of instability and uncertainty as recent events in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran demonstrate. Arab countries remain skeptical whether America is fully committed to their security and regional stability. At the same time, and despite the growing Iranian threat, the Arab countries continue to underscore the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and despite common interests and threats will not pursue normalization of relations under present conditions.

In recent years, Israel is experiencing a relatively improved and stable security and economic situation. However, future-oriented analysis reveals a complex and challenging horizon.

The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran has not achieved its declared objectives. Iran has become more aggressive across the region and has resumed its nuclear program. American economic pressure is likely to continue, but Tehran might respond by increasing its audacity and its offensive measures. Thus, Israel must be ready for a confrontation between Iran and the United States that could lead to escalation along Israel’s borders and even long-range attacks from Iran. Conversely, Israel must be ready for a reverse scenario – negotiations between Washington and Teheran. It would be prudent for Israel to operate in close coordination with the administration, first and foremost to ensure the United States will insist on an agreement that blocks Iran’s nuclear program. Simultaneously, Israel should develop an independent and multidimensional capability to foil Iran’s nuclear programs as a last resort.

Parallel to the threats emanating from Iran, conditions evolving in the Palestinian arena might lead to the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and force Israel to manage the day-to-day affairs of millions of Palestinians in the West Bank. At the same time, the absence of solutions to the threat from Gaza under Hamas rule (which does not recognize Israel and remains determined to destroy it) Israel might be drawn back – albeit reluctantly – into the Gaza Strip.

Israeli strategy in the Palestinian arena should be based on the long-term objective of a Jewish, democratic and secured state. Israel and the United States should reintroduce a political horizon in terms of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, act
immediately to alleviate the Palestinian Authority’s economic crisis, and ensure security coordination with the Palestinians. Parallel to pursuing immediate and positive change in the living conditions in Gaza, Israel must also prepare for a comprehensive military operation that may prove unavoidable.

The mounting strategic challenges facing Israel will require increased reliance on Israel’s alliance with the United States. Despite the strong bonds between the two countries, Israel must address a number of problematic trends that might adversely affect the relationship: eroding bipartisan support towards Israel, increasingly ‘charged’ relations with American Jewry, and the potential crisis regarding China.

At a time in which bolstering Israel’s national resilience is so essential, societal and economic trends and processes afoot are increasing domestic risks and threaten Israel’s identity as a law-abiding democracy. There are clear signs of erosion in public trust in state institutions and values, while judicial and administrative gatekeepers are increasingly under attack. These domestic trends and processes undermine internal cohesion and impede Israel’s ability to mobilize the legitimacy essential for garnering international support in addressing the external challenges it faces, to fend-off legal and diplomatic pressures, and to prevent erosion of support for Israel abroad, including in America.

The report at hand outlines the ten core challenges facing Israel and the key insights and recommendations raised by the Institute for Policy and Strategy’s team. Distilled from the overall proceedings of the 2019 Herzliya Conference, the report rests on the expertise and assessments of senior officials and experts from Israel and around the world. As such, the insights and recommendations presented here reflect the spirit of the exchanges that took place at the Conference, but they neither presume to include all that was said, nor do they obligate the Conference’s speakers or participants. Nonetheless, one hopes this report can facilitate and contribute to a most timely and urgent public debate.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy
Chairman of the Annual Herzliya Conference Series
IDC Herzliya
The long-term vision of the Iranian regime is to weaken Israel to the point of destruction, and it is building the tools and capacities to achieve this. Despite Israel's achievements in obstructing its schemes, Iran has not abandoned its efforts to upgrade its arsenal and capabilities in Lebanon and to extend them to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as well. Iran continues to arm its proxies with advanced weapons that could tilt the balance of Israel's military edge and threaten Israel's ability to achieve a decisive victory in the event of war, and threatens to expose the Israeli homefront to severe damage. Simultaneously, Iran is resuming work on its nuclear program and ramping-up its aggressive regional policy, putting it on a violent collision course with Israel, the United States and its allies in the region.

The Palestinian Arena

Conditions evolving in the Palestinian arena might force Israel once again to manage the day-to-day affairs of millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The loss of faith in the utility of the Two-State Solution is affecting a change in basic concepts and discourse among Palestinians and Israelis. On the Palestinian side, there is a shift from a territorial discourse to a discourse of rights calling for “One Person – One Vote.” Within Israeli society, there is a shift from a model seeking to preserve the Jewish and democratic character of the state by evacuating territory, to a discourse of annexation. These developments undermine the Zionist foundations of Israel and could severely harm its international standing. In addition, the impasse with the Palestinians prevents normalization between Israel and the Arab countries despite the commonality of interests, shared threat perceptions, and closer relations hidden from the public eye.

The Regional Arena

Instability and uncertainty continue to characterize the Middle East because of two main factors: (a) several regimes find it increasingly difficult to address urgent needs of their citizenry; (b) global and regional actors are forging rapid strategic change in the region. These processes could pose a threat particularly to Jordan, whose instability would constitute a strategic-defense threat for Israel and for regional security.

The Strategic Alliance with the United States

The mounting strategic challenges facing Israel will require increased reliance on Israel’s alliance with the United States. Despite the strong bonds between the two countries, particularly during the Trump presidency, several problematic trends might adversely affect relations: eroding bipartisan support towards Israel, charged relations with American Jewry, a potential crisis regarding China-Israel relations, and gaps in prioritizing strategic challenges (China vs. Iran).
Vis-à-vis Iran – Israel needs to be able to defend itself on its own and develop an independent capability to thwart the nuclear program, as a last resort. Simultaneously, Israel should:

- Pursue the multidimensional campaign – in full coordination with the American administration – to block the Iranian threat in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
- Increase its readiness for contingencies of war between the United States and Iran, which could lead to violent escalation along Israel’s borders and even direct long-range attacks by Iran.
- Prepare for the reverse possibility – that the volatile situation will lead the parties to step back, leading to negotiations between the United States and Iran where Israel must ensure that its interests, topped by blocking Iran’s nuclear program, will take precedence.

The strategic objective in the Palestinian arena needs to be safeguarding that Israel will be a Jewish, democratic and secured state

- Israel and the United States should reintroduce an element of hope on the political horizon for realization of an independent Palestinian state, while taking immediate steps to alleviate the Authority’s economic crisis and prevent the breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian security coordination.
- In Gaza, Israel should work for immediate and positive change in the living conditions of the population. At the same time, Israel must prepare for a comprehensive military operation in Gaza – a step from which there may be no escape. In such an event, it is imperative to plan an exit strategy and conditions that would enable return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip in the future.

Considering military escalation contingencies with Iran and its proxies:

- Israel needs to substantially strengthen the capabilities and competence of IDF’s ground forces (army) to engage in ground maneuver.
- Encourage a non-intimidating and realistic public discourse regarding anticipated casualties and damage to the homefront in the event of war.
- Seek to upgrade military cooperation with the United States for all contingencies.
- Maintain freedom of operation in the North through maintaining the deconfliction mechanism with Russian military forces in the region and close contact with Moscow at the high political level.

Against the backdrop of instability and volatility in the Middle East

- Prioritize the strengthening of Jordan.
- Avoid imposing the Western democratic model on Egypt and other states such as Saudi Arabia, demands that are likely to merely undermine regime stability.
- Despite diversion of attention from Syria to the Gulf, it is important to keep the issue of Syria’s rehabilitation on the international agenda; as time passes, Iran is filling the void in Syria.
In light of the deep polarization in the American society, Israel should prevent the politicization of U.S.-Israel relations. It is essential to adopt a broad and ‘inclusive’ approach. Israel ought to:

• Act urgently to restore bipartisan support of relations with Israel.
• Forge ties and dialogue with all streams of American Jewry.

To prevent having the Chinese challenge becoming a threat to Israel and avoid a crisis with the Trump administration, Israel should more-closely regulate and oversee Chinese investments and involvement in physical and technological infrastructure projects in Israel while taking steps to maintain full transparency with the American administration about such projects.

Also, Israel needs to be prepared for turning-points – rooted in the present and which might create risks as well as opportunities, including: the fall of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MbS); deep instability in Jordan; rapprochement between the Gulf states and Iran; the return of regional turmoil led by young protesters; a second term (or not) for President Trump; Russian withdrawal from the region; and large-scale regional development led by China.

Fissures in National Resilience

The Israeli democracy including the Rule of Law, judicial and administrative gatekeepers, state’s values and institutions, are under assault. This process occurs as the executive branch is seeking to control all other branches – the Knesset, the Judiciary, the State Ombudsman – along with the media. The threat to democracy and good governance is further overshadowed by growing corruption:

• Eroding public trust in the state’s institutions.
• Damaging Israel’s image as the sole democracy in the Middle East – impeding Israel’s ability to mobilize legitimacy and support for addressing external challenges, to fend-off legal and diplomatic pressures, and to prevent erosion of support to Israel, in the United States as well.

Alongside a growing and prosperous economy and remarkable technological achievements, social and economic gaps are deepening and undermining Israel’s national resilience. Israel ranks among the worst in the OECD in terms of inequality, the prevalence of poverty, and low educational achievements.

Israel’s economic growth appears to be short-term and does not realize the full potential of the economy because of:

• Low labor productivity.
• Limited societal mobility.
• Deepening societal gaps between center and periphery, including health and life expectancy indicators.
The Israeli healthcare system is weighed down under immense pressure. Although Israel is among the top-ranked in several health indicators, it trails most OECD countries in patient: hospital bed and medical and healthcare personnel ratios. Israel’s poor ratings are reflected in long waiting times for ambulatory medical treatment and a hospital system on the verge of collapse.

The National Resilience Cluster

Policy Recommendations

Government and elected officials need to urgently mobilize to defend the judiciary, Rule of Law, and the legal and administrative gatekeepers and their authority to protect law enforcement agencies and root-out corruption. This is a necessary condition to ensure the function of democratic processes and restore public confidence in the state’s institutions, values, and national resilience.

Socioeconomic policy should focus on a national effort to narrow the gaps between center and periphery and to increase labor productivity. To that end, the government should initiate short- and long-term measures to enhance the integration of marginalized populations with low levels of participation in the workforce, particularly their integration into the high-tech sector.

The health system requires implementation of a strategic plan that should include:

- Allocating more financial resources towards building new hospitals.
- Increasing the number of hospital beds.
- Expanding medical personnel training and value-based orientation focusing on professionalism, compassion, and human dignity.
- Establishing an independent national ‘hospital authority’ and promoting home hospitalization.
Ten Core Strategic Challenges

01

Challenge #1

Iran – The Primary Threat – on a Violent Collision Course with the United States and Israel

Iran is the primary threat to Israel and the region. The regime in Teheran maintains a long-term vision of weakening Israel until its utter destruction – and it is developing the tools and capabilities to realize this goal in the future. As a theological and ideological regime, the expectation that it will accept Israel’s existence and agree to live with it in peace is a dangerous illusion.

Teheran maintains a long-term vision of weakening Israel until its utter destruction – and it is developing the tools and capabilities to realize this goal in the future.

The regime is developing gradually, but steadfastly, the nuclear infrastructure that will provide a minimal breakthrough point to nuclear weapons. Iranian nuclear weapons will significantly damage Israel’s deterrence in the region and might lead Israel’s opponents to attack under the aegis of an Iranian nuclear ‘umbrella’.

Arab countries will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran and will opt to follow suit in acquiring nuclear weapons. A Middle East with numerous nuclear actors will become a dangerously unstable region that will threaten global stability.

Iran is implanting a strategic plan to establish in Syria an additional front against Israel and develop a threat similar to the one it developed in Lebanon that Teheran continuously seeks to upgrade. Iran is developing in Lebanon an arsenal of precision-guided missiles that could threaten strategic infrastructure in Israel.

Iran is also strengthening its grip in Iraq through its Shiite militias that are expanding their influence. Iran assigns Iraq a key role as a transit country for advanced munitions slated for Lebanon and Syria and as a launching pad for long-range missiles targeting Israel.
Finally, Iran has an additional offensive layer targeting Israel – its own long-range missile arsenal under rapid development since 2000. The missile arsenal is part of its deterrence strategy and is designed to defend Iran’s nuclear program and improve its offensive capabilities against Israel and American interests in the region.

Israel is determined to prevent Iran’s nuclearization. Likewise, it is resolved to foil Iran’s force construction schemes in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Thus, Israel and Iran are on a collision course, already having engaged in direct military exchanges on several occasions. At the operative level, Israel has significantly undercut Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, but at the strategic level has not been successful in persuading Iran to forgo this objective. Rather, Iran is expanding these efforts to additional fronts. The robust sanctions America has imposed have weakened the Iranian regime, but have not led Iran to reassess its strategies or restrain its actions.

American Policy

American deterrence vis-à-vis Iran has, in fact, eroded. The declared threats of National Security Advisor Bolton that the United States would respond forcefully to Iranian provocations were not followed through (and since the Herzliya Conference was held – Bolton has been replaced because of his forceful approach). Iran has used military force in various ways and is gradually reducing its commitments to the JCPOA. The American response has been limited to additional sanctions. As America’s deterrence erodes, the risk of miscalculation and escalation grows. Neither Iran nor the United States want war, but that does not mean that they will be able to prevent escalation.

A major question debated at the Herzliya Conference was whether the United States has a well-organized strategy for addressing different contingencies vis-à-vis Iran? Most experts assess that the American administration has not developed a plan of action should the two countries enter into negotiations or should sanctions fail, if the situation in the Gulf escalates, and if Iran’s nuclear program is expanded.

Furthermore, facing disputes and conflicts with other world powers regarding trade and tariffs, and lacking international support or legitimacy, the United States finds it difficult to either engage Iran diplomatically or to manage an escalation. With regards to the prioritization of threat perceptions, there appears to be a gap between Israel – focused on Iran, and America’s prioritizing China.

Most experts assess that the American administration has not developed a plan of action should the two countries enter into negotiations or should sanctions fail, if the situation in the Gulf escalates, and if Iran’s nuclear program is expanded.

1 Written in the fall of 2019, long before the targeting of Qods Force commander, Qassem Soleimani.
A plausible outcome of the current situation is a return to the negotiating table at some point, probably after American elections. President Trump’s over-eagerness to reach a deal might fail to address the serious shortcomings of the JCPOA.

With regards to the JCPOA itself – there is a broad consensus that despite the expectations, the deal reached by Obama did not yield a positive approach or a change in Iran’s malevolent policies. Nevertheless, Europeans contend that in the absence of an alternative, it is better to stick to the deal, also because it provides tight oversight and inspections in Iran. The countering position is that the JCPOA is a bad deal, based on lies (as the Iranian nuclear archive documents ‘stolen’ by Israel prove), and problematically implemented. In any case, it is no longer possible to go back to the old deal.

There is a debate regarding the best negotiating strategy when negotiations will resume. According to one approach, negotiations ought to focus on the nuclear file and amend the substantive shortcomings of the JCPOA, detaching regional issues that can be expected to complicate bargaining and might result in failed negotiations.

The Trump administration takes the opposite approach, holding that negotiations ought to pursue a “grand bargain” that will address all the components of the Iranian threat. An agreement that will fail to address all aspects of Iranian conduct would be perceived by countries in the region as disappointing. From an Israeli perspective, an agreement that solely focuses on the nuclear file would be considered against Israel’s national interests.

Concerning the nuclear file, the interim nuclear deal – the JPOA that preceded the JCPOA – could offer a positive setting for resumption of negotiations since it includes all the principles for a new deal (including conditioning the fuel cycle by establishing proven need).

The Europeans’ eagerness to preserve the JCPOA at almost any cost and American policy based clearly on sanctions alone and reluctance to establish a credible military threat are being exploited by Iran to enhance its aggressive policy across the region and to expand its nuclear program.
Recommendations for Israel

Under current circumstances, and as Iran resumes its nuclear program, Israel must develop independent capabilities to foil the nuclear program. These capabilities should, however, be utilized solely as a last resort. Preferably, the international community, led by the United States will intervene to stop Iran’s nuclear program. Yet, if the international community will fail, Israel will then still retain a credible military option to stop the program.

Israel will not be able to tolerate a nuclear Iran and must be able to defend itself by itself, and be willing to pay the high price of developing the required military capability.

Simultaneously, Israel should focus all efforts – military, diplomatic, intelligence, and international advocacy – to reduce the regional threat Iran poses: continue blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria and the upgrading of capabilities in Lebanon. Israel should also continue to confront Iran’s grip in Iraq in coordination with the United States’ efforts in this regard to contain Iranian influence there.

Israel must enhance its readiness for contingencies of war between the United States and Iran, which might lead to escalation along Israel’s own borders. Conversely, Israel also needs to prepare for the resumption of negotiations, in order to ensure that its interests are safeguarded – primarily blocking Iran’s nuclear program.
Regime Change in Iran – Is it Possible?

The question regarding Iranian regime change dates back to the founding of the Islamic Republic. The reason for the ongoing debate is the broad consensus that the regime will not change its negative policies because of its fundamental ideological, theological and revolutionary foundations. Thus, the only way to yield change in Iran’s approach is by replacing the regime.

However, the likelihood of regime change in Iran does not appear to be high in the foreseeable future for various reasons:

a. The Iranian regime has considerable circles of support – some 20-to-30 percent of the public are dependent upon the regime. Leading an effective dual policy and suppressing the opposition, the regime remains in control. On one hand, it allows “venting” among the youth and refrains from unnecessary use of force, on the other hand, when required, the regime can carry out brutal suppression measures.

b. Protests and demonstrations in Iran are sectorial and lack a leadership to guide the protests and connect the socioeconomic unrest with a political agenda.

c. The scenes of the “Arab Spring” have instilled concern within the Iranian public that revolution will lead to domestic violence and chaos.

d. The Iranian public is preoccupied with day-to-day survival and its growing economic challenges and is not open to taking on revolution and regime change.

e. There is a deep fear among the public from the security apparatuses that have demonstrated their ability to cruelly suppress popular protests (summer of 2009).

f. The forces of change in Iran do not receive Western support or incentives that could encourage them to act. The public perceives the West as having abandoned the opposition during previous waves of protests and as de-facto supporting the regime. In any case, the assumption that regime change will lead to a new and moderate regime is not a given. A possible outcome could be a regime led by more extreme and nationalist forces.
There is no willingness or desire for a real meaningful negotiating process on either side. The national Palestinian project is divided into two completely separate entities. The Palestinian leadership is weak, lacks legitimacy at home and across the Arab world, is perceived as corrupt, and is not cultivating a new generation of future leaders. For its part and in practical terms, Israel is undermining the very idea of a Two-State Solution and the possibility of implementing it on the ground. Both societies show growing despair and disillusionment in future solutions.

Among both sides, there is no attempt to set the stage for positive and constructive measures and there is no serious debate regarding the evolving dangerous reality. Both sides are in holding position – incapacitated and reluctant to take action.

President Abbas is in deep conflict with the American administration, which he perceives to be biased in favor of Israel, and is waiting for a new administration and the departure of Trump. The Israeli side has been waiting for two years now for the administration’s “Deal of the Century.” Consequently, Israel is diplomatically motionless. Contrary to the Zionist ethos, Israel is not trying to shape its own future.

Even if the “Deal of the Century” 1 will be rolled out, the parties will not be ripe to seriously consider it. Therefore, it will become – in the best case – a point of reference for future American administrations. In the worst case, the contents of ‘the deal’ could lead to instability on the ground and pull the plug on the Two-State Solution.

With no political horizon, receding legitimacy, economic uncertainty, political pressures and despair, the Palestinian Authority faces a real threat to its very existence. The collapse of the Palestinian Authority or its gradual disintegration will place upon Israel the responsibility for managing the day-to-day lives of millions of Palestinians, while Israel is not ready for such an undertaking. This contingency would damage Israel’s foreign relations and amplify adversarial diplomatic and legal initiatives, including appeals to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

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1 On January 28, President Trump unveiled his vision for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (“Deal of the Century”). Our assessment remains valid.
Simultaneously, young Palestinians’ despair – in the face of no political horizon and no hope for the Two-State Solution – is unleashing a historical process of adopting a new narrative of “one-state”.

Palestinian public opinion surveys show 40 percent support for a “one-state” outcome. Against this backdrop, the prevailing paradigm is gradually changing. On the Palestinian side, there is a notable transition from a discourse focusing on territory to a ‘discourse of rights’ that speaks of “One Person – One Vote”. In Israeli society, there is a move from the model of evacuating territory to a discourse of unilaterally annexing parts of the West Bank/Judea and Samaria.

The claim for equal rights based on “One Person – One Vote” will resonate powerfully in the United States, as this principle is at the core of America’s DNA. Israel might become increasingly associated with the South African Apartheid regime and face unprecedented international isolation – even in America – energizing and providing fuel for the BDS movement.

The good news is that currently most young Palestinians still aspire to live in an independent Palestinian state and the “one-state” concept contradicts the aspiration for independence. On the ground, the security forces of the Palestinian Authority and Israel continue to cooperate, foil hundreds of terror attacks every year, thus maintaining relative security and stability.

However, the atmosphere in the West Bank is reminiscent of the mood that preceded the First Intifada (First Palestinian Uprising 1987-1993): a young generation that has not experienced the consequences of a violent protest wave, saddled with a deeply disappointing leadership, helpless in face of Israel’s actions, and sensing Palestinians have been deserted by the Arab World now more concerned about Iran than the plight of their Palestinian brethren. This is a combustive mixture – a combination of economic crisis, shortcomings in security apparatuses, and a looming generational transition in leadership.

Furthermore, the departure from the stage of President Abbas could spell the collapse of the approach he has personified – peace and resistance to violence and terror. After Abbas, the new Palestinian leadership might seek different paths to apply pressure on Israel.

Instability in the West Bank and Palestinian political turbulence might place Jordanian stability in real danger. Detriment to the stability of the Hashemite Court would pose a strategic threat of the highest order for Israel and to regional security.
In the northern refugee camps in the West Bank, a new young and armed leadership is emerging that under certain circumstances could sweep young Palestinians down a path to violent escalation and clashes with Israeli security forces. Deep undercurrents, heretofore presently beneath the surface, could breakout, with social media adding fuel to the flames.

Instability in the West Bank and Palestinian political turbulence might place Jordanian stability in real danger. Detriment to the stability of the Hashemite Court would pose a strategic threat of the highest order for Israel and to regional security.

In the Gaza Strip, Hamas’ position – unwilling to recognize Israel and determination to pursue its destruction – remains firm. The Islamist ideology of Hamas precludes reaching any meaningful accord. Furthermore, Hamas aspires to take over and rule the West Bank, as well.

Israeli security services foil every year many hundreds of terror attacks that Hamas attempts to carry out. Hamas aims to demonstrate to the Palestinian public that terror and violent resistance is the only effective way to take the Palestinian cause forward. In the meanwhile, civilian and humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip – the orderly supply of water, electricity, health services and infrastructure continue to deteriorate, edging towards catastrophe.
**Recommendations for Israel**

The long-term objective of preserving Israel as a Jewish, democratic and secure state should shape and guide Israel’s strategy in the Palestinian arena – in the West Bank and Gaza. The next Israeli government should take the opportunity of relative security to advance political measures and initiatives under convenient conditions rather than under the pressure of violent escalation.

In the West Bank – it is urgent that Israel focus on immediate alleviation of the Palestinian Authority’s economic crisis. In contrast to the long-term economic vision of the Bahrain Workshop, there is a need for immediate positive change on the ground. Without immediate change, the long-term vision will become unviable.

Counter-terror operations should continue to be conducted with minimal disruption of normal day-to-day life for Palestinians, and permit employment of Palestinians in Israel which facilitates peace and security. It is imperative to preserve the security coordination and cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatus, as well.

The Trump administration, which in its policy so far is perceived as solely addressing Israeli symbolic needs, ought to demonstrate – in deeds rather than statements – that it is also mindful of Palestinian interests. Moreover, to reestablish credibility, it is imperative to reintroduce a political horizon in terms of an independent Palestinian state.

Vis-à-vis Gaza, Israel needs a strategy. Without solving the problem, Israel will be drawn back and forced to control and govern the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, Israel ought to do all that is in its power to improve the conditions of Gaza civilians utilizing measures that will not risk Israeli security, such as encouraging exports from Gaza, permanent opening of the crossing points, and permitting the entrance of construction materials.

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2 In June 2019, the White House unveiled the economic dimension of its peace plan. Titled “Peace to Prosperity”, the plan was presented at an “economic workshop” hosted by Bahrain.
Fissures in the National Resilience

Alongside a growing and prosperous economy and remarkable technological achievements, the fissures in Israel’s national resilience are expanding. Rule of Law, the roles of judicial and administrative gatekeepers, and even the state’s values and institutions are being challenged. The assault, in most cases is led by the executive branch. These challenges are mounting in face of the “Israeli paradox” — a prospering economy, but one that seems to be based on short-term growth that does not benefit from the full potential of the economy. This paradox is the result of spreading corruption, low labor productivity, deepening societal gaps between center and periphery, limited social mobility, a public health system on the verge of collapse, and private consumption based on cheap credit disconnected from debt-servicing capabilities.

The ‘bubble’ masks the ability to detect and identify dangerous undercurrents. Israel is potentially on the precipice of deep crisis that could engulf its democracy, governance, national values and institutions, Rule of Law, society and economy.

Threats to Israel’s Democracy

The State of Israel’s foundational values are those of an enlightened, liberal Jewish and democratic country. These values are defined in Israel’s Declaration of Independence that promises freedom and equality to all citizens and expresses the aspiration to establish a model society. However, several domestic processes challenge these foundational values.

Maintaining the supremacy of the Rule of Law is a prerequisite for a functioning democracy and protecting the public interest and civil rights. This is a cornerstone of national resilience.

The Nationality Law erases the values of freedom, liberalism, and equality. As a Basic Law, the Nationality Law is considered a constitutional law, while the Declaration of Independence remains void of a legal binding status because, just before the Knesset voted
on the bill, the reference to the Declaration was omitted from the final version. The institutions that preserve these foundational values and ensure their application – the judiciary, the state attorney office, the police, the IDF and others – are under continuous assault and face amplified religious extremism and radical nationalism, and incitement in the media.

Israel is experiencing a process of encroachment of the executive branch over other sources of authority that erodes the balance of powers with the other branches of government – the Knesset, the courts, the State’s Ombudsman – and even undermines the function of the media. The campaign against the press, already weakened by economic forces, seeks to prevent the press from effectively fulfilling its role as a “watchdog” of democracy. Instead of checks-and-balances between the branches, Israel is moving towards a dangerous concentration of power where the strong dominate, democracy is hollow and crumbling, and majority rule has become the sole and exclusive principle of government.

A culture of unconstrained coveting of unrestrained power is taking hold in Israel, allegedly in the name ideology and security. This is epitomized by ‘personalized legislation’ that undermines the basic values and principles of democratic governance. This also justified the legislation of a law that contradicts the Declaration of Independence, stigmatizing and marginalizing all those who are not part of the Jewish majority. This presents a real and imminent threat to Israel’s democracy – for democratic governance mandates power-holders’ exercising restraint.

Under these circumstances, an atmosphere of intimidation, threat, and persecution is growing more prevalent. The judicial and administrative gatekeepers in government and state institutions are being challenged and put on the defensive. There are clear signs that several gatekeepers are intimidated in carrying out their functions. Moreover, obedience and submission to power-holders’ desires is increasingly becoming a prerequisite for official appointments.

The cynical use of social media allows the circulation of false and superficial information, along with extremist rhetoric. The political chaos exacts a high and growing price that is engulfing society-as-a-whole: citizens, exposed to inflammatory discourse and experiencing growing gaps, are losing trust in law enforcement authorities and state institutions. Without checks-and-balances, Israel might drift towards limited freedoms, further distanced from the model of an enlightened and righteous society at the core of the Zionist dream – a vision for which, in the past, the people of Israel have been willing to fight one generation after the other.
The Rule of Law and Fight against Corruption

Although corruption remains on the media agenda and the process of law enforcement continues, the legitimacy in the eyes of some of the public for those suspected of corruption has not waned. At best, law enforcement officials are portrayed as self-righteous, or worse, as officials who seek to abrogate the will of the majority.

Corruption is not a new phenomenon. However, public perception in broad circles that corruption is an acceptable aspect of government and indifference to deteriorating standards of conduct are worrisome trends that reflect moral erosion within Israeli society.

The public trust in state institutions is fragile, while distrust is far more stable. This is a slippery slope. Political leaders have successfully nurtured distrust among their supporters in the legal system and law enforcement process, making the principle of equality before law a debatable issue. Under such circumstances, belief in protection of the law and trust in government is being undermined to a point where restoring trust will become extremely difficult.

Socioeconomic Aspects

Socioeconomic gaps in Israeli society are widening and deepening. The principle of equality is under constant threat. A third of Israelis categorize themselves as economically weak. In many cases, these gaps overlap; minorities, women, people with disabilities, and people residing in the geographical periphery often experience exclusion on more than one count.

Income Inequality – Gini Coefficients in OECD Countries

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The public trust in state institutions is fragile, while distrust is far more stable. This is a slippery slope.
In recent years, the government has cut funding of public services. At the same time, Israel ranks high among OECD countries in economic inequality, poverty prevalence, and low educational achievements. Those struggling financially will not be able to purchase services privately—be it for education or healthcare. Thus, the current gaps can only be expected to further expand.

Studies show that more than 60 percent of salary differences in Israel derive from the education system. With limited social mobility, Israeli society is deeply rifted, with declining social capital.

More than third of Israelis claim they wish they were not born in Israel. Many of those survey respondents are young, educated, and talented. The covenant between the worker and the state—I work and the state ensures dignified living—is not being upheld. Some 450,000 Israelis belong to families of working poor. When people become invisible, their common bond and sense of belonging erodes, posing a threat to national resilience. This trend is reflected in the declining rate of IDF recruitment that has dropped from 84 percent to 67 percent, and could even fall further to 45-50 percent.

While technological innovation in Israel is blossoming, employment in the high-tech sector is hardly representative of the workforce as a whole, and does not reflect society-at-large. The lack of social diversity in the high-tech sector further deepens social gaps. The result is low labor productivity and the Israeli economy is failing to realize its full growth potential. Without improving labor productivity, Israel will not be able to raise the standards of living for the entire population. Consequently, Israel is drifting away from the countries upon which it aspires to model itself.
Recommendations

The next government should do everything in its power to defend and uphold the authority of law enforcement agencies to combat corruption and preserve Rule of Law. This is an essential prerequisite in safeguarding democracy, and preserving the public interest and individual rights. It would also be a first and vital step in restoring national resilience and public trust in public institutions and values.

Dramatic measures are required to stop the deterioration. Small steps will not suffice. This is a national mission that mandates broad public mobilization. The Israeli public ought to demand from its elected leaders the highest standards. Israel’s leaders must abide to the law and a normative code of conduct – in both words and deeds.

To that end, the Nationality Law should be reviewed and amended to bring it in line with the values of the Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, the Knesset ought to legislate a new basic law granting the Declaration of Independence the status of a basic law. In addition, the Knesset should review the electoral system of Israel.

In the socioeconomic realm, the government should leverage the attributes of the Start-Up Nation to include more segments of the population in the labor market and facilitate a more ‘inclusive’ high-tech sector. The government should forge conditions that can allow all those able to work to participate in the labor force, and specifically in the high-tech sector. To that end, in the short-term, the government should support high-tech firms recruiting workers from underrepresented populations. In the long-term, the government should prioritize education among those population segments.
The Healthcare Crisis

The level of healthcare in Israel is very high, but the healthcare system is facing crisis. Israel is among the leading countries in the world in several healthcare indicators, but severely lags behind on others. Among the OECD countries, Israel has one of the lowest ratios of healthcare personnel and hospital beds and long waiting times. The average hospital bed occupancy in Israel is 94 percent, and in winter seasons, internal medicine wards record more than 200 percent bed occupancy.

According to Ministry of Health data and the State Ombudsman reports, more than 4,000 people die every year as a result of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs). There is growing evidence that high levels of bed occupancy and overcrowding are associated with HAIs.

There are 3.1 physicians for every thousand residents, compared to the OECD average of 3.4; there are only five nurses for every thousand Israeli residents, compared to an average of 9.2 nurses in OECD countries. This data reflects poor prioritization of national budget allocation. Israel lacks a long-term and budgeted national plan for building new hospitals, which would take into account demographic trends. Furthermore, the Israeli public health system is unprepared to address the rapid rise of new medical technologies, an emerging dimension to healthcare that requires additional funding. With insufficient allocation of funds, Israel’s public healthcare system is in dire straits and might face collapse within the coming decade.

Furthermore, data shows an unacceptable gap between the level of healthcare services in central areas and on the periphery. As a result, life expectancy of residents in the South of Israel is two-to-four years below than in the Central region.

With insufficient allocation of funds, Israel’s public healthcare system is in dire straits and might face collapse within the coming decade.
Recommendations

Addressing the crisis of Israel’s ambulatory services requires formulation and implementation of a strategic plan that will include allocation of additional resources towards building new hospitals, adding continued-care hospital beds, expanding medical personnel training in a public health system that will champion professionalism, compassion, and human dignity. To achieve the latter, Israel needs to raise its standards of hospitalization to avoid overcrowding (no more than two hospital beds per room) parallel to adding 500 hospital beds. Time has come to establish a national hospital authority and to promote expansion of home-hospitalization as a viable and cost-effective option.

The healthcare crisis mandates the formulation and implementation of a strategic plan that will include allocation of additional resources towards building new hospitals, adding continued-care hospital beds, expanding medical personnel training in a public health system that will champion professionalism, compassion, and human dignity.
The Arab Society in Israel: Between Alienation and Integration

Arab society in Israel has reached a strategic juncture and is in the midst of a transition between generations, leaderships, and ideological outlook.

In recent years, and as the result of several trends combined, there is a perceptible trend in aspirations of Arabs to integrate into the state and this is marked by the growing presence of Arabs in many walks of life. The rising standards of living in the Arab sector is accompanied by collective aspirations for self-achievement and increasing attention to civic issues and problems ‘at home’: violence and crime, opposition to government demolishing illegal buildings (with no building permits), and discrimination. There is notable disappointment with the performance of the Arab parties and the sense of a full-blown leadership crisis.

The young generation of the Arab society is a rising force – with growing influence, however, their current impact remains limited. Young people in the Arab sector are experiencing double alienation – from the government and from Arab leadership. Addressing crime and violence tops the agenda of Arab society in Israel.

Future Look

Both the government and the Arab (and Jewish) parties ought to recognize and value Arab citizens’ aspirations for integration. This aspiration does not anticipate changing the foundational features of the state, but expects that as citizens they will be granted full and equal civil rights. Clearly, the government is duty-bound to encourage the integration and participation of Arabs in all walks of life, including a greater presence in state institutions. To that end, the government ought to allocate budgets, remove traditional barriers, and encourage initiatives that will deepen the Arab citizens’ affinity to the state. association with Arab countries. It is imperative that the government recognize that the high levels of violence and crime in the Arab sector of society amounts to a strategic challenge and will not remain forever only an ‘internal’ problem of the Arab population or only a matter of ‘law and order’.

Taking a long-term strategic perspective – Israel’s Jews and Arabs ought to appreciate that the interconnectedness of both societies is growing broader. This will require both to better understand one another and redefine their relations.

Taking a long-term strategic perspective – Israel’s Jews and Arabs ought to appreciate that the interconnectedness of both societies is growing broader. This will require both to better understand one another and redefine their relations.
Israel will not lose the next war, but will find it difficult to create a ‘victory narrative’. The next military campaign will likely end with the bitter taste of a tie. This bitterness will reflect the unprecedented damage to civilian life and property and disruption to civilian life due to precision targeting of strategic infrastructure, as well as possible (short-term) land grabs of Israeli territory. The political leadership is not readying the public to the expected heavy damage on the homefront.

There is a broad consensus that after years of neglect, the level of competence of IDF’s ground forces (army) is insufficient. Considering the gaps in the ground forces, changes in the nature of the battlefield, and the growing capabilities of Israel’s enemies – both in quality and quantity – the IDF’s ground forces will be subject to high levels of casualties in the next war.

There is debate afoot regarding the role of ground forces in the next war and maneuver warfare. Some military experts contend that a rapid victory will require a deep, comprehensive and powerful land maneuver into South Lebanon. Others contend that a limited maneuver will suffice.

The advocates of a comprehensive ground maneuver argue that facing significant Israeli civilian damage, the age of air and artillery bombing with limited ground maneuver is over. According to them, the only way to minimize disruption to life on the homefront and minimize the duration of military engagement, while preventing unexpected developments, such as incursions across the border by enemy forces (“land-grabs”), is to as swiftly as possible inflict devastating damage to the enemies’ capabilities (casualties, weapons, and infrastructure).

Those advocating a limited ground maneuver claim that both the nature of the enemy and the battleground have completely changed. The enemy possesses advanced weaponry, including an arsenal of tens-of-thousands of rockets. A broad ground maneuver entails considerable risks, such as significantly extending the length of the military campaign, including mounting casualties and the increased risk of entanglement.

**Challenge #4**

Will Israel win the next war?

The political leadership is not readying the public to the expected heavy damage on the homefront.
According to the latter approach, a limited maneuver would avoid starting the defense at the line of engagement, while leveraging the IDF’s clear edge in managing rapid and forceful air and artillery bombing (this advantage erodes as the length of the military exchange grows). The IDF has made a qualitative leap in its bombing and intelligence capabilities and the damage it can inflict. Today, the IDF is capable of carrying out in the first 36-to-48 hours of combat the scope of bombing that took 33 days during the 2006 Lebanon War. The extent of damage that the IDF could produce on the enemy’s side can be expected to provide years of quiet – even if the war will end with a bitter taste.

Another debatable concept is the principal target in a future war – should the state of Lebanon be the target or solely the terror organization Hezbollah? Some experts contend that afflicting harsh and broad damage to Lebanon will lead to ending hostilities in a shorter time. However, considering the political situation in Israel, in the absence of an elected government, the ability and the attention span of Israeli leaders’ for dealing with long-term security issues is limited, leading to delays in the military’s budget allocation and long-term planning. Finally, there is a notable decline in the public’s willingness to accept casualties. In turn, this has an effect on political leaders’ resolve and willingness to assume risks of military engagement.

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Recommendations

The State of Israel and its political leadership must determine the scope of state damage – regarding Lebanon it wishes to inflict – and to launch a diplomatic campaign to shore up international legitimacy to attack Lebanese infrastructure that supports the war effort of the enemy. The capabilities and competence of IDF ground forces must be significantly strengthened. Irrespective of the debate regarding the depth or scope of Israel’s ground maneuver warfare, there is an agreement that in the next war, Israel will have to carry out some ground maneuver. If the Israeli civilian infrastructure and population will experience substantial damage and casualties, the likelihood of a broad ground maneuver increases.

A balanced and non-intimidating public discourse on the anticipated civilian damage and casualties is important. The general sense is that the public is strong and willing to pay justified costs, however, it is imperative to ground public expectations on realities, both the nature of the war and its price, and its outcome.
United States-Israel Relations: Put to the Test

Israel’s relations with its great ally are a cornerstone of the country’s national security. The United States plays a critical role in developing Israel’s military, economic, and diplomatic power. Notwithstanding, this relationship is far broader and is based not only on interests, but also on common values.

Two core elements of Israel’s relations with the United States are challenged in recent years – bipartisan support and Israel’s relations with the American Jewish community. China-Israel ties pose a new challenge.

The close relations and American strategic support are among the building blocks of Israel’s regional deterrent posture and unique position. The developing relations between Israel and the Arab countries are to a large extent a result of United States-Israel relations.

Nevertheless, two core elements of Israel’s relations with the United States are challenged in recent years – bipartisan support and Israel’s relations with the American Jewish community. In addition, a more recent challenge has emerged – growing economic and technological ties between China and Israel. Viewing China as its primary strategic threat, the United States perceives China-Israel ties as endangering its interests and technologies.

The bipartisan support towards Israel and the alliance between the countries remains strong. However, there is a significant decline in public support for Israel among the ranks of the Democratic Party, including expanding and vocal criticism of Israel. Despite the deep friendship of the current administration, expressed in moving the American embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing the Golan Heights, the deep political polarization in the United States requires Israel to tread carefully to prevent turning the relationship into a partisan political issue that would harm relations.
Recommendations

Israel must apply a broad and inclusive approach vis-à-vis both the American political arena and the American Jewish community. Israel cannot allow itself to limit its outreach to Orthodox Jews and it must engage all Jewish religious movements.

Both Israel and American Jewry ought to recognize the severity of the crisis and work to resolve it. All parties should emancipate themselves from an unproductive dialogue based on accusations and rival claims of ‘victimhood’ that hardly encourages honest or effective dialogue. Rather, they should pursue the developing of a new joint vision, leveraging a common denominator of shared values.

On China – Israel must act with full transparency vis-à-vis the United States to allow the administration to assist Israel and to verify that American security interests are not being compromised.

Both Israel and American Jewry ought to recognize the severity of the crisis and work to resolve it. All parties should emancipate themselves from rival claims of ‘victimhood’ that hardly encourages effective dialogue. Rather, they should pursue a new joint vision, leveraging shared values.

To prevent turning the Chinese challenge into a threat to Israel and a crisis with the United States, the Israeli government ought to enhance oversight on importing advanced technological infrastructure (particularly 5G cellular networks) and on Chinese investments. Israel must act with full transparency vis-à-vis the United States to allow the administration to assist Israel and to verify that American security interests are not being compromised by Israel’s actions.
Regional Instability and Challenges

The Middle East remains in the throes of an ‘age of upheavals’. Instability has characterized the Middle East prior to the current regional turbulence, but it is deepening. Information Technology and the flow of information reflect cleavages in Middle East countries and often exacerbate them. With deepening religious and ethnic divisions and radicalism rampant that produce recurrent shockwaves and uncertainty, there is no peace on the horizon.

The countries in the region, particularly in the Gulf, are attempting to manufacture economic dynamism that can foster stability. However, without strong governance foundations and the ability to address public needs – employment, education, public services, clean water, and so forth – these countries will not be able to achieve stability.

With 70 percent of the region’s population under the age of 30, the domestic situation in Arab countries resembles a ‘pressure-cooker’. Under these circumstances, the legitimacy of Arab leaders is fragile. Furthermore, the prevalence of corruption weights heavy on the regimes and their ability to address domestic challenges. In the failure of the leadership to deal with corruption, the primary benefactors are the Islamist movements that claim to hold the high moral ground and leverage their status by calling for a more equitable distribution of resources and social justice.

Monarchies’ stability: To date, the region’s monarchies have weathered the turmoil. Their resilience stems from a combination of legitimacy, economic resources, and a modern tribal structure that supports the regimes. Nonetheless, a threat to the rule of the monarchies persists.

In Saudi Arabia, at this point, the rule of the Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MbS) seems stable and enjoys broad support among the young generation (in a country where two-thirds of the population is under the age of thirty). Despite this firm base, the rule of MbS in the Saudi Court is based on fear, rather than gradual development of consensus as in the past. There appear to be foci of resentment against his rule and the reforms he is leading. The domestic challenge might well increase after the departure of King Salman.
The Saudi regime, which in the past rested on a broad and unified royal family, depends today on one person. Contrary to the past, when it was possible to assess who will be the next leader, it remains unclear who would fill the void if the MbS would leave the stage. The top echelons of the Saudi Court are weak and the situation in Kuwait and Bahrain is in a similar state.

**Jordan** – In recent years, the King of Jordan faces growing challenges to the stability of his Kingdom – the burden of Syrian refugees, socioeconomic difficulties, limited aid from the Gulf countries, and domestic criticism targeting the Royal Court originating even from the Bedouin population, the backbone of the Kingdom.

Undermining the stability of Jordan will have negative repercussions for the entire region. The American “Deal of the Century” is increasing the pressure and concern in the Kingdom, with concern that the ‘deal’ could advance solutions to the Palestinian problem at Jordan’s expense.

**Syria** is submerged in the rubble and devastation left by its civil war; its recovery – with an estimated price tag of USD 250-400 billion – is not in the cards. As time passes, Iran infiltrates and fills the vacuum, expanding its influence through cheap projects that yield quick results on the ground.

**ISIS** – The collapse of the territorial emirate has not neutralized the threat ISIS poses as a terror organization. ISIS continues to exploit divisions, conflicts and poorly-governed territories to plan and execute terror attacks across the region and beyond.

**Regional Competition** – Meanwhile, the non-Arab forces in the region – Iran, Turkey, and Russia – are gaining clout and influence at the expense of Arab countries. The moderate Arab camp is divided and internally conflicted, while the radical camp led by Iran appears more homogenic and united.

In the absence of a coherent and clear American strategy and policy, the Middle East is becoming a more dangerous place. American resolve to guarantee the security and stability of the region appears to be declining. The Arab countries have taken note of the direction the United States is taking under Trump, to exit the region and its reluctance to assume the burden of securing freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Straits as America becomes less dependent on Middle East oil.

Meanwhile, Russia is filling the void left by the United States, but is an unreliable actor. The Europeans are not a dominant actor in the region and China is focused mainly on accruing economic clout.

**Pakistan as a threat** – Suffering from grave domestic challenges, Pakistan poses a regional threat. Pakistan is a *de-facto* nuclear state, with 46 percent illiteracy, 50 percent of youth school attendance, an economy on the verge of collapse, limited foreign reserves and dependence on foreign aid, with an army that controls the political sphere and focused on rivalry with India. The worst-case scenario for the Middle East is Pakistan engaging in nuclear and missile proliferation in exchange for energy and financial resources.
Recommendations

The top regional priority for Israel is to do all that is in its power to bolster Jordanian stability and counteract the processes weakening the Hashemite Court. There is no alternative to a stable Jordan in terms of Israel’s national security. Jordan prevents terror and military threats along Israel’s long Eastern border and provides strategic depth. From an Israeli perspective, Jordan’s stability is vital and a strategic asset for the stability of the entire Middle East.

In coordination with the United States here too, Israel should act to bolster the position of the Kingdom – persuade the Saudis to increase their support to Jordan, maintain the level of American support and to ascertain that the “Deal of the Century” does not undermine the position of the Kingdom in the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and does not advance the idea of Jordan becoming an ‘alternative homeland’ for the Palestinians. Israel also ought to prevent instability in the West Bank that might ‘spillover’ into Jordan.

Although the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East is debatable, it would be prudent to avoid imposing Western democratic concepts on Arab Middle East countries. Relative stability under strong autocratic leaders seems to be preferable to advancing democracy that might help pave the way to the ascent of reactionary and radical forces in the region.

While regional attention has shifted away from Syria towards the Gulf, it is important to keep the issue of Syrian (and Iraqi) rehabilitation on the international agenda.
In recent years, Israel’s relations with the Sunni Arab countries have experienced a turning point. The Arab leaders share with Israel a closely synchronized strategic map and shared threats: Iran and its Shiite proxies, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Sunni terror (al-Qaeda and ISIS).

Declining trust in American guarantees is also pushing them towards increased cooperation with Israel who is actively working to counter the threats. Against this backdrop, Israel has made remarkable gains building covert cooperation on security, intelligence sharing, and counter-terrorism with Arab countries. There has also been modest progress in the diplomatic realm, including official visits and participation in international sport events. Despite the broadening of relations, Israel needs real normalization. Currently, relations are based on a small number of senior officials. There are no formal military relations with the Gulf countries and people-to-people exchanges are very limited. The relations can be portrayed as a tree with a single root that might not withstand political turmoil.

Without resolving the Palestinian issue, which under current circumstances is not in the cards, there will be no progress towards normalization with Arab countries. The power of the Palestinians is in their weakness and they are expected to reject any proposal that will not live up to their national goals, no matter how attractive the financial incentives. Without Palestinian consent, the “Deal of the Century” will not be accepted and the Arab countries will not abandon the Palestinians and move ahead without them.

Overt relations with the Gulf countries and Israel’s acceptance as a legitimate polity in the region would be incredibly valuable for Israel. Nevertheless, such
a development is not risk-free. The Arab regimes might encounter instability and from a military perspective, the Arab military forces do not appear to be an asset, particularly not in a campaign against the Iranian threat.

Turkey would be a natural ally for the United States and Israel; however, the unbalanced leadership of Erdogan does not allow for resumption of Israeli-Turkish strategic relationship that flourished during the 1990s. Nevertheless, Israel has developed growing strategic, military, diplomatic, and economic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus.

**Recommendations**

Israel should preserve the covert security cooperation with the Arab countries, while seeking to establish formal ties with Arab military forces and pursuing open exchanges with Arab countries in various fields (diplomacy, economics, agriculture, tourism, and culture).

Providing a political horizon in the Palestinian arena based on the Two-State Solution would enhance ties with the Arab countries.
Russia – Friend or Foe?

The Russian forces arrived to Syria in 2015 to fight Sunni terror in order to counter any future flow of terrorists to Chechnya and Dagestan. In Putin’s mindset, he salvaged the Assad regime and prevented terror in Moscow. Furthermore, Russia controls two bases in Syria – naval and air – establishing an outlet to the Mediterranean that Russian Czars dreamed of for more than 100 years, but failed to achieve.

Unlike Iran, Russia does not consider Israel a strategic ally. Notwithstanding, Moscow does not wish to see an overly powerful Iran in Syria and allows Israel to challenge Iran’s entrenchment as long as it does not harm Russian soldiers and assets.

As a global power, Russia’s presence along its northern border is more of a challenge for Israel than an opportunity. With its advanced military capabilities in Syria, Russia is the only player in the region that challenges the IDF’s freedom of operation in dealing with one of Israel’s primary strategic threats – Iran’s effort to develop a ‘second front’ of missiles and terror along its northern border.

Apart from the threat of terror and global Jihad, Russia is mostly in a conflict of interest with Israel:

a. Moscow can be expected to continue to deepen its presence in Syria and strengthen the Assad regime and rebuild its army, including aspects that pose a direct threat to Israel.

b. Russia maintains strategic relations with Iran that go well beyond the Syrian arena – including Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea area, and more. In Syria, Iran provides ‘boots on the ground’ for Russia and Moscow is unable to end Iran’s presence there.

c. Russia seeks to undermine American dominance in the Middle East and to restore its own great power status which the Soviet Union held until the mid-1970s. In this respect, Russia might perceive Israel – America’s closest ally in the Middle East – as a problematic actor.

Russia’s *modus operandi* is to position itself as a regional powerbroker capable of engaging-courting all parties in light of its military and diplomatic capabilities to inflict harm. Thus, Russia consents to a certain scope of operation by Israel against Iran in Syria (so that Iran will not become too powerful), but at the same time, allows Iran to transfer advanced weaponry to Syria (destined for Lebanon), including heavy rockets, missiles, and drones.
Israel has a vital interest in preventing Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, while avoiding any military engagement with Russia. To preserve its freedom of operation, Israel operates a deconfliction mechanism with the Russia’s military in Syria and the two countries maintain close contact between their leaders to avoid misunderstandings.

Nevertheless, Israel has no alternative to its strategic alliance with the United States—a cornerstone of Israel’s national security. Israel also has an interest in preserving a dominant American role in the region. As a result, Israel limits its intelligence and technology exchanges with Russia and strictly maintains full transparency with the United States on its exchanges with Russia.

In crisis contingencies, Russia might limit the freedom of operation of Israel and of its adversaries—exact a price from all the actors. This will position Russia as the only effective broker that can mediate and achieve a ceasefire, even if it lacks significant political and economic leverage. In operational terms, Russia could deploy its forces in a way that would blur the lines between its own forces and those of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. Russia might even provide Russian arm systems to its allies or transfer such systems to their control.

Russia’s strategic conduct in the Middle East consists of several principles. First, Russia preserves a manageable level of conflict in the region—sufficient to provide Russia with a role, without threatening its interests or assets. Second, Russia positions itself as a broker that can engage all relevant stakeholders and limit their freedom of operation. Thirdly, Russia engages in the use of force in a geographically-focused theater yielding a high cost-benefit ratio.

Recommendations

Israel should preserve its freedom of operation vis-à-vis Russia through the deconfliction mechanism with the Russian military forces in the region and continue to maintain a close and regular dialogue between the leaders.

Continue limiting the intelligence and technology exchanges with Russia, while maintaining full transparency with the United States.
The Great Power Rivalry

The United States’ rivalry with China extends beyond the trade issue. Emerging trends point to a severe evolving economic and strategic bipolar rivalry. This rivalry taking shape involves wide-ranging competition over the world order, technological supremacy, and control of global networks of manufacturing and trade. Over the past year, China has encouraged harsh anti-American rhetoric in its government-controlled social media. Meanwhile, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in the United States that views China as the primary strategic threat to America’s national security.

The apparent compromise in the trade dispute in the offing will probably not end the rivalry between the powers. China demonstrates resolve and self-confidence in its ability to challenge America. The Americans consider China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) as a strategy designed to bolster China’s position in the bipolar rivalry.

The two countries’ ‘soft power’ and their ability to develop partnerships and alliances will shape the rivalry to a large extent. President Trump’s attitude towards American allies in Europe and Asia and the doubts he has created, as to whether America’s European and Asian allies can depend on the United States, have harmed America’s position in the rivalry. In the long-term, however, China appears as a rigid, authoritarian and mercantilist regime that lacks the required soft power. Several countries that have become dependent on China following loans and infrastructure projects are attempting to lessen their dependence. Despite of tensions between Washington and Delhi, China’s attempts to warm-up its relations with India have failed. Consequently, China’s ability to expand its power and influence beyond the Asian arena is doubtful, while the United States is likely to continue to maintain a leading position due to its stronger projection of soft power. This would be particularly true if the administration would adjust its attitude towards its allies.
Unlike China, the United States does not view Russia as a long-term strategic threat, in light of its economic and societal weakness. The Americans were even willing to explore the possibility of cooperation and coordination with Russia in the Middle East. For instance, the United States, Russia, and Israel held a trilateral meeting of national security advisors in Jerusalem in June to discuss regional issues. However, due to evidence of Russian interference in American electoral politics, the American administration’s capacity to advance cooperation with Russia is limited.

In the wake of global economic crisis, Europe has lost much of its influence on the world stage and in the Middle East. The economic crisis exposed European societies’ vulnerability to nationalist positions and populist sentiment. Nevertheless, the European Union maintains an important role in global trade and regulatory issues that are a major dimension of the great power rivalry. Furthermore, the results of elections for the European Parliament held in May demonstrated there is still considerable public support behind the European Union. Irrespective of President Trump’s position, there is broad and mutual recognition on both sides of the Atlantic regarding the commonality of interests and values. Thus, the understanding that China’s policies and actions could pose a threat to European interests as well, is increasingly shared by European leaders. On this issue, there is growing willingness in Europe to cooperate with the United States.

In the emerging great power rivalry, Israel’s position ought to be clear and simple: Considering its strategic alliance with America and its shared interests and values with the West, Israel should side with the United States and Europe.

The Global Economy

The current state of the global economy is complex and fluid from both the short- and long-term perspectives. In the short-term, the global economy has registered a decline in growth rates, but a global recession is unlikely before the end of 2020.

Expert analysis suggests that the likelihood of China and the United States resolving their trade-related disputes is not high. China has shown a rigid position regarding American demands to cease discriminatory policies that contradict the principles of free and fair trade.

Several developments in the European economy could cast a shadow over the global economy. The implications of BREXIT and a potential Italian debt crisis might inflict damage on the entire European economy. Unlike the previous crisis that mainly involved medium-size and small economies in Europe, Italy, which holds the highest debt among members of the European Union, is one of the largest economies on the continent.

In the longer run, assuming the rivalry between the United States and China will heat up, the scenario of economic decoupling and the emergence of two economic poles in the global arena will become increasingly likely.
In the longer run, assuming the rivalry between the United States and China will heat up, the scenario of economic decoupling and the emergence of two economic poles in the global arena will become increasingly likely. Decoupling will carry grave economic ramifications. Although according to current projections China’s economy is expected to surpass the American economy in the course of the next decade, decoupling will harm China more than it will harm the American economy. Furthermore, China will have to contend with the ramifications of its past “one child” policy that has created a demographic time bomb.

The World Order

It seems premature to proclaim the demise of the liberal world order that the United States established and led following the Second World War, even though the current American president is not committed to it. Following the end of the Cold War, the prevailing assumption was that the liberal democracies were resilient and that the global spread of democratic values, the Rule of Law, and human rights was inevitable. This assumption has now been refuted. In fact, liberal democracies are fighting to preserve their basic values, although these values remain as relevant and vital as ever. Democracies – although under assault at home and from abroad – continue to cooperate to advance common interests, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and promoting free and fair trade.

China-Israel Relations

Over the past few years, China and Israel have enhanced their relations on two levels – both the dialogue between leaders and economic and commercial cooperation. However, these relations have raised concerns, questions and criticism within the American administration of Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects and possible acquisition of sensitive Israeli technologies by Chinese corporations. The dialogue with the American administration exposed a lack of information regarding Chinese investments in Israeli technology and start-up firms that Israel needs to clarify. There is no dispute regarding the importance of China-Israel commercial and investment relations. However, as relations between the United States and China deteriorate, Israel must tread softly, adapt and seek to develop relations with China without harming its own interests or those of the United States. Israel’s maneuverability vis-à-vis China will narrow, and Israel will have to navigate a path that can accommodate the interests of China, the United States, and Israel together.

As relations between the United States and China deteriorate, Israel must tread softly, adapt and seek to develop relations with China without harming its own interests or those of the United States.
Israel’s Relations with Europe

European-Israeli relations rest on a combination of common interests and values, against the backdrop of historical memory.

The official position of the European Union remains critical of Israel. Israel does not accept the European linkage of deepening relations with Israel hinging on Israel advancing the peace process with the Palestinians. Nevertheless, and despite the ongoing European crisis, the European Union is an important actor for Israel.

Elections for the European Parliament demonstrated the continued vitality of the European Union and its broad domestic base of support. For Israel, Europe is a major destination of its exports and a primary partner in technological R&D. Broadening cooperation among its members in the field of defense creates new opportunities for Israel.

Alongside Israel’s special relations with key member-states of the European Union, top among them Germany, Israel has deepened its relations with several other European countries. Israel and Greece – along with Cyprus, have developed a unique relationship that has weathered coalition changes in Greece. These relations contribute not only to Israel’s economy, but also to its national security.

The Cyber Race

Cyber threats are mounting and proliferating. Cybercrime is exacting an increasing cost around the globe – estimated at two trillion USD. Cyber targets are also expanding. A decade ago, vulnerable critical infrastructure consisted of physical infrastructure – energy, transportation, and healthcare networks. The West is almost completely dependent on digital infrastructure that is extremely vulnerable to cyber threats.

Today, the most critical infrastructure vulnerable to cyber threats is public trust as cyber threats target electoral systems, financial markets, government systems, and healthcare providers. This is amplified by increasing dissemination of fake news into mainstream media outlets in an attempt to shape national agendas and public perceptions. The adversaries and enemies of the West are less dependent on digital infrastructure and public trust. Thus, cyber threats add a new dimension to the asymmetric relations between the West and its adversaries.

A new form of cyber threats challenges most-recent technological innovation – Artificial Intelligence (AI). The world is starting to witness AI electronic warfare – of ‘AI vs. AI’ – that targets and attacks algorithms.
Anti-Semitism

The prevalence of anti-Semitic incidents – including violent incidents – is on the rise across the world. The sources of anti-Semitism are not uniform – ranging from radical groups on the Left and Right, to radical Islam – the common denominator being hatred of Jews. In this context, the “New anti-Semitism” – based on hatred to Israel and anti-Zionism – is spreading virally. This is ‘old’ anti-Semitism in new clothes – hatred towards the sole Jewish state among the nations. As anti-Semitism spreads, there is growing understanding among American and European leaders as to the true meaning of the threat – which does not target Jews and Israel alone, but also the very identity and core values of Western societies.
A special off-the-record session explored possible game-changers and potential turning points – with roots in the current reality of the Middle East, but if realized could become a strategic surprise.

The Fall of the Saudi Crown Prince – the rule of MbS appears to be stable and has won broad support among the young generation. However, MbS' rule within the royal court is a one-man-show (resting on fear of the crown prince, rather than gradual consensus-building as in the past). There appear to be clusters of resentment against MbS and his reforms among the extended royal family. The internal challenge could well increase following the eventual departure of King Salman. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that MbS will be able to create six million new jobs in a global competitive world.

Deep Instability in Jordan – Jordan is extremely vulnerable, and domestic instability might reach a tipping point. Some contend that Saudi Arabia, in fact, supports radical forces; while Saudi Arabia understands the importance of Jordan, the aid it provides is negligible by comparison. This state of affairs reflects deep emotional residue with historical roots.

Saudi-Iranian rapprochement – Erosion of Saudi trust in America’s commitment to its security could prompt the Saudis to seek a rapprochement with Iran, however, closer relations will likely be short-lived, considering Saudi Arabia will never consent to Iranian-Shiite domination in the Middle East.

Return of Regional Turmoil – The Middle East, where 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30, is a tinderbox; renewed turmoil could break out and spread, fed by growing frustration among the young generation at the failure of the regimes to provide for their needs.

A Second Trump Term (Yes or No?) – With Trump leaving a major mark on the shape of global and Middle East affairs – the outcome of the upcoming presidential election in the United States might produce a turning-point in the Middle East.

Russian Withdrawal from the Middle East

Chinese-led massive regional economic development
Some 40,000 asylum seekers from Africa reside in Israel, most of them from Eritrea and Sudan. Both countries are dictatorships that repress their citizens. “Israel at Heart” is a NGO dedicated to improving Israel’s standing in the world. Through humanitarian work, “Israel at Heart” advocates the rights of African asylum seekers in Israel and supports their education. The organization provides scholarships for academic education (and IDC Herzliya was the first academic institution to enroll African asylum seekers as students). The organization believes that supporting African asylum seekers will also make them good ambassadors of Israel in the world, helping to combat the anti-Israeli BDS movement. Eventually, when these African asylum seekers will be able to repatriate, they will be able to promote democracy in their respective countries.

In cooperation with “Israel at Heart”, the 19th Herzliya Conference featured a special session to present success stories of African students in Israel. Four African asylum seekers participated in the session and shared their stories:

**Alhaji Fofana** – 39-year-old from Ivory Coast, married and father of two, who has earned a bachelor degree in Communications at IDC Herzliya and is pursuing a graduate degree. He arrived to Israel in 2006 during the civil war in his country.

**Melat Mikael** – a 21-year-old undergraduate student at IDC Herzliya. Her mother is Ethiopian and her father is Eritrean. During her childhood, her family moved to Sudan. When riots began there in 2008, her family made their way to Israel when she was age ten. On the way to Israel, her father passed away. Today, her mother and her three little brothers live in Ethiopia. Raised in Israel, Melat considers herself Israeli and is frustrated and disappointed that the IDF refused to enlist her because she is not an Israeli citizen.

**Mutasim Ali** – 32-year-old from Darfur, Sudan. He arrived to Israel ten years ago and was granted residency in Israel. He earned a bachelor degree in Law from the Academic Center for Law and Business and was recently admitted to graduate Law studies at George Washington University. Before receiving his residency, he was held for two years in detention facilities in southern Israel.

**Monim Harron** – a 30-year-old undergraduate student in Political Science and Business Administration at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He arrived to Israel from Darfur, Sudan seven years ago, after studying at a university in Sudan and suffering from political persecution. He was held for two-and-a-half years in detention facilities in southern Israel. His family remained in Sudan.
The session dealt with the students’ personal success stories, as their admission to academic studies was, in itself, a remarkable achievement. Before arriving to Israel, their lives and personal security were in grave and constant danger. They pointed out that in Israel they enjoyed personal security and freedom of expression – experiences they were deprived in other countries on their escape route. The students told the audience that the asylum seekers that have entered Israel try to integrate into the Israeli society and learn Hebrew. Their children celebrate Israeli-Jewish holidays, study at Israeli schools and participate in programs that bring together African asylum seekers and Israelis.

Nevertheless, the students portrayed arduous living conditions in Israel. Following the construction of the wall along the Egyptian-Israeli border, the flow of asylum seekers from Africa has completely stopped. The current estimate of African asylum seekers living in Israel stands at 40,000 people. Many asylum seekers were held for extensive periods in detainment centers in southern Israel. At the detainment centers they were not able to learn Hebrew and their freedoms were withdrawn. Asylum seekers without residency status must renew their visas every two months – and those visas do not permit them to work. They live in constant uncertainty and are subject to deportation every two months. The students told the audience that there are not entitled to medical insurance and cannot receive medical assistance except for first aid. In 2017, the government introduced the deposit law for asylum seekers requiring them to deduct 20 percent of their salaries towards a savings fund that will be returned to them upon their departure from Israel. These circumstances impose an additional hardship on earning their livelihood and they remain concerned that they will never receive these funds. The feeling among most asylum seekers is that the government’s attitude towards them is motivated by political considerations.

One cannot separate the topic of this session from discussion of the resilience of the Israeli society, which is a major theme of the Herzliya Conference. The State of Israel does not formally recognize the vast majority of asylum seekers as refugees and considers them illegal migrants. As such, the government contends that the asylum seekers do not meet the criteria of refugees according to international law. The government portrays its activities against asylum seekers as defending the Zionist enterprise and the Jewish character of Israel. This is based on concern that waves of asylum seekers could change the demographics of Israel. In addition, Israelis living in the southern neighborhoods of Tel Aviv (where most of the asylum seekers reside), are apprehensive as the character of their neighborhoods are changing and asylum seekers have taken over the public areas; the veteran residents charge that their neighborhoods have become no-man-lands neglected by the authorities. Meanwhile, the asylum seekers feel that they contribute to Israel and work in jobs that most Israelis do not wish to work.

The chair and moderator of the session, Joey Low, founder of “Israel at Heart” pointed out that the mission of the organization is not to open the borders to additional asylum seekers, but to treat those who have already entered Israel properly. In his remarks, Joey Low explained that he was guided by what his parents taught him were Jewish values and what it meant to be a Jew.
"It is a pretty consequential time in the security environment, here in the region but also globally. One of the things that I find particularly challenging in my role in the Defense Department is looking at the global environment. In my life this is the most dangerous and uncertain it has been. The biggest muscle movement or concern that we have is the return of great power competition around the world... In recent years, really since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we've gone through an unusual period, probably for some three decades, in which we didn't have the specter of conflict amongst the largest, most powerful militaries in the world. That unfortunately returned and we see competition across the globe.

Since 9.11.2001, we in the Defense Department have been very focused on the threat from terrorism, and the threat from terrorism remains a very grave concern of ours and we are engaged around the world combating it. But, in term of threats that could change our way of life, that could remake America and America's friends and allies' way of life, China is the largest concern...

China is increasingly challenging international order and our values such as free movement of people and ideas, respect for human rights, and sovereignty.

In the military sphere, beside the tremendous growth in its capabilities, China contests free navigation and aviation, and militarized the South China Sea despite promises by President Xi. The One Belt One Road Initiative... well China wants to own the road and control the belt. And the American vision is many belts, many roads.

For us in the United States, the long-term threat from China is the greatest national security threat that we face. China ambitions are to become a global power and over time to replace the U.S. as the preeminent global power.

The Chinese have shown interest in Israeli technology and in certain commercial dealings in Israel. We plan to maintain a very robust level of economic trade and investments in the U.S. from Chinese companies... But we have seen concerning Chinese behavior around the world in the ties between their security services and what is nominally the private sector.

Both the U.S. and Israel were a little slower to recognize the challenge. The Israeli government officials are listening to our concerns, sympathetic to them, and we are having good collaboration in this area. But it is going to be a continuing challenge... and there will be more and more areas that we have got to work together to address..."
The resilience of the State of Israel requires a framework of agreed-upon basic values as a precondition for the kind of national unity that can stand firm even in the face of disagreement. Today I am going to argue that we had such a foundation; it is called the Declaration of Independence. This seminal and vital document has been undermined by the Nation-State Law as a result of capitulation to the ultra-Orthodox community. This capitulation has opened the floodgates and is part of a dangerous trend of legal and constitutional changes that could jeopardize Israeli democracy and rock the foundations of national consensus. It is important that we address this issue seriously, without being dragged into election rhetoric.

Following the UN resolution that recognized the Jewish state, the Arabs declared a holy jihad to annihilate the Zionist entity. Whilst engaged in battle, and in the knowledge that the following day the Arab armies would join the war against us, on the 14th of May 1948, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel came into effect. The Declaration of Independence is the national credo that accompanied the fighters of the fiercest and most brutal war in the history of the state. Had we been defeated, it would likely have been the end of the Jewish people. After the Holocaust, this was indeed the last battle.

The Declaration of Independence is not simply a statement conveying a war of liberation. The Declaration of Independence is the second most important document in the history of the Jewish people after the Ten Commandments. The caste of Jewish slaves in Egypt was organized by Moses, who led them to rebel against their fate and guided them on their journey to the land of their forefathers. The Zionist revolution, led by Herzl, accomplished something unbelievable and unprecedented in the history of nations when it brought a fragmented and persecuted nation, who had suffered much bloodshed throughout its 2000 years in exile, back to its historic homeland. Among the Jews who left Egypt, there were those who dissented and craved a return to the reality of slavery with which they were familiar; the Zionist movement also encountered resistance, this time from ultra-Orthodox movements who preferred to wait for mercy from above in order to achieve salvation.

The Declaration of Independence expresses the values of Zionism. The movement was born out of the Enlightenment - the Jews’ departure from the ghettos allowed for their rapid entry into the elite of Western society, and with it their exposure to enlightenment and progress. Many of them rebelled against the totality of the Halacha and the leadership of the rabbinate, but they continued to see themselves as members of the Jewish people, loyal to its shared history, culture and values. For them, the essence of Judaism was national identity, devotion to the Land of Israel, the Hebrew language, the preservation of ethnic distinctiveness, humanistic values and traditions related to the land. The concept of the Jews as a nation lay at the root of the national activism that produced a practical and diplomatic movement that led to the settlement of the country, the building of defense forces, and international recognition of the
Jewish state. Following the Zionist doctrine, the Declaration of Independence expresses the fulfillment of the generations-old desire to “be a free people in our homeland” while guaranteeing a life of liberty and equality for all. The Declaration of Independence reflects the aspiration to be a moral, exemplary society, committed to the basic principles it outlines:

“The State of Israel will be open to Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions...”

The declaration of the founding of the Jewish state includes the basic values of the state. The declaration was signed by the representatives of all the political parties in Israel. The values of the declaration were seen as having constitutive validity, as an inextricable part of the establishment of the State of Israel.

A number of proposed bills were submitted ahead of the passing of the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Each one included the assertion that the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people and the Jewish people alone, each contained references to Jewish sovereignty, and each mentioned the principles laid out in the Declaration of Independence. The Nation-State Bill could therefore have been perceived as reinforcing and ratifying the Declaration of Independence.

At the last minute, ahead of the Knesset vote, all of the references to the Declaration of Independence in the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Each one included the assertion that the State of Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people and the Jewish people alone, each contained references to Jewish sovereignty, and each mentioned the principles laid out in the Declaration of Independence. The Nation-State Bill could therefore have been perceived as reinforcing and ratifying the Declaration of Independence.

The problem is that the Basic Law, which defines the essence of the nation-state of the Jewish people, encompasses primarily the symbolic, external side of the state, but ignores, in contrast to the proposed Nation-State Bill, its moral essence. Therefore, any constitutional-judicial oversight of violations of the principles of the Declaration of Independence is avoided, and only the bare, national message remains. What happened, then, in the short time between the proposed Nation-State Bill and its passing into law? There is no argument about the facts. In order to pass the Basic Law by a majority of 61 MKs, the Likud appealed to the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties. Their compliance was conditional on the removal of the reference to the Declaration of Independence. And who did the deletion of the mention of the Declaration of Independence serve?

Firstly, the ultra-Orthodox camp. The ultra-Orthodox disapprove of the declaration mainly because it does not determine that the regime of the State of Israel be based on the written and oral laws of the Torah, and that the Torah’s commandments and laws be applied to all areas of life; it also refrains from mentioning the name of God.
Removing the mention of the Declaration of Independence and its values constitutes a tremendous victory for the ultra-Orthodox worldview. Although the Nation-State Law does not restore dominance to the ultra-Orthodox, it does erase the free, liberal, equality-embracing character from the definition of the state. What we see here is an expression of the historical ultra-Orthodox disapproval of the state and the Zionist movement.

A second group that certainly benefits from this deletion is the Messianic religious camp. This group, via a band of rabbis on the seam line, is trying to undermine the Zionist narrative by proposing an alternative one: that the return to Zion is a religious phenomenon. Unlike the ultra-Orthodox, who see Zionism as an invalid secular phenomenon, the Messianic people see it as an act of divine providence. Whether or not the heretical Zionists are seen as the donkey upon which the Messiah will arrive, the belief that religion and state are intertwined prevailed. The final wording of the Nation-State Law determined that the Jewish people are entitled to define themselves religiously. This definition, by law, will probably be nationally binding. After the passing of the neutered version of the Nation-State Law, MK Smutrich, understandably, considered himself able to declare the establishment of a Halachic state. A practical interpretation of the law would not negate this.

It is worth asking how the prime minister agreed to pass the Nation-State Law without mentioning the principles of the Declaration of Independence. The prime minister apparently saw the importance of passing the law with only the coalition votes. In this way, during the election campaign the Likud would appear as representing the national camp, with the left appearing as anti-national. The move was a media success. The absurdity is that an agreement with the camp that is actually opposed to Zionism, which led to the removal of the reference to the Declaration of Independence - which expresses Zionism in its original form - was portrayed as a nationalistic move, while supporters of the Declaration of Independence were seen as opponents. There is no doubt that Netanyahu understood the significance of this move. A responsible leader would try to form a broad consensus when it comes to defining the nation state, one that transcends narrow political interests. Indeed, this was hypocritical political manipulation.

A similar question could be asked of former Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked. On August 29, 2017, at an Israeli Bar Association conference kicking off the new year, Minister Shaked stated: "My ambition is to see Israel as a strong nation state ... and alongside that, one that grants its citizens all the individual rights that it undertook to protect in the Declaration of Independence, the greatest constitutive document of our nation - for all its citizens: Jews, Druze, Muslims, Christians. And because of this duty, there is of course not, nor can there be, a political dispute."

The Nation-State Bill that Ayelet Shaked drafted, together with MKs Yariv Levin and Robert Iltov, did indeed include a reference to the principles of the Declaration of Independence. So how did it disappear? How did Ayelet Shaked end up supporting the deletion of the document that she calls "the greatest constitutive document of our nation?"

The truth must be stated. An evil wind has been blowing lately, one that is changing the values of the State of Israel. The Nation-State Law is blatantly detached from the national credo, the moral foundation upon
which the illustrious Zionist enterprise was built. We are heading down an unknown path. Democracies die slowly, and the process is usually fanned by the hot flames of nationalism, religious extremism, and media incitement. Turkey, Poland and Hungary are ahead of us - we are not there yet, but we are already walking down the same path.

The major deterioration in these three countries began with the perception that the will of the majority, as expressed in parliament or the Knesset, is the true essence of the democracy. This will compels all of the country’s authorities as well as the conduct of the people. The next step is to come out against anyone who dares to object to what has been accepted as the will of the people and interferes with the elected government’s ability to rule. Hence, the constitutional violations and even takeovers of the constitutional courts in Turkey, Poland and Hungary, the purging of the gatekeeping leadership, that is, the appointment of disciplined loyalists to the heads of the police, the Attorney General’s Office, and the intelligence agencies, and of course the replacement of military commanders. The public media in these countries is transformed into a government propaganda tool and a regulatory system established to protect so-called national freedom of expression. In Poland, non-profit organizations and research institutes have become subjugated to the political hegemony, and the government controls the funds that these organizations receive. In Hungary, the new constitution states that all state bodies have a duty to protect Hungary’s self-identity and Christian culture. In Poland and Hungary, electoral laws were changed to consolidate the victory of the so-called national-religious democracies. It is important to note that all of the changes that took place in these countries came step by step, by virtue of seemingly legitimate legislation by the legislative branch.

This development sounds familiar; the wind is blowing in this direction. Here is the truth: without checks and balances, we and our children will live in a different world, a world without freedom. The State of Israel will not be an exemplary state and will not reflect the dream that we were prepared to sacrifice ourselves for. In Israel, too, they preach that the laws of the Knesset are the will of the people. In our coalition system, the Knesset is not the one to decide, but rather upholds the will of the government, while the government is often controlled by a minority of ministers. Here, even the majority needs protection.

We should take a look at the rhetoric of the Israeli government and at the changing reality of the law, and say a few words about the nationalist-religious connection and its consequences. The Supreme Court is being attacked for not being nationalistic enough; it is claimed that it should not have the authority to disqualify unconstitutional Knesset laws, and that the government should have the power to reject court decisions, according to the new justice minister, if they are perceived as being too radical. Some are even demanding that there be a clause allowing any judicial decision to be overridden by a majority of 61 MKs. There is a process underway to delegitimize the gatekeepers: the police, the prosecution, and the Attorney General. Along the way, bills will be proposed that seek to change the ways we select judges and attorney generals, limit people’s rights to appeal to the Supreme Court, and determine issues that cannot go to court. We have already passed legislation restricting human rights organizations, the government has tried to take control of the public media and directly influence other media outlets, and we have experienced the reality of a cultural commissar.

Where does all this come from? Part of it is due to a violation of the principle that legislation is not intended to advance personal interests, propelled by the prime minister’s “He’s Innocent” campaign.
But on a deeper level, the ultra-Orthodox resentment of the secular courts has come to the surface. Even Ovadia Yosef, a major religious figure, considered a moderate, spoke out blatantly against the Supreme Court in the past. According to him, the court is an unelected body that brings disaster upon us. There is also the movement for the autonomy of the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox community, who want civil judicial power, while the Messianic-religious movement are revving the engines of their D9 tractors. In the ultra-Orthodox world, democracy is only the rule of the majority in the Knesset. They make the majority decisions so that disagreements are settled for the sake of public peace and conflict prevention. They do not accept judicial constitutional oversight, and they reject the value of equality. In their eyes, there is only one constitution for Israel and that is the Torah. Today, coalition builders and other politicians are adopting this view.

When Minister Arieh Deri’s appeal was rejected and he was sent to prison, a small group of his Shas supporters tried to break into the Supreme Court. Not long after, a huge protest of tens of thousands of ultra-Orthodox convened outside of the Supreme Court. I feared there would be another attempt to break into the court. We recruited 7,000 people to attend a protest at the nearby Sacker Garden. I told people, “If there is a break-in at the Supreme Court, we will defend it with our bodies.” The ultra-Orthodox ended up making do with a demonstration of power and defiance by mass prayer. We folded up our banners. We will not hesitate to fly them once again and defend the court, defend Israeli democracy.

All my life I have seen in the Declaration of Independence an expression of the Israeli social contract and the definition of our common spirit. When I founded IDC Herzliya, I saw it as a Zionist university, the original Zionism as defined in the Declaration of Independence. We will stay true to our path and we will tell the truth. Today we call for the enactment of a one-sentence Basic Law: The Declaration of Independence of May 14th, 1948 is a Basic Law. Let us resolve to only vote for parties that commit to passing this Basic Law. If we demand, if we will it, our goal will be realized. Our hope is not yet lost; we have not yet lost our hope of being a free people in our country.
Appendix C

Perspectives on Egypt’s Foreign Policy towards the Middle East

Statement by Khaled Azmi, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt

It is my pleasure to be here today, to deliver the opening statement of your conference and to share with you some perspectives on the key questions and the guiding principles that governs Egypt’s foreign policy towards our region.

As your conference’s theme rightly indicates, we are definitely navigating in a very turbulent region, and we certainly need, in such a confused and exposed environment, to formulate a new course based on some guiding principles to meet the ever-growing challenges of our times, and to build a better future for the region.

Few years ago, the dynamics that governed the Middle East for some decades were profoundly changed. Initially, a large wave of societal change swept the region launching a unique historic moment and a dramatic chain of events that were both promising and alarming.

In parallel, the experience of the last few years has also demonstrated beyond any doubt that undermining the institutions of the nation states creates a vacuum that is quickly filled by non-state actors, sectarian militias, and terrorist organizations, whose ideologies are hostile and utterly opposed to the hopes of the people for a better future and modernization.

The patterns we all observed in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen, are abound. The challenge remains, however, of how to secure the benefits of this wave of change while minimizing the cost thereof.

Our approach in Egypt to this question was based on two main principles:

First, that orderly change is the much-needed prerequisite to fulfilling the aspirations of millions of young people in the Middle East, a region in which more than 60 per cent of the population are under the age of 30.

The Second is that orderly change should be based on keeping the integrity and the stability of the nation state to achieve the much needed and desired progress. The challenge, therefore, is to achieve change within the nation states, not on the ruins thereof.

Egypt, through the two waves of its revolution in 2011 and 2013, demonstrated that a progressive change that responds to the aspirations of the vast majority of the population while maintaining the integrity of the nation state is a viable choice.
Ladies and Gentlemen,

The foreign policy of this invigorated, reformed and revived Egypt is guided by principles that are deeply embedded in our long history and values, strictly committed to the principles of peace, development, respect for the independence of nations, and non-intervention in their affairs. We also believe that there are always opportunities for regional and international cooperation to meet the challenges of our times.

However, the conduct of our foreign policy is grounded in the recognition that it unfolds in the context of profound regional transformation. We face today a situation of tremendous flux, unprecedented perhaps since the creation of present day regional state system in the Middle East a hundred years ago.

Regional politics are becoming increasingly sectarian with profound impact on its long-standing conflicts. While conflicts between states are open to the possibilities of negotiated solutions, conflicts based on primordial identity more often defy compromise and become increasingly intractable.

In parallel, we are witnessing a trend towards increasing regional fragmentation, which in turn provides for an enabling environment for trans-national threats, particularly terrorism, that prosper in the ungoverned spaces and safe havens produced by weak or collapsing state structures.

Finally, these numerous challenges are unfolding amidst the region’s own looming resource crisis, particularly water, which will be a defining feature of the region’s future landscape.

In navigating this complex regional setting, Egypt is formulating its regional diplomacy, based neither on narrow sectarian interests, nor on the politicization of religion. Rather it will seek to project its role based on a political model founded on the values of a civil state that is inclusive of all its citizens irrespective of gender, race or creed.

Exactly six years ago, on the 30th of June 2013, the overwhelming popular will of the Egyptian people reinforced our identity, formed by a rich civilization that spans millennia, through embracing once more tolerance and moderation, while rejecting attempts by some to fundamentally alter it. This historical experience has shaped both the attitudes and behavior of Egypt toward the region and the world.

What guides our approach to the unprecedented simultaneous regional crises, being in Syria, Libya or Yemen and elsewhere, is the tested principle that revived and reformed nation states are the answer to the aspirations of the wave of change that swept the region some eight years ago. Our vision for the way forward to solve those crises is based on two pillars:

The first is to preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of those states.

The second is to support the legitimate aspirations of the people in rebuilding their own state through an acceptable political solution that revive an all-inclusive modern nation state based on civic ethics and full citizenship, which will provide an enabling environment for reconstruction efforts.
Given the strategic importance of the Middle East, it is only natural that some powers may want to be involved in seeking to influence the course of developments in our region. Egypt stands ready to fully support all sincere efforts aimed at resolving the region's crises, and to protect nation states in the region from the forces of extremism and sectarian fragmentation, which provides a fertile ground for the proliferation of terrorism. In so doing, we cannot accept any attempt by some actors to use sub-state entities, sectarian militias, and terrorist organizations to further their interests, threatening the security of our people and the stability of our region.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The quest for reformed and modernized nation statehood is not only the answer to the emerging threats in the Middle East, it is also the answer to the oldest of the conflicts in our region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Contrary to conventional wisdom, resolving the conflict cannot be put on hold as we deal with other challenges emerging throughout the region. Doing so will only further radicalize the region's politics and strain the already precarious foundation of regional stability.

Resolving the conflict through a just, comprehensive solution that realizes both the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians to establish their sovereign state on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital; as well as realizing the aspirations of Israelis to live in peace, security; will provide a tangible new reality for both people, as well as to the peoples of the region.

This comprehensive settlement should be based on the two-state solution, the agreements signed between the two parties, the Arab Peace Initiative, and relevant international resolutions. The alternative is an open-ended turmoil even if, in the short term, things look deceptively manageable.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let conclude by emphasizing that we need to build a shared vision for the Middle East, one based on pluralism and respect for its ethnic and religious diversity, free from extremism and reconciled to play a constructive role in global peace and security.

In this spirit, Egypt is looking forward to a Middle East free from all threats to its stability and progress; a Middle East where all peoples enjoy their living within secured borders; a Middle East immune to political terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic chauvinism; a Middle East in which there is no place for nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Such is the Middle East for which Egypt is hoping to attain in cooperation with her regional and global partners.
**Conference Program**

## Plenary Sessions

### Opening Ceremony

Prof. Uriel Reichman, President & Founder, IDC Herzliya  
Prof. Boaz Ganor, Dean, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy, Founder & Executive Director, Institute for CounterTerrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya  
Mr. Moshe Fadlon, Mayor of Herzliya  
**MC:** Mr. Jonathan Davis, Vice President for External Relations and Head of the Raphael Recanati International School, IDC Herzliya

### Statement

H.E. Khaled Azmi, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt to Israel

### One-on-One: Speaker of the Knesset

MK Yuli (Yoel) Edelstein, Speaker of the Knesset  
*With* Mr. Udi Segal, Chief Political Analyst & Anchor, Reshet 13 TV; Sammy Ofer School of Communications, IDC Herzliya

### The Importance of Trust as a Building Block for Society

HerzliyaTalk  
Prof. Dan Ariely, James B. Duke Professor of Psychology and Behavioral Economics, Duke University, USA

### Will Israel Win the Next War?

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yair Golan, Former Deputy Chief of IDF General Staff  
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Eshel, Former Commander, Israeli Air Force  
Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, Former Head of Israel National Security Council  
Mr. Amos Harel, Military Correspondent and Defense Analyst, Haaretz Daily  
**Moderator:** Mr. Yoav Limor, TV Anchor and Senior Defense Correspondent

### Breaking the Glass Ceiling – In Science and Life

Prof. Marcelle Machluf, Dean, Faculty of Biotechnology and Food Engineering and Head of the Cancer Drug Delivery & Cell Based Technologies, Technion

### Strategic Arena: The Middle East – Is the Writing on the Wall?

Amb. Dr. Dennis Ross, Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute; Former Special Assistant to President Obama and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf Region; CoChair, Jewish People Policy Institute (JPP), USA  
Mr. Tamir Pardo, Former Director of the Mossad  
Mr. Brett McGurk, Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, USA  
Amb. Husain Haqqani, Director, South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute; Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States  
Dr. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND Corporation, USA  
Prof. Eyal Zisser, Vice Rector & Professor of Contemporary History of the Middle East, Tel Aviv University  
Amb. Dr. Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO, Former Ambassador of the UK to Saudi Arabia  
Dr. Kori Schake, Deputy Director General, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK  
Prof. Bingbing WU, Special Research Fellow, Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, China  
**Moderators:**  
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya  
Mr. Tommy Steiner, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

### The Attorney General and the Rule of Law

Dr. Avichai Mandelblit, Attorney General, Ministry of Justice

### Conversation with the President of Israel

H.E. Reuven (Ruvi) Rivlin, President of the State of Israel  
*With* Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director and Chairman of the Herzliya Conference Series, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya
Briefing for Ambassadors & Business Executives

Keynote Address

Ms. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Chairwoman, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Germany
The speech will be delivered in German and simultaneously translated to English.

Keynote Address

Lt. Gen. (res.) Benjamin Gantz, Blue and White's candidate for Prime Minister

Iran – Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Senior Fellow, Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security; Former National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu

Amb. Jean-David Levitte, Former Senior Diplomatic Adviser and Sherpa to President Sarkozy, France

Dr. Ariel (Eli) LeVite, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Former Principal Deputy Director General at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission

Mr. Mark Dubowitz, CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), USA

Ms. Sima Shine, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Former Head of the Research Division of the Mossad

Moderator: Dr. Ronen Bergman, Senior Correspondent for Military and Intelligence Affairs, Yedioth Ahronoth; Contributing Writer, New York Times

Keynote Address

Ms. Marillyn A. Hewson, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin, USA

Keynote Address

Mr. Joseph (Yossi) Cohen, Director of the Mossad

Statement

Hon. Elan Carr, U.S. Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, State Department

"Deal of the Century" – Make or Break ... or "One State"?

Experts’ Assessments

Mr. David Makovsky, Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute; Former Senior Advisor for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the State Department, USA

Mr. Arik Brabbing "Harris", Former Head of the Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria division of the Israel Security Agency (SHABAK)

Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael (Mike) Herzog, International Fellow, Washington Institute; Director, Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD); Former Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense

Ms. Shimrit Meir, Journalist and Commentator on Middle East Affairs; CEO, Link, the Center for Strategic Communication in the Middle East

Strategic Debate

Ms. Zehava Gal-On, Former Chairwoman of Meretz and Former Member of Knesset

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, Senior Research Fellow, BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies; Former Commander of the IDF Northern Corps

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Moderator: Mr. Attila Somfalvi, Political Analyst & Chief Anchor, Ynetnews; Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

The Crisis in Israel’s Public Healthcare System

In cooperation with Assuta Health Services Research Institute, Assuta Medical Centers

Keynote Address: Health and Israel’s National Resilience

Prof. Joshua (Shuki) Shemer, Chairman, Assuta Medical Centers

Remarks:

Mr. Moshe Bar Siman Tov, Director General, Ministry of Health

Personal Testimony:

Mr. Shimon Shiffer, Senior Political-Diplomatic Commentator, Yediot Ahronoth

Moderated Discussion: Has Israel Given Up on its Public Healthcare System?

Chair: Prof. Ari Shamiss, CEO, Assuta Medical Centers

Mr. Ron Saar, CEO, Maccabi Healthcare Services

Ms. Sigal Regev-Rozenberg, CEO, Meuhedet Health Services

Prof. Arnon Afek, Associate Director, Sheba Medical Center; Sackler School of Medicine, Tel Aviv University; Former Director General of the Ministry of Health

Ms. Noa Heymann, Head of the Healthcare Team, Budget Department, Ministry of Finance

Ms. Ronny Linder Gantz, Health Reporter, TheMarker

Moderator: Prof. Yossi Weiss, Head, Planning and Organization, Secretary of the Board, Assuta Medical Centers
## Israel’s Democracy and the Rule of Law

**One-on-Two**

**Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead**, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

**With:**

**Dr. Ilana Dayan**, Senior Investigative Journalist, Keshet 12 TV

**Mr. Raviv Drucker**, Senior Journalist, Reshet 13 TV

## Israel At Heart – Africans Living and Studying in Israel as an Asset

In cooperation with “Israel At Heart”

**Chair & Moderator:** **Mr. Joey Low**, Founder of “Israel At Heart” and Star Farm Ventures

**Mr. Alhaji Fofana**, Graduate Student, IDC Herzliya; Co-Founder, African Students Organization in Israel

**Ms. Melat Mikael**, Student, IDC Herzliya

**Mr. Mutasim Ali**, LLM Student, George Washington University Law School

**Mr. Monim Haroon**, Student, Hebrew University

## The World Outlook

In cooperation with Bank Julius Baer

**The Outlook for the Global Economy**

**Mr. Janwillem Acket**, Chief Economist, Bank Julius Baer, Switzerland

**Moderator:** **Mr. Yariv Nornberg**, Head, Tel Aviv Representative Office, Bank Julius Baer

**Strategic Arena: The Great Power Rivalry – Is the World Out of Order?**

**Hon. Christine E. Wormuth**, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, USA

**Amb. Jean-David Levitte**, Former Senior Diplomatic Adviser and Sherpa to President Sarkozy, France

**Mr. Mark S. Matthews**, Head, Research Asia, Bank Julius Baer, Singapore

**Maj. Gen. (ret.) Rajiv Narayanan**, Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institution (USI), India

**Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein**, President and CEO, Hudson Institute, USA

**Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller**, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution, USA

**Mr. Benjamin Kang Lim**, Global Affairs Correspondent, *Straits Times*; Former Bureau Chief of Reuters in Beijing

**Prof. Boaz Ganor**, Dean, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy and Founder & Executive Director, Institute for CounterTerrorism (ICT), IDC Herzliya

**Moderator:** **Mr. Tommy Steiner**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

## U.S.-Israel – The Resilience of the Strategic Alliance

In cooperation with The Museum of the Jewish People at Beit Hatfutsoth

**Keynote Address**

**Ms. Irina Nevzlin**, Chair, Board of Directors, The Museum of the Jewish People at Beit Hatfutsoth; President of The Nadav Foundation

**Address of the Leader of the Congressional Delegation**

**Congressman Ted Deutch**, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International Terrorism, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, USA

**Congressman Gus M. Bilirakis**, Ranking Member of the Economic Opportunity Subcommittee on Veterans’ Affairs and Co-Chair of the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance, USA

**Moderated Discussion**

**Hon. Senator Mark Kirk**, Former U.S. Senator for Illinois

**Mr. David Makovsky**, Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute; Former Senior Advisor for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations at the State Department, USA

**Ms. Danielle Pletka**, Senior Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), USA

**Amb. Zalman Shoval**, Former Ambassador of Israel to the U.S. Mr. Boaz Bismuth, Editor-in-Chief, Israel Hayom

**Mr. Boaz Bismuth**, Editor-in-Chief, Israel Hayom

**Dr. Michelle Stein Teer**, Rhetoric Expert, Political Communication Scholar, and Head of the Rhetoric Academy, IDC Herzliya

**Moderator:** **Mr. Udi Segal**, Chief Political Analyst & Anchor, Reshet 13 TV; Sammy Ofer School of Communications, IDC Herzliya
Strategic Conversations

The Strategic Relations between the United States and Israel

Hon. John C. Rood, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

After Bahrain – The Peace Process and the Middle East Quo Vadis?

Hon. Jason D. Greenblatt, Assistant to the 45th President of the United States & Special Representative for International Negotiations, the White House

Herzliya Breakfast Conversation: What are the Game-Changers to look out for?

Chair: Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Amb. Dr. Dennis Ross, Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute; Former Special Assistant to President Obama and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf Region, USA

Dr. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Director, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND Corporation, USA

Amb. Jean-David Levitte, Former Senior Diplomatic Adviser and Sherpa to President Sarkozy, France

Amb. Dr. Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO, Former Ambassador of the UK to Saudi Arabia

Conversation

MK Avigdor Liberman, Former Minister of Defense; Chairman, "Yisrael Beiteinu"

With Mr. Shimon Shiffer, Senior Political-Diplomatic Commentator, Yediot Ahronoth

Amazon’s Invention Machine in Innovation Nation

Mr. Paul Misener, Vice President for Global Innovation Policy and Communications, Amazon

A Changing Europe – What Does it Mean for Israel?

In cooperation with The European Union

Opening Address

H.E. Amb. Susanna Terstal, EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process

Moderated Discussion

H.E. Dr. Emanuele Giaufret, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Israel

Amb. Ron Prosor, Head, Abba Eban Institute for International Diplomacy, IDC Herzliya; Former Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution, USA

Amb. Dr. Oded Eran, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS); Former Ambassador of Israel to the European Union and to Jordan

Moderator: Mr. Barak Ravid, Senior Diplomatic Correspondent, Channel 13 News

Statement

MK Yair Lapid, Chairman of "Yesh Atid", “Blue & White”

Cleavages in the Israeli Society: Who Will Pay the Price?

In cooperation with JDC-Israel & The Social Policy Institute (SPI), Washington University in St. Louis

Presentation

Dr. Sigal Shelach, Executive Director, JDC-Israel

Moderated Discussion

Chair: Prof. Alex Mintz, Provost, IDC Herzliya

Prof. Yossi Matias, VP Engineering, Google

Prof. Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Associate Dean for Policy Initiatives, Brown School, Washington University in St. Louis, USA

Ms. Shira Greenberg, Chief Economist, Ministry of Finance

Mr. Yoav Kriem, Co-Director, Community Development and Social Change Department, Beit Issie Shapiro

Dr. Muhammad Al-Nabari, Former Mayor of Hura

MK Ram Ben-Barak, The Knesset

Milestones in Creating the New University

Prof. Yaffa Zilbershats, Chair, Planning and Budgeting Committee, Council for Higher Education

Israel’s Democracy and the Rule of Law?

Prof. Daniel Friedmann, Former Minister of Justice; Professor of Law (Emeritus), Tel Aviv University

Adv. Dr. Avigdor (Dori) Klagsbald

Adv. Revital Swid, Former Member of Knesset

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Meni Yitshaki, Former Head of the Investigations and Intelligence Department of the Israel Police

Moderator: Mr. Roy Katz, Vice President, Tel Aviv Radio; Sammy Offer School of Communications, IDC Herzliya
Statement
Ms. Tzipi Livni, Former Acting Prime Minister and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

Statement
Dr. Victoria Coates, Deputy Assistant to the President & Senior Director for Middle Eastern Affairs, National Security Council, The White House, USA

Russia in the Middle East – Friend or Foe?
In cooperation with The Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA
Mr. Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA
Prof. Dmitry Adamsky, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya
Col. (res.) Ehud (Udi) Evental, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya
Dr. Maxim A. Suchkov, Senior Research Fellow, MGIMOUniversity, Moscow, Russia
Ms. Antonia Dimou, Director, Middle East & Persian Gulf Intelligence, Security & Defence Analysis Institute, Athens, Greece
Moderator: Ms. Smadar Perry, Senior Middle East Editor, Yedioth Ahronot

Statement
Amb. James F. Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement & Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, U.S. State Department

The Cyber Race – Keeping Up and Maintaining Israel’s Edge
HerzliyaTalk
Mr. Yigal Unna, Director General, Israel National Cyber Directorate

Statement
MK Israel Katz, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Intelligence

Statement
Mr. Naftali Bennett, Former Minister of Education

Defense and Security in the East Mediterranean: The Perspective of Greece
Hon. Admiral (ret.) Evangelos Apostolakis HN, Minister of National Defence of Greece

Closing Session
Keynote Address
Prof. Uriel Reichman, President & Founder, IDC Herzliya

Presentation: Herzliya Conference 360°
Prof. Avi Degani, CEO & President, Geocartography Knowledge Group

The Herzliya Assessment
Prof. Rafi Melnick, Former Provost, IDC Herzliya; Former Member of the Monetary Committee of the Bank of Israel
Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Conversation: Israel’s Security Horizon
Lt. Gen. (res.) Gadi Eisenkot, Former Chief of the IDF General Staff
With Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

MC: Mr. Jonathan Davis, Vice President for Relations Affairs and Head of the Raphael Recanati International School, IDC Herzliya
Upgrading Israel’s Hospitals

In cooperation with Assuta Health Services Research Institute, Assuta Medical Centers

Chair: Prof. Joshua (Shuki) Shemer, Chairman, Assuta Medical Centers
Prof. Ronni Gamzu, CEO, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center
Ms. Lily Perelman, Chief Nursing Officer, Clalit Health Services
Dr. Adv. Adi Niv-Yagoda, Expert in Medical Law and Health Policy; Lecturer at the Tel Aviv University School of Medicine
Mr. Avi Ben-Zaken, Senior Deputy Director General, Ministry of Health
Mr. Nissim Alon, CEO, Leumit Health Services
Dr. Osnat Levzion–Korach, CEO, Shamir Medical Center

Toppling the Iranian Regime Before It Goes Nuclear – Is It Possible?

Chair: Col. (res.) Ehud (Udi) Evental, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya
Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Ephraim Sneh, Chairman, S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue, Netanya Academic College; Former Deputy Minister of Defense
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), USA
Prof. Meir Litvak, Director, Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, Tel Aviv University
Dr. Ori Goldberg, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya
Mr. Behnam Ben Taleblu, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), USA
Mr. Meir Javedanfar, Iran Lecturer, IDC Herzliya

The Arab Society in Israel: Integration or Alienation?

Chair: Col. (res.) Michael Milstein, Head, Palestinian Studies Forum, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University
Dr. Dalia Fadila, Founder & Director, Q Schools Consultation, Development & Education
Dr. Adv. Morsi Abu Moch, Mayor of Baqqa al-Gharbiyye
Mr. Naif Abu Swiss, Member of Ramla City Council
Adv. Maissa Garabli, Manager of Hotline in Arabic at the Israel Women’s Network
Ms. Eman Safady, IDF Radio Correspondent for Arab Affairs and Minorities

Middle East Regional Challenges – Briefing by Ambassador Satterfield

Briefing
Amb. David M. Satterfield, Special Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State
Chair: Col. (res.) Ehud (Udi) Evental, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya

Europe Facing Political and Identity Crises: What is it to Israel?

In cooperation with: The European Leadership Network (ELNET) and the Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD)

Opening Remarks
Mr. Pierre Dassas, Chairman, European Leadership Network ELNET-France
H.E. Dr. Emanuele Giaufret, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Israel

Part 1: Europe Faces Political and Identity Crises

Chair: Ms. Pascaline Wagemans, Deputy Director, Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD)
Dr. Denis Charbit, Senior Lecturer in Political Science, The Open University of Israel
Mr. Jürgen Klimke, Member, Board of Trustees, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), University of Hamburg; Former Member of the German Parliament, Germany
Dr. Daniele Scalea, Special Advisor to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy; Founder & President, Machiavelli Center for Political and Stratagetical Studies, Italy
Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein, President and CEO, Hudson Institute, USA
Ms. Noa Landau, Diplomatic Correspondent, Haaretz
Part 2: What is it to Israel?

Chair: Mr. David Siegel, CEO, ELNET-Israel
Amb. Avi Pazner, Former Ambassador of Israel to France and Italy
Dr. Emmanuel Navon, Lecturer, International Relations, Tel Aviv University; Fellow, Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies (JISS)
Mr. Ariel Shafransky, Director, Department for European Multilateral Organization, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Concluding Remarks
Brig. Gen. (ret.) Michael Herzog, Director, Forum of Strategic Dialogue (FSD)

Strategic Rivalries in Asia – What do they Mean for Israel?

Chair: Mr. Eric Lynn, Senior Advisor, CNS Global Advisors, USA
Hon. Christine E. Wormuth, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, USA
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Rajiv Narayanan, Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institution (USI), India
Amb. Husain Haqqani, Director, South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute; Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States
Mr. Benjamin Kang Lim, Global Affairs Correspondent, Straits Times; Former Bureau Chief of Reuters in Beijing
Prof. Yaacov Vertzberger, Department of International Relations, Hebrew University
Dr. Yoram Evron, Department of Asian Studies, University of Haifa

Saudi Arabia – Quo Vadis?

Chair: Dr. Israel Elad-Altman, Former Senior Director at the Prime Minister’s Office
Amb. Dr. Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO, Former Ambassador of the UK to Saudi Arabia, UK
Ms. Smadar Perry, Senior Middle East Editor, Yediot Ahronot
Dr. Michal Yaari, Tel Aviv University and the Open University

Contending with China’s Rise – Key Countries’ Lessons

In cooperation with: SIGNAL – Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership
Ms. Carice Witte, Founder and Executive Director, SIGNAL – Sino-Israel Global Network & Academic Leadership
Dr. Mathieu Dûchatel, Director, Asia Program, Institut Montaigne, France
Mr. Benjamin Kang Lim, Global Affairs Correspondent, Straits Times; Former Bureau Chief of Reuters in Beijing
Amb. Husain Haqqani, Director, South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute; Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Rajiv Narayanan, Distinguished Fellow, United Service Institution (USI), India
Mr. Yuri Poita, Head, Asia-Pacific Section, Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine
Dr. Shira Efron, Policy Researcher and Special Advisor on Israel, Center for Middle East Public Policy, RAND Corporation

Liberalism in the Modern Age: Getting It Right

In cooperation with: The Center for Liberal Modernity (LIB-MOD), Berlin
Chair: Mr. Ralf Fücks, Managing Director, Zentrum Liberale Moderne, Germany
Prof. Naomi Chazan, Co-Director, WIPS – Center for the Advancement of Women in the Public Sphere, Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem; Professor (Emerita), the Hebrew University
Dr. Kenneth R. Weinstein, President and CEO, Hudson Institute, USA
Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution, USA
Senator Pavel Fischer, Chairman, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Security Committee of the Senate, Czech Republic
Dr. Amichai Magen, Head of the MA Program in Diplomacy & Conflict Studies, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya
The U.S.-Iran Crisis: Future Directions

War Game Conveners

Col. (res.) Udi Even
tal, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), IDC Herzliya
Brig. Gen. (res.) Yoram Hamo, Strategic analyst

Participants

Amb. Dr. Dennis Ross, Distinguished Fellow, Washington Institute; Former Special Assistant to President Obama and White House Coordinator for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf Region, USA
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), USA
Dr. Kori Schake, Deputy Director General, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), UK
Ms. Danielle Pletka, Senior Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), USA
Dr. Marvin C. Feuer, Director, Policy and Government Affairs, AIPAC, USA
Mr. Brett McGurk, Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Stanford University; Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, USA
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Dr. Raz Zimm
t, Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Mr. Omer Carmi, Vice President of intelligence, Sixgill
Mr. Joab Rosenberg, CEO & Founder, Epistema
Mr. Amos Harel, Military Correspondent and Defense Analyst, Haaretz Daily
Mr. Meir Javedanfar, Iran Lecturer, IDC Herzliya
Ms. Sharona Mazalian Le
ti, Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS), Tel Aviv University
Dr. Ori Goldberg, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC Herzliya
Lt. Col. (res.) Michael Segall, Senior Analyst, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs; CIO, Acumen Risk
Col. (res.) Yuval Sharshevski, Former Head of Analysis Division, Prime Minister Office
The Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at IDC Herzliya, the convener of the Annual Herzliya Conference Series, aspires to contribute to Israel’s national security and resilience. To that end, the Institute conducts integrative and comprehensive policy analysis on the national challenges, produces strategic insights and policy recommendations for decision-makers, and informs the public and policy discourse. The Institute’s policy agenda consists of two main pillars – Israel’s national security and societal resilience. The Institute’s policy analysis and deliberations on Israel’s national security assesses key processes shaping the Middle East and the global arena and identifies strategic opportunities to mitigate and offset critical threats and risks. The Institute’s policy work on societal resilience stems from the understanding that internal weakness could harm Israel’s overall ability to tackle strategic challenges, thus making societal resilience a key building-block of Israel’s national security. Connecting both pillars, the Institute also addresses the growing gap between Israel and Jewish communities around the world – and with American Jews in particular.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead heads the Institute, serves as its Executive Director, and chairs the Annual Herzliya Conference Series. General Gilead led a distinguished career for more than three decades in the IDF and in the Defense Establishment, his last position being Director of Policy and Political-Military Affairs at the Ministry of Defense. In addition, General Gilead served as Chief of the IDF Intelligence Research and Analysis Division, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, IDF Spokesperson, and Military Secretary (Aide de Camp) to Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Yitzhak Rabin.

The Herzliya Conference is Israel’s foremost global policy annual gathering, drawing together the most senior Israeli and international participants from government, business, and academia to address pressing national, regional, and global issues.

The Herzliya Conference is the anchor of the Institute’s year-long cycle of policy analysis work deliberating the key agenda issues and the Institute’s policy products in various settings, including plenary sessions, roundtable discussions, and an international simulation. The Israeli and international media attention that the Conference draws allows to enhance the outreach and impact of the Institute’s policy products. Over more than a decade, the Herzliya Conference has welcomed many notable participants from abroad, including Ban Ki-moon, Nicolas Sarkozy, Jimmy Carter, Tony Blair, Jose Manuel Barroso, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, José María Aznar, Prince Hassan bin Talal, Robert Zoellick, Nouriel Roubini, the late Samuel R. Berger, Lawrence Summers, John McCain, General James L. Jones, Condoleezza Rice, and Salam Fayyad.