The Two-Group Decision Model: Applications to Military Intervention in the Middle East

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Introduction

The decision-making process on issues of national security includes three main stages: policy design, formal approval, and implementation and feedback (Mitchell, 2010, p. 636).

The policy design stage is often carried out in small groups. The leader formalizes the policy outline with the help of a small group of close advisers. Only after completing the policy formulation does he bring it to formal bodies for approval. The small group that carries out this process can include close advisers and members of a trust that could be called, “The Kitchen Cabinet” (Pedahzur, 2012, p. 20; Goduti, 2009, p. 9). Analogous examples of kitchen cabinets are Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s “Ranch Forum”, Prime Minister Golda Meir’s "Kitchen Cabinet", British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “Couch Group”, and more. In this article it will be defined as the “Decision Design Group”, or DDG.

Once the leader has formulated his decision within the smaller group, he brings it for formal approval to the Cabinet/Israeli Government, the UK government or the US National Security Council for approval. This group will be defined as the “Decision Approval Group”, or DAG. The leader will do all he can have his decision approved.

Theory

Several models of decision-making are applicable to foreign policy-making. Among them, the Rational Actor Model, Prospect Theory, Poliheuristic Theory, Cybernetic Theory, Bureaucratic Politics, and Organizational Politics. There are also several models of group dynamics: Groupthink, Polythink and Con-Div. The literature on group decision-making refers to the group as a unified and coherent
"decision unit", discussing and considering several courses of action and choosing the course of action that will provide the best results. “The rational decision-maker chooses the alternative that provides the consequence that is most preferred" (Allison, 1971, p. 30). Some of the theories are comprised of two phases/stages – the Prospect theory, and the Poliheuristic theory (Levy, 1992, p. 194; Mintz and DeRouen, 2010, p. 79).

In this article I wish to argue that the decision-making process is a two-group process: In a crisis situation, the critical decision unit typically consists of a leader and a few advisors. We call it the Decision Design Group (DDG). After considering alternatives and choosing the preferred one, a "larger" group, consisting of Cabinet members and other key executives, discusses the situation and the recommended alternative. The Decision Design Group (DDG) is responsible for identifying courses of action. Typically, a leader presents his/her preferred way of acting and group members deliberate over it. Once the DDG agrees on the preferred way of action, it is presented to a larger team -- a Cabinet, or a Government, for approval. This group is called the Decision Approval Group (DAG).

The Decision Approval Groups in the following democratic countries are:

Israel – the Political - Security Cabinet, the Israeli government

USA – The National Security Council, the Congress

UK - Permanent Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defense Policy, the government quorum, the Parliament.

Each group (e.g., the DDG and the DAG) can function in a different intra-group dynamic: Polythink, Groupthink, or any other group dynamic configuration. Groupthink - "the group making the decision seeks consensus at the expense of exploring a variety of alternatives. Conformity to the group's views is an overreaching concern for all members, so dissent is stifled and in some instances even punished. The group exhibits self-censorship and feelings of invulnerability and does not tolerate contrary viewpoints as it seeks to consolidate its unanimity" (Janis, 1982; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 44). According to Janis (1982), the symptoms of Groupthink are: possessing an illusion of invulnerability; belief in the group's inherent morality and the use of collective rationalizations; stereotyping the out-
The symptoms of defective decision-making include: gross omissions in surveying objectives; gross omissions in the survey of alternatives; conducting a poor information search; processing information in a biased manner; failing to consider rejected alternatives; failing to examine the costs and risks of the preferred choice.

Polythink is a group dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and offer divergent policy prescriptions, even dissent which can result in intra-group conflict and a fragmented, disjointed decision-making process. Members of the Polythink decision-making unit, by virtue of their disparate worldviews, institutional affiliations, and decision-making styles, typically have deep disagreements over the same decision problem (Mintz and Wayne 2016, pp. 5-6). Consequently, members of groups characterized by the Polythink dynamic will often be unable to understand or appreciate the perspectives of other group members, and thus will fail to benefit from the consideration of various viewpoints (Mintz, Mishal, and Morag, 2005). As such, Polythink is no less problematic or prevalent than Groupthink.

Whereas Groupthink tends towards overwhelming conformity and unanimity, Polythink is characterized by a large plurality of opinions, views and perceptions amongst group members. This divergence of opinions, and even dissent within the group, often leads to a sub-optimal decision or even deadlock. Polythink be seen as a mode of thinking that results from membership in a highly disjointed group rather than a highly cohesive one.

Some of the symptoms of Polythink are intra-group conflict and; likelihood of leaks; likelihood of confusion and lack of communication; limited review of policy options (similar to Groupthink); adoption of positions with the lowest common denominator; decision paralysis (Mintz and Wayne 2016, p. 7).

There are several inter-group interactions:

- When the "small group" (DDG) is homogenous and the dynamics is of Groupthink and the discussion in the "large group" (DAG) is also Groupthink style, the course of action designed in the
"small group" will be adopted "as is" (examples are the decisions of the Israeli government to enter the First and Second Lebanon War).

- When the dynamics in the "small group" (DDG) is of Groupthink, but the "large group" (DAG) is characterized by Polythink, the ultimate decision will be similar to the one recommended in the small group. In these instances, the proposed course of action will be "reduced" or more limited than proposed (example is the decision of the UK government to join the US in the Second Gulf War in 2003).

- When the dynamics in both groups are of Polythink, the leader will make every effort to "force" his preferred way and the decision will reflect his/her choice (for example, the debate in Israel to attack the missile launchers in western Iraq during the First Gulf War, 1991).

- When the dynamics in the "small group" (DDG) are of Polythink, and the dynamics in the "large group" (DAG) are of Groupthink, the leader will make every effort to gain support of his/her choice within the "large group" and the course of action will be adopted (example is the debate in UK government on the preferred way to solve the dispute with Argentina on the Falkland Islands).

This article focuses on the relationship and evolving dynamics within and between the two groups: the Decision Design Group (DDG) and the Decision Approval Group (DAG), on decisions of militarily intervention.

The research question is: how do the dynamics, both within and between the groups, affect the decision to intervene or not to intervene militarily?

The hypotheses that will be considered are:

Hypothesis 1 - when the DDG formulates a course of action, it will do its utmost to gain group support and approval of the decision in order to ensure that its chosen course of action will be approved.

Hypothesis 2 – when there are consensus dynamics (e.g., groupthink) in the design group, as well as dynamics of Groupthink in the discussion between the two groups

2.1 The decision will be made for military intervention.
2.2 There will be only partial correlation between the defined goals and the outcomes achieved.

**Hypothesis 3** – when disagreements occur within the DDG that lead to Polythink, and these dynamics also occur between the DDG and the DAG,

3.1 The decision made will be made in accordance with the direction outlined by the leader.

3.2 Correlation between the defined objectives and achieved results will be good.

In order to test the research hypotheses I will analyze two events in Israel in which military force was contemplated:

In 1991, during the First Gulf War the Iraqi army fired thirty-nine “SCUD” missiles at Israel. There were disagreements between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who did not want to respond with military action in western Iraq, and Defense Minister Moshe Arens who pushed for intervention in order to stop the Iraqis from firing at the Israeli home front. Polythink dynamics developed within the DDG and opinions were divided in the security cabinet between those who supported the action and those who disapproved, leading to Polythink dynamics. In the end, Israel did not carry out a military operation in western Iraq.

During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the Israeli government decided to change the policy of containment which Israeli governments had adopted since the withdrawal from Lebanon in May, 2000, and laid out a course of attack on Hezbollah's rocket arsenal. The DDG dynamics were of Groupthink, as were dynamics in the security cabinet. The war "deteriorated", lasting 34 days, during which the decision-makers changed their position from opposing a widespread ground assault in Lebanon to a ground operation that was the final accord of the war.

In this case, the question is, why did the Israeli government decide not to carry out a military operation in western Iraq, but elected for a ground attack in the Second Lebanon War that grew and expanded?
Analysis of Incident 1 – Israel’s decision during the first Gulf War

Background

On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, taking it in two days. Within a few hours the United Nations Security Council convened at the request of the United States and Kuwaiti ambassadors and passed Resolution No. 660 which called on Iraq to withdraw its forces to the international border. For fear of an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia, US President George H. W. Bush declared his intention to protect Saudi Arabia and transferred the first American troops there. The operation, called “Desert Shield”, started on August 7, 1990. The US worked to build an international coalition of 34 countries, some of them Arab, including Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Oman. This coalition to fight Saddam Hussein was designed to remove him from Kuwait if he did not respond to the Security Council’s decisions. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council voted on Resolution No. 678 which presented Iraq with an ultimatum to withdraw all its forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

In mid-October, 1990, when it became clear that the crisis in the Gulf was advancing towards military action by the US-led coalition, President Bush, Secretary of State Baker and their advisors feared that Israeli involvement in the anticipated action would cause the Arab countries to cancel their coalition involvement. In order to clarify America’s position and to hear Israel’s, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was invited to Washington to meet with President Bush at the White House (Shoval, 2016, p. 191).

At the hour-long meeting the US president said the United States intended to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait "by any means", and that if Saddam tried to attack Israel, "the United States has the ability to destroy his entire arsenal." The President asked that Israel not preemptively strike. He did not speak decisively against the possibility of an Israeli response but requested that Israel notify the US first, and coordinate such a move. The Prime Minister said that Israel had a tradition of responding to any attack on its territory and offered to hold close consultations between the two
countries (Shoval, 2016, p. 193; Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016; memorandum of conversation, one-on-one meeting with Prime Minister Shamir of Israel and the White House, December 11, 1990, 10:00-11:00 am, Oval Office).

On January 6, 1991, King Hussein of Jordan invited Prime Minister Shamir to a meeting in London. In a private conversation between the two leaders, the Prime Minister told the King that the region was marching toward war and that if Iraq attacked Israel with missiles, Israel would have to respond by air in order to eliminate the source of fire. The Prime Minister asked the King to understand that the Israeli Air Force would probably have to fly over an area of Jordan to reach western Iraq. The King responded that if this were the case, he would have to launch land-to-air missiles to prevent the flight. He told the Prime Minister that he could not fail to respond due to Jordanian and Arab public opinion. The Prime Minister said that if that were to occur, Israel would have to act against the Jordanian army and the situation could develop into a wider confrontation. To the Prime Minister’s question about cooperation between Jordan and Iraq, King Hussein promised Israel that he would not allow any Iraqi ground or air force to operate from Jordan against Israel (Ephraim Halevy, 2006,35-16; Halevy, December 30, 2015; Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016; Bligh, December 16, 2015; Moshe Zak, 1995).


Positions of the various Israeli parties

Opinions were divided in the Decision Design Group (DDG). Prime Minister Shamir did not want independent Israeli action without coordination with the Americans. In preliminary discussions the Prime Minister clearly stated that "Israel will not join the coalition nor volunteer to fight in Iraq if Israel is not attacked directly and the scale of the attack does not require a response” (Drory, 2016, p. 399). Prime Minister Shamir did not want to confront the Americans nor bring about the dissolution of the coalition against Saddam Hussein. He thought that Israel would incur losses if it were to act, knowing that the lack of current and accurate intelligence meant the chances of an attack being effective were not high. The Prime Minister estimated that Israeli action could lead to a confrontation with Jordan and possibly Syria. As long as the missiles fired into Israel caused damage to property
alone, without casualties, the Prime Minister maintained a policy of restraint (Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016; Bligh, December 16, 2015; Nevo, September 10, 2015; Shavit, December 27, 2015; Deri, February 16, 2016; Meridor, December 2, 2015). During a conversation with Yossi Ahimeir, Director of the Office of the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister said: "I'm holding back as much as I can. But if a missile falls and ten or more civilians are killed, I cannot stop our response" (Ahimeir, October 31, 2016). Defense Minister Arens, whose top priority was the question of Israeli deterrence, backed an Israeli retaliatory operation in western Iraq. At first the Defense Minister thought such an action should be carried out in coordination with the United States, but as the war went on and rockets continued to be launched into Israel, he changed his position and supported an independent Israeli response to cease the rocket fire into Israel territory (Nevo, September 10, 2015; Arens, July 27, 2015; Meridor, December 2, 2015).

Opinions in the Decision Approval Group (DAG) were mixed. The "militant bloc" pushed, pressuring for action in western Iraq without prior coordination with the Americans. This position was led by Housing Minister Ariel Sharon and was joined by Ministers Yuval Ne'eman, Isaac Modai, Rafael Eitan, Moshe Katsav, and Roni Milo. The Defense Minister also supported Israeli action in western Iraq. The "pragmatic bloc" on the other side included Ministers Moshe Nissim, Dan Meridor, Ehud Olmert, David Levy, Zevulun Hammer, Aryeh Deri, who opposed any action in Iraq, let alone doing so without coordination with the United States (Nevo, September 10, 2015; Meridor, December 2, 2015; Deri, 16 February 2016).

In the "Advisory Group" there were differences of opinion. Air Force Commander, General Avihu Ben-Nun was in favor of Israeli action, as was Deputy Chief of Staff, General Ehud Barak. Military Intelligence Director, General Amnon Shahak opposed an independent Israeli operation in western Iraq. The Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Dan Shomron supported it but stressed that it must be done in coordination with the Americans (Froimovich, January 10, 2016; interview, Rothschild, December 1, 2015; Shavit, December 27, 2015: Gilad, July 27, 2016; Rom, January 26, 2016; Yatom, January 11, 2017). The Director General of the Defense Ministry, General (Ret.) David Ivry, thought that Israel would not succeed militarily in completely stopping the rocket attacks and that for Israeli forces, the prospect of significant achievement was low and the risk was high (Ivry, September 10, 2015; Nevo, 10 September 2015).
War decision dynamics

Throughout the war, debate took place between the two main establishments. The security establishment, led by Defense Minister Moshe Arens, who was driven primarily by a desire to preserve Israel's deterrent capability, pressed Israel to take action in western Iraq to reduce the launching of rockets at Israel, and made various aerial and ground plans. In opposition, the Prime Minister was against action that lacked coordination with the Americans and did not believe Israeli action could achieve anything significant (Nevo, September 10, 2015; Ivry, September 10, 2015).

On January 22, 1991, a “Scud” missile fell in Ramat Gan, causing damage to many homes in the area. On Saturday, January 23, the Political - Security Cabinet met to discuss an Israeli response. According to the Defense Minister’s instructions, the IDF prepared a plan for ground forces to “hunt” rocket launchers in western Iraq. Before the meeting the Prime Minister met with Defense Minister Arens, Chief of General Staff, Shomron, and his deputy, Barak. The Chief of General Staff presented his stance against an offensive in Iraq (Shlaim, 1994, p. 72). At the beginning of the cabinet discussion
the Prime Minister asked the Air Force Commander when the latest time the aircraft could leave was. The Air Force Commander replied, “1400 hours”. At the cabinet meeting the IDF presented the ground attack plan. The main problems indicated in the presentation were lack of reliable and accurate intelligence on the locations of missile launchers, limited extraction capacity, and fear of multiple casualties. The Chief of General Staff presented his vision of the tension between what he considered as "important" - the destruction of Iraq's military force, conducted by coalition forces, as opposed to what was considered "urgent" – attacking the missile launchers. The Chief of General Staff said that in his view, the priority was to continue harming Iraqi military capabilities. If the home front were to continue to suffer considerably, or if Saddam Hussein were to use chemical weapons, the IDF would attack the missile launchers, even without American agreement (Drory, 2016, pp. 405-406; Barak, 2015, p. 143, Shlaim, 1994, p. 72). There seemed to be a majority in favor of an attack in western Iraq, with Ministers Sharon, Eitan, Ne’eman, Modai, Katsav, Milo, and Defense Minister Arens supporting the action in western Iraq. Ministers Levy, Deri, Hammer, Nissim, Meridor, and Olmert opposed the action. The Prime Minister allowed each one to express his position. Interior Minister Deri was the last to speak. His central message was, "We have no major casualties, there is great risk in the proposed action, and we must continue to broadcast a message of the power of restraint" (Deri, February 16, 2016). At the end of the discussion the Prime Minister summarized by analyzing the options. He pointed out that the probability of locating the launchers in such a large area wasn’t great, and there was a risk of Israeli casualties, political or possibly military conflict with Jordan, and perhaps even with Syria, and taking action without any coordination was against the explicit request of the United States. The Prime Minister concluded that under these circumstances he did not approve the action. He suggested that the cabinet authorize him and the Defense Minister to decide whether, where and how to respond, if needed. His proposal was approved by the cabinet (Deri, February 16, 2016; Nevo, September 10, 2015; Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016).

Decision-group dynamics in the subgroups

The two subgroups - the "Design Design Group", DDG (Prime Minister and Minister of Defense) and the "Decision Approval Group", DAG (Political - Security Cabinet) acted in dynamics of Polythink.
In the Decision Design Group (DDG) there were two distinct subgroups: Prime Minister Shamir vehemently opposed independent Israeli action in Western Iraq, and certainly any action without coordination with United States. The Prime Minister weighed a broad range of considerations. They included his reluctance to enter into confrontation with the United States to avoid being accused of damaging the coalition in Iraq, and his understanding of the conversation with King Hussein that Jordan would not allow Israeli planes to fly over its territory and would try to prevent the passage of aircraft in any way, which could lead to a possible confrontation with Jordan and possibly with Syria (if Israeli planes were to fly over northern Jordan). When the Defense Minister pressured to carry out a reconnaissance mission over Jordan to examine Jordanian response, the Prime Minister refused to give his approval "I rushed to call Shamir on the secure line to get his approval of the flight but he refused to approve it. He stubbornly insisted that there was no reason for it, that the war was about to end and there was no justification to take risks. Our argument heated up and continued, but he refused to give up... "(Arens, 1995, p. 229). They also included his assessment of the IDF's inability to achieve significant achievements, and the risk of casualties to Israeli forces in an air or combined air/ground operation. The Prime Minister consulted with his close advisers (his "inner circle"), Cabinet Secretary Rubinstein, Government Secretary Ben Aharon and Military Secretary Nevo (Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016; Nevo, September 10, 2015) and consulted with his close cabinet ministers, Meridor and Nissim, prior to the Cabinet discussions (Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016; Meridor, December 2, 2015).

Defense Minister Arens saw the preservation of Israel’s deterrence capability as a central objective and therefore supported military action in Iraq. He instructed the IDF General Staff to prepare various plans to pressure the Prime Minister to approve actions, including a reconnaissance mission over Jordan to check out their response, or a meeting with the US president to present him with the IDF’s plans and Israel’s desire to act. If at first the Defense Minister thought action should be in coordination with the Americans, he later changed his position and supported action even without prior coordination (Nevo, September 10, 2015; Arens, July 27, 2015; Meridor, December 2, 2015).

The Decision Design Group (DDG) operated in Polythink mainly on two significant issues: to act or not to act, given the different objectives as seen by the two men, and preservation of relations with
the United States (the Prime Minister) as opposed to the need to preserve deterrence (the Defense Minister).

There were two distinct subgroups in the Decision Approval Group (DAG) (the Political- Security Cabinet): the “militant” bloc, led by Minister Sharon, who felt there was no turning back after Israel’s deterrent capability was damaged, and therefore Israel should take military action in western Iraq. During one of the cabinet meetings the Defense Minister raised the issue of lack of intelligence that affected Israel’s ability to attack, to which Minister Sharon responded, "Send planes to take photographs of western Iraq." To the Defense Minister’s question of whether it was right to do so without coordination with the Americans, Minister Sharon said, "Tell them first and then go..." (Deri, February 16, 2016; Arens, July 27, 2015; Arens, 1995, p. 196).

The "moderate" bloc consisted of Ministers Deri, Hammer, Olmert, Meridor, Nissim, and Levy thought that in view of the risks, action in Iraq had no added value for Israel.

The Decision Approval Group operated in Polythink (as did even the IDF leadership, to some extent). The group had different views (to attack or not to attack), different goals (conserving relations with the United States versus the need to preserve Israel’s deterrence capability). Group members expressed pluralistic opinions about action (the need to coordinate action with the US, action without prior American coordination, no action at all). In such a situation, independent thinking by members of the group led to the point where determining identical policy goals was virtually impossible (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010, pp. 53-54; Mintz and Wayne, 2016, p. 4).

Within the "Advisory Group" (the defense apparatus), there were disagreements about military action in Iraq. The Director General of the Defense Ministry was opposed, saying, "Israel will not succeed in completely stopping the rocket attacks, the risk is high and the likelihood of achieving significant gains is low. If that happens, Israel’s deterrence capacity will be badly damaged” (Ivry, September 10, 2015).

There were disputes at the highest level of the IDF as to the purpose of action and its chances of success. Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Dan Shomron was not convinced of the necessity and effectiveness of an operation in western Iraq and felt obliged to act in coordination with the Americans. The opinion of Israel’s Chief of General Staff carries a lot of weight, and Israel’s political
apparatus has never forced a Chief of General Staff to act contrary to his position and recommendation (Mofaz, July 13, 2016). The Defense Minister expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of IDF preparations, saying "I was frustrated by the slowness of the army’s response to my request for an exploratory flight over Jordan to check out possible actions there. The generals reiterated their argument that the mission would either be useless or would constitute overt provocation...” (Arens, 1995, p. 229).

In this situation, the differences of opinion and inability to reach a compromise led Prime Minister Shamir to a situation where his position would be the one implemented. He acted in several ways:

He was not interested in seeing the plans the IDF had prepared prior to the cabinet discussions (Ivry, September 10, 2015), in order to avoid discussing the details of the operation so as not to appear to have given permission. And because the Prime Minister sets the agenda and determines the subjects to be discussed, he could avoid a discussion in which he was unsure if a majority would back his position (Nevo, September 10, 2015). When discussion on the Israeli response took place and the Prime Minister wasn’t sure if the majority would support his position, he did not put the issue to a vote and concluded by saying he would “make the right decision”. When the majority supported taking action, the Prime Minister did not raise the issue for discussion. He asked all the ministers to speak out and present their positions. By doing so he prolonged the discussion that ended an hour after the planes could have taken off for action.... Finally, he concluded without leaving time to reach a decision that could be carried out. “In Israel, the Prime Minister’s opinion carries a lot of weight. He can direct matters towards the decision he is interested in” (Shavit, December 27, 2015; Rothschild, December 1, 2015; Ben Aharon, November 14, 2016).

The Prime Minister and Defense Minister enjoyed a relationship of trust and mutual respect, therefore throughout the discussions, the Prime Minister did not wish to oppose all the Defense Minister’s proposals. He made some (small) concessions to the Minister of Defense’s demands. He authorized a reconnaissance flight over Jordan when it was clear to him that the war would soon be over. He gave permission for a trip to the United States to meet with top government officials (including President Bush) to present to them the IDF plans to attack missile launchers in western
Iraq when it was clear to him that the war was very close to an end. Another possible explanation is that by providing the travel permit, Prime Minister Shamir was activating pressure on the US to increase its efforts to act against the missile launchers in Iraq. After the meeting, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney instructed General Schwarzkopf, the Commander-in-Chief of the Gulf War, to allocate more planes to act against the rocket launchers (Ahimeir, October 31, 2016; Arens, 1995, pp. 219-220; Cheney, 2011, p. 215).

**Conclusion**

The reality created in Israel during the (first) Gulf War was unique and different from any other war. Israel was not part of the coalition and did not participate actively in the action against Iraq, though it suffered a barrage of 39 "Scud" missiles aimed (mostly) at the larger population centers (Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Ramat Gan). The Americans made every effort to prevent Israel from taking an active part in the conflict, using a variety of techniques and pressures to maintain the coalition.

The Israeli leadership found itself in a grave dilemma. On one hand, Israel was not accustomed to non-response when attacked and had never relied on a foreign element to protect its residents without taking action itself. On the other hand, Israel was under heavy American pressure not to intervene and the Prime Minister was aware of the Jordanian king’s position regarding an Israeli flight over his territory. The Israeli leadership had a common goal: to stop or reduce the number of rockets launched at Israeli population centers. But there were disagreements among the Decision Design Group, the Decision Approval Group, and the Advisory Group (the defense apparatus) on everything regarding how to reach their objective. The Prime Minister saw the "big picture" (with Israel-US relations at its center), the Defense Minister was more focused on his area of responsibility (especially the preservation of Israel's deterrence capability), and cabinet members formulated their positions in accordance with their world view and interests.

There were substantial disagreements among members of the Decision Design Group (DDG) and within the Decision Approval Group (DAG), and dynamics between the two groups were Polythink - Polythink. There were also disagreements within the security apparatus. Thus, the Prime Minister led the process in such a way that his position would be the one to prevail. He manipulated
matters so as not to raise the issue for a vote, formulating his position together with the Chief of Staff (whose position was similar to his).

"In Israel, the Prime Minister’s position carries a lot of weight and can lead to the decision he is interested in" (Arens, July 27, 2015). The Prime Minister was aware of his Defense Minister’s position, gave in on a number of small concessions, knowing with a high degree of certainty that the "concessions" would serve the Defense Minister but would not lead to a change in policy.

The Decision Design Group (DDG) is a small group in which the two main members, the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister, conducts consultations with insiders and with the Advisory Group, i.e. the security apparatus. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was conspicuously absent, and was not an integral part of the DDG. Contacts with the Americans were conducted by the Prime Minister and Defense Minister. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was updated along with members of the "Decision Approval Group" and was not an active participant in the formulation and design of the decision.

As to the correlation between formulated objectives and actual results, during the preliminary discussions, Prime Minister Shamir held that "Israel would not join the coalition nor volunteer to fight in Iraq if Israel were not attacked directly and if the extent of the attack did not require a response" (Drory, 2016, p. 399). The Prime Minister, who was aware of the constraints and limitations, made every effort to avoid military action despite heavy pressure by the Defense Ministry and some Political- Security Cabinet ministers. But he, as well as the Chief of General Staff, were aware that if one of the attacks caused a large number of casualties, or alternatively, if Iraq launched missiles with chemical warheads, Israel would have to respond (Ahimeir, October 31, 2016; Drory, 2016, p. 399; Rom, January 26, 2016). Since no such events occurred and missile launches decreased, the Prime Minister had no reason to change his policy.

In the end, Israel did not carry out a military operation in western Iraq. There were very few casualties from rocket fire, US-Israel relations were not damaged as a result of uncoordinated actions, and Jordan-Israel relations went untested. Israel’s deterrence capacity was somewhat damaged but not to an extent that encouraged its enemies to take any initiatives. Hence, the outcome was consistent with the policies laid out by the Prime Minister at the start of the crisis.
Analysis of Incident 2 – Decision-making in Israel in the Second Lebanon War (2006)

Background

Israel’s government, headed by Ehud Olmert, began serving on May 4, 2006. Amir Peretz, Chairman of the Labor Party, was appointed Defense Minister, and MK Tzipi Livni was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On June 25, 2006, Corporal Gilad Shalit was kidnapped in the Gaza Strip area. The Israeli government decided to launch an operation to free him, but despite intensive military actions, the IDF was unable to free him by force, and negotiations did not bear fruit. Immediately after the kidnapping the Prime Minister told his closest aides that "this case will not repeat itself. I will act, even if it endangers my political career" (Turgeman, September 12, 2016). On July 12, 2006, two IDF reservists, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, were kidnapped on the Lebanese border by the Hezbollah. Upon receiving news of the kidnapping, at close timing to the abduction of Gilad Shalit, Israel’s decision-makers decided that Israel must respond. Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Dan Halutz said, "We saw the event as a turning point, a change in policy. There would be no more containment and restraint, rather, an offensive operation that went beyond our enemy’s expectations" (Halutz, 2010, p. 371). Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was determined to respond forcefully to the abduction. Around the time he received the report he told his close aides, “Tonight Beirut will burn” (Yehezkel, July 21, 2016). At 1800 hours, Prime Minister Olmert gathered the Decision Design Group (DDG). During the discussion, three alternatives were presented to him after which he concluded that an attack on Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal was the preferred response. At 2000 hours the Government, the Decision Approval Group (DAG) convened to approve the operation. The government was not presented with the three alternatives discussed earlier with the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister. The Chief of General Staff presented the IDF proposal, but without a review of the pros and cons, allowing the ministers to believe that success of this operation was guaranteed. "When Deputy Prime Minister Peres asked the Chief of General Staff how he believed Hezbollah would respond to the IDF operation and how the IDF planned to respond, the Chief of General Staff was evasive" (Freilich, 2013, p. 216). The Chief of General Staff
was not required by the Prime Minister to answer (Makovsky and White, 2006, p. 14). Prime Minister Olmert and his ministers did not understand that they were entering into a lengthy war, as defined by one of the ministers, "There wasn't an atmosphere of war and certainly nobody talked about a month and a half-long operation. Each minister said his piece and moved on. At this meeting, like other cabinet meetings, no one really consulted with us....The government plenum is largely a body devoid of content. Nobody asks a lot of questions. The Prime Minister arrives knowing full well what he will leave with” (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, p. 171). The ministers voted for the plan presented without realizing that it was opening an extended operation and that Israel was "rolling towards war" (Mofaz, July 13, 2016; Dichter, October 19, 2016; Shamny, March 13, 2016; Kober, 2008, p. 10). On the night of July 12 the Israeli Air Force attacked Hezbollah's rocket arsenal and destroyed most of their long-range launchers. Before dawn Hezbollah began launching rockets of various types and ranges at Israel. Rocket fire continued daily and constantly throughout the fighting until a ceasefire was reached on August 13, 2006. The prevailing confusion among Israel’s decision-makers with respect to the definition of the situation can be found in the words of the Chief of General Staff in a cabinet meeting held on July 27, "...There is a fundamental question here. Are we at war or is this something limited? According to my definition, we are at war, and the formal definition isn't important now. Let's not be confused. We are at war..."(Halutz, 2010, p. 418).

Positions of the Israeli players

The "Decision Design Group" (DDG) included the Prime Minister’s "inner circle", those close to Prime Minister: Chief of Staff Yoram Turbowicz, Political Adviser Shalom Turgeman, Military Secretary General Gadi Shamny, Cabinet Secretary Israel Maimon, and Deputy Chief of Staff Oved Yehezkel. This team worked closely with the Prime Minister who consulted them on a variety of topics related to the management of the war. (Livni, August 14, 2016; Peretz, November 7, 2016; Gilad, July 27, 2016; Harel, August 10, 2016; Shelah, August 9, 2016; Mizrahi, September 29, 2016; Shamny, March 13, 2016; Turbowicz, December 11, 2016; Yehezkel, July 21, 2016; Freilich, 2013, p. 215). In addition, the DDG included members of the Defense apparatus: the Minister of Defense, Military Secretary to the Defense Minister, the Head of Political Security branch in the Defense Ministry, the Chief of General Staff, Deputy to Chief of General Staff, Director of Military
Intelligence, the Head of Operations, Director of the Mossad, and Director of Israel’s Internal Agency ("Shabak"). This was the team that formulated the positions that reached the approval of the Cabinet/"Forum of Seven". During the discussions held in the DDG, The IDF presented alternative courses of action and its recommendations. The significant, professional discussions took place there and the Prime Minister formulated his position to be presented for approval to the Political - Security Cabinet. "Decisions on security issues are made in informal settings. This is where a full intelligence picture is presented. The meeting is not publicized and there is no record of what came up for debate" (Yehezkel, July 21, 2016). This group was, in most phases of the war, in consensus on operations in Lebanon. Even if there were debates, the Prime Minister concluded them with his position. At the end of the Decision Design Group’s discussion, the Prime Minister's office Chief of Staff prepared a draft resolution and delivered it to the Prime Minister. Sometimes he transmitted the draft to the Defense Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well, so the recommendation would be coordinated. At the end of the Cabinet meeting the Prime Minister read out the text of the resolution and it was voted on by the ministers” (Turbowicz, December 11, 2016).

The Decision Approval Group (DAG) – the Political- Security Cabinet - is the approval body with the authority to make decisions on all Issues. During the "Second Lebanon War" the Cabinet appointed twelve members. By virtue of their positions, members included the Prime Minister and Ministers of Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Internal Security and Justice. Other members were coalition party leaders and other ministers (Shelach, 2015, p. 253). Though the Cabinet is defined by law as the highest decision-making body in the State of Israel, when it needed to discuss security issues, the picture presented to it was incomplete. The Prime Minister viewed the Cabinet as a factor required to approve the resolution he had already formulated earlier in the Decision Design Group. “There is no meaningful discussion in the Cabinet. The Cabinet is a 'leaky' body. You can’t present it with classified information nor all the operational considerations. Cabinet and Forum of Seven discussions are a type of ‘political honor’, to create the appearance of shared responsibility and cooperative decision-making. In reality, in-depth cabinet discussions did not exist during the war. The Prime Minister, in his 'first among equals' status, led the process according to his
understanding. The cabinet was used, essentially, as a kind of ‘rubber stamp’ ” (Turbowicz, December, 11, 2016).

Positions of the players in the Second Lebanon War - Groupthink-Groupthink

Decision dynamics during the war

All the relevant parties in Israel thought the plan for fighting Hezbollah formulated and proposed by the defense establishment would bear fruit. Not even one of those involved in the decision-making wanted or supported a broad ground operation in Lebanon in order to achieve Israel’s goals, which were formulated in consultation with the senior military and political echelons, e.g., the Prime Minister and Defense Minister. However, from a relatively early stage in the fighting, the understanding became to trickle in among those involved that ground operations were necessary to defeat Hezbollah and
reduce the rocket fire into Israel. The main decision-makers, especially the Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff, were not willing to discuss it, as stated by the Prime Minister to the Chief of General Staff during their meeting on July 20, 2016 "I'm directing you, and if it comes up among the generals or in one of the planning forums, I will not authorize an extensive ground operation". The Chief of General Staff replied: "Prime Minister, I, like you, do not want it. Even more than that…. I think we should reach an understanding with them that this is not the direction we want to take" (Winograd Commission, Final Report, 2008, p. 90). With the continuation of combat, only partial IDF achievements and continued rocket fire into Israel, there was a sense of frustration and despair in the Prime Minister's Office (Turbowicz, December 11, 2016). The senior political leadership, particularly the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, tried to find some kind of move to break the deadlock, but still avoided initiating ground maneuvers. In discussions held in the Decision Design Group (DDG) the participants came to the conclusion they have to commence the preparations for a ground attack. In the "Forum of Seven" discussion held on July 26, 2006, the Chief of General Staff recommended mobilizing two or three divisions of reserve units. "As Chief of General Staff I cannot help but recommend, first of all, to prepare for the possibility of a wider military action. I am raising a request to support the preparation of moves that build the ability, in case the Israeli government decides it wants to take a further step". The Prime Minister, who supported the recommendation, and the Chief of General Staff explained why, in their opinion, a ground operation was not desirable, (Winograd Commission, Final Report, 2008, pp. 120-121). At the Political - Security Cabinet meeting that took place the following day, July 27, the Cabinet approved the mobilization of reservists. During the discussion, Ministers Livni, Ramon, Herzog, Sheetrit, Paz-Pines and Mofaz expressed their opposition to a broad ground operation (Winograd Commission, Final Report, 2008, p. 125). On August 7, 2006, a meeting of the Decision Design Group (DDG) was held. They concluded with the Prime Minister's decision to approve preparations for a large-scale ground operation to begin on August 9, but "...subject to the constraints of the political process schedule. The operation will be presented to the Cabinet separately" (Winograd Commission, Final Report, 2008, p. 168). The Prime Minister instructed the Chief of General Staff on how to present the issue to the Cabinet ministers: "...what you have to say to the cabinet is....we, the IDF, assure that wherever we go, there will no longer be “Katyusha” fire (Halutz, 2010, p. 448).
What led to the change in perception? The desire to prevent Hezbollah from "striking the final blow" and the desire to achieve an "image of victory", so Israeli society and the whole world would see a clear victory on the ground (Pines-Paz, November 30, 2016; Shamny, March 13, 2016; Dichter, October 19, 2016; Murciano, 2011, p. 16). At the Political - Security Cabinet discussion that took place on August 9, the Chief of General Staff said, "The ground effort is doubly required.....secondly, because of image. The IDF should and can operate on the ground and win" (Shelach and Limor, 2007, p. 308). On August 8, 2006, the Prime Minister called in Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz and presented to him the ground offensive plan prepared by the IDF that was to be presented to the Cabinet. The Prime Minister asked Mofaz for his opinion of the plan. Mofaz criticized it, and proposed another course of action that was more limited and faster. The Prime Minister was impressed by his proposal and requested that the Minister present it in the cabinet discussion planned for the next day (Rappaport, 2007, p. 268; Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, p. 388; Mofaz, July 13, 2016; Shamny, March 13, 2016; Turbowicz, December 11, 2016). On August 9, 2006, the Political - Security Cabinet met for a six-hour meeting to approve the ground operation. During this discussion a unique and unusual dynamic developed. The IDF Chief of General Staff presented the IDF plan and called for the Cabinet ministers to approve it in its entirety "...I'm talking about the whole process, not parts. Only parts won’t bring a thing. They will achieve a presence but not the reduction of rocket fire, which is the goal. We will have to start tonight and there is not much time for debate. There are no interim steps here, no doing half or a quarter of it. It's all or nothing. We have the manpower, the reserves are primed and ready and it is impossible to keep them on hold and tell them 'wait, wait'. Either we do it, or we release the reserves” (Shelach and Limor, 2007, p. 307).

The Prime Minister asked Minister Mofaz to present his plan, but the Defense Minister and the IDF Chief of General Staff objected to the idea of presenting another plan (Freilich, 2013, p. 220; Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, p. 391). During the discussion the Prime Minister understood that Minister Mofaz’s plan had support among some of the ministers. He wrote notes to Ministers (Eitan, Livni) asking them to support the IDF plan (Harel and Issacharoff, 2008, p. 392). When it came time to decide, Mofaz’s proposal was not put to a vote. The Prime Minister believed that if Mofaz's proposal were raised, the Chief of General Staff and Defense Minister would perceive it as a “slap in the face” that they couldn’t accept, and that the Chief of General Staff might even resign (Shelach and Limor, 2007, p. 315; Harel
and Issacharoff, 2008, p. 392). So the Prime Minister took Mofaz’s proposal off the table and the ministers were required to vote only for or against the IDF plan. “The Cabinet was presented with a single operation to vote on, without the ability to examine other alternatives” (Livni, August 14, 2016). The ministers were given no explanation (Pines-Paz, November 30, 2016). Prime Minister Olmert concluded the discussion with, “Today I will recommend that the cabinet fully adopt the recommendation of the IDF Chief of Staff and Defense Minister. Plain and simple. There should be no doubt on the matter…” (Winograd Commission, Final Report, 2008, p. 184). Nine members of the cabinet voted in favor of the IDF proposal and three ministers (Peres, Pines-Paz and Yishai) abstained. Minister Shimon Peres told the Winograd Commission, when asked why he did not vote against the move after criticizing it during the cabinet meeting, "I think my role is to support those at the top rather than to discourage them. I don’t vote against a Prime Minister during war, nor do I go against the army” (Shelach, 2015, p. 256). The Cabinet decision was to “approve operation ‘Change of Direction 11’, as presented by the Minister of Defense and the IDF, while adjusting for future political implications ... to empower the Prime Minister and Defense Minister to set the date to begin Change of Direction 11” (Winograd Commision, Final Report, 2008, p. 184).

The events of this meeting were exceptional. Mofaz's plan, that “....you had to be stupid not to realize was better than the IDF’s, that had been introduced at the request of the Prime Minister and that most of the cabinet ministers would have tended to support” (Pines-Paz, November 30, 2016) was removed from the agenda and the cabinet ministers voted largely in favor of the IDF program, which appeared less favorable. However, none of the ministers asked questions about the process, nor argued against it (Harel and Issacharof, 2008, p. 393).

After the Cabinet meeting the Prime Minister called the IDF Chief of General Staff late that evening, saying "... I know that psychologically this is difficult, but it’s possible that it might be better to start with the northern action [Mofaz's plan]... Halutz, I’m talking to you as a man to his brother... if you can, I think it would be right to start in the north and not get involved in the center.... "(Halutz, 2010, p. 455; Winograd Commision, Final Report, 2008, p. 188). The Chief of General Staff and Defense Minister put pressure on the Prime Minister to authorize the implementation of the plan, but the Prime Minister, who did not want to launch it, mainly due to the fear of many casualties delayed his approval...
and in the afternoon hours of Friday, August 11, the Prime Minister gave in to pressure from the Defense Minister and approved the operation (Shelach and Limor, 2007, p. 351).

Dynamics in the decision-making subgroups

The dynamics in discussions in various forums were almost entirely Groupthink. At IDF General Headquarters, the Chief of General Staff rationalized that in discussions with the political leadership only one position should be presented: "In the formal discussions, the IDF position will be heard; just as the Shabak has one position, and the Mossad has one position... you will present the IDF’s position, period. If it is difficult for people, I will go there alone..." (Harel and Issacharof, 2008, p. 186).

In the Decision Design Group (DDG), during the formal discussion a number of possible courses of action were considered, but at the end, the Prime Minister decided which one he preferred and this was the alternative presented to the cabinet for approval (Mofaz, July 13, 2016; Livni, August 14, 2016; Peretz, November 7, 2016). The Prime Minister’s "inner staff" knew to update him on various possible ministerial positions and the difficulties he may encounter.

In the Decision Approval Group (DAG), the Political-Security Cabinet - discussion dynamics were primarily of Groupthink. The Prime Minister knew, usually in advance, what the ministers’ positions were and worked to mobilize the support of ministers whose support for his proposed plan was in doubt (Yehezkel, July 21, 2016; Dangot, September 27, 2016; Peretz, November 7, 2016). The Prime Minister, whose position had already been formulated, pressured the ministers not to ask "unnecessary" questions or to ask for clarifications and to quickly approve the decision. Initial information, such as the condition and capabilities of the ground force, and especially the army reserves, was not presented to the ministers, and when they asked for clarifications, for example, in the discussion that took place in the cabinet on July 26, the Prime Minister said, "I don’t understand the problem. You’re conducting a discussion with the Chief of General Staff on the level of readiness of the reserves? I suggest authorizing the army to call up the number he requested "(Rappaport,
The Cabinet members were not presented with other alternatives/options, in these discussions only one plan was presented and the ministers were asked to vote for it or against it. The Cabinet's decision was made, in the end by consensus: the Cabinet voted unanimously for the Prime Minister's recommendation, even though some of the ministers had reservations and opposing opinions. In the cabinet there was a sense of unity achieved in part by applying direct pressure on members of the group whose opinions were different. The Prime Minister held preliminary talks with the ministers whose opinions he thought might differ.

The Prime Minister succeeded in fully passing every one of the decisions he wanted to authorize. The decisions were accepted in preliminary discussions in the Decision Design Group (DDG), and the Political- Security Cabinet (DAG) discussions" became 'worthless' since the decision had already been made earlier. The ministers voted in favor of the Prime Minister’s recommendations without any in-depth discussions" (Turbowicz, December 11, 2016).

In the Decision Design Group's (DDG) discussion, only defense officials took part, headed by the Prime Minister and Defense Minister. The absence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was not an integral part of the Decision Design Group, was noticeable. Relations with the Americans were carried out by the Prime Minister’s office and the Minister of Foreign Affairs was updated together with members of the Decision Approval Group and was not an active partner in the formulation of decisions. At a Cabinet meeting which took place on August 9, 2016 to discuss the approval of the ground operation, Minister Ophir Pines-Paz said, "With your permission, I asked Tzipi [Livni] if she knew what was being brought to the cabinet on the security level, and she said no. I want to tell you something. It cannot be that there is no significant coordination on the headquarters working level in the stages we’re in, between the security and the political staff. It cannot be. It’s shameful” (Winograd Commission, Final Report, 2008, p. 184).

The Winograd Commision interim report said, "The quality of decision-making by the political echelon on national and security issues depends largely on the depth and breadth of the decision-makers’ knowledge on the subjects. In the operation in Lebanon in 2006, some of the primary decision-makers did not have this knowledge... (Committee to examine the events of the 2006 Lebanon war, Interim Report, 2007, p. 146).
As to the correlation between the objectives set and the actual results, in a speech to the Knesset on July 17, 2006, the Prime Minister said, "Only the return of the abducted soldiers will stop the operation. Israel will fight against Hezbollah for as long as it takes to return the abducted soldiers and to fully implement Resolution 1559, and to implement the blueprint set by the G-8 Heads of State – the unconditional return of the abducted soldiers, disarmament of Hezbollah and the cessation of the threat of rocket attacks on Israel" (Zisser, 2009, p. 40). If we look at the results of the war against the defined goals:

- The kidnapped soldiers were not returned to Israel following the war (actually, their bodies were returned in exchange for Hezbollah prisoners in July, 2008). It should be noted that the Chief of General Staff objected to the definition of this goal and told the Prime Minister that it could not be achieved (Halutz, 2010, p. 404).

- Hezbollah was not disarmed and rocket fire at Israel did not stop. Hezbollah continued firing rockets into Israel until the last day of the battle. To this day, Hezbollah has not disarmed and continues to maintain its arms capacity. There has been a significant increase in missiles and rockets at its disposal, with higher precision capacities and longer ranges. Hence, the threat of rocket attacks on Israel has not only continued, but has grown. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Hezbollah is deterred and is carefully considering his activities towards Israel.

- UN Security Council Resolution 1701, declared on August 11, 2006, stipulated that Lebanese Armed Forces totaling about 15,000 troops would be deployed in southern Lebanon along the border with Israel with the UN force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which also would grow in scope to about 15,000 men (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, August 11, 2006). However, nothing was determined regarding the presence of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah maintains its armed presence in south Lebanon.

Hence, in a Groupthink – Groupthink situation, where there was no disagreement with, nor opposition to the Prime Minister’s position nor to the Decision Design Group, some of the goals that were determined were unrealizable (the return of the kidnapped soldiers in a military operation), some of the goals were unattained, and UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was a compromise when compared to the goals presented by the Prime Minister in his speech in the Knesset on July 17, 2006.
Discussion and conclusions

An analysis of the two events shows that when the Israeli leadership is required to discuss a crisis created in which one of the alternatives is military force, the government and professional staff members make the decisions in two main groups. They are the Decision Design Group (DDG), led by the leader (the Prime Minister) and containing a limited number of participants. This group considers the various options and ultimately chooses the preferred course of action. After the decision is formulated in this group, it is presented for approval to the Political-Security Cabinet, which is the Decision Approval Group (DAG). This group is only presented with what was agreed upon in the Decision Design Group, and the Cabinet members have no chance of discussing alternatives.

After the formulation of the decision and before the Cabinet authorizes it (and also during the debate) the Prime Minister acts to mobilize support among members of the Cabinet for the proposal he plans to advance for approval, either through preliminary talks or by contacting members of the Cabinet during the discussion. When the Prime Minister is concerned that his recommendation might not be accepted, he may act in different ways "to remove the threat", by not raising the recommendation for a vote, "playing for time", and removing another plan that "threatens" his.

When the discussions in the Decision Design Group (DDG) are of dynamics of Polythink and the discussions between this group and the Decision Approval Group (DAG) is also of dynamics of Polythink, they are unable to reach a mutual decision (as occurred in the 1991 Gulf War). Then, the Prime Minister worked with full force to have his position accepted. Thus, despite the pressure exerted on him by the Defense Minister and other Cabinet members, Prime Minister Shamir did not give in to pressure and did not approve of an IDF operation in western Iraq to stop Scud missile fire into Israel. On one hand, the IDF accepted the Defense Minister’s instructions and prepared various
plans of action, while on the other, Chief of General Staff Lt. General Dan Shomron did not support the action, assisting the Prime Minister to stand up to the pressure placed upon him.

When both groups, e.g. – the DDG and the DAG - act within Groupthink dynamics (as happened in the Second Lebanon War), the decision was actually made in the Decision Design Group (DDG). The Political - Security Cabinet debates became worthless, and the cabinet served as a kind of “rubber stamp”, authorizing the decision brought before it. Even though some of the ministers raised different positions, when the issue came to a vote, the ministers voted in favor of that which was presented by the Prime Minister, usually unanimously.

As to the correlation between objectives and results defined by the political leadership, it can be said that in a Polythink – Polythink situation, congruence between goals and results will be high. The various opinions and the pressure on the Prime Minister to take action in western Iraq forced the Prime Minister to set realistic and attainable goals.

In a Groupthink – Groupthink situation, as in the Second Lebanon War in which the decisions were actually made in the Decision Design Group (DDG), the Prime Minister was “free” to define the objectives, which were ambitious and partly unrealistic. Even when the Chief of General Staff protested, saying there was no way to realize the goal of returning the abducted soldiers by military action, the Prime Minister did not change the definition. In the end, correlation between the defined objectives and the results attained was low, however, there were no in-depth discussions and/or debates on the goals that had been set.

The Decision Design Group is a small group, whose members are mostly the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, security organization heads (IDF, Mossad, Shabak) and assistants to the Prime Minister, e.g., his "inner circle". The Minister of Foreign Affairs' absence from this group is obvious. Since military action should eventually lead to an agreement/political settlement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must be a part of all discussions and dilemmas and bring his insights to the group.

However, in the analysis of the two events, the Prime Minister directly managed the relationships with the United States, Israel's main ally, and with the other leaders. He "synchronized" between the military operation and the political conduct, thus the Minister of Foreign Affairs had a very limited influence on the process of decision-making.
When there are doubts about the use of military force, there is a direct "channel" between the Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff, and policy coordination between them, sometimes even without the Defense Minister’s knowledge of the existence of the relationship (as during the Second Lebanon War). When the Prime Minister is confident of the way he wants to lead the response to the crisis situation he consults with the Chief of General Staff to understand capabilities and limitations, and then formulates policies. During the First Gulf War, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir consulted with the Chief of General Staff several times to understand the complexity of the plan of action and its inherent threats, and the ability of the IDF to implement this plan. He also weighed the risks from a broader perspective, e.g., the risk of conflict with Jordan, and confrontation with the United States. The Prime Minister in the Second Lebanon War, Ehud Olmert, consulted frequently with the Chief of General Staff, but was not familiar with the IDF’s capabilities. He was not capable of "dictating" his desired policy to the Chief of General Staff. This, together with the Defense Minister’s partly lack of knowledge and Chief of General Staff Dan Halutz’s personality were such that the Chief of General Staff was the dominant figure in formulating action policy by directing the cabinet ministers. In his unwillingness to hear other comments and ideas, he actually led government policy, backed by the Prime Minister’s support. Even when the Prime Minister thought the ground operation plan offered by minister Mofaz was better, he did not force the Chief of General Staff to deal with it, but he asked him to “study it…”

In both events the "domestic dimension" stands out, especially the issue of casualties. Prime Minister Shamir expressed that as long as there were not many casualties as a result of missiles fire into Israel, Israel didn’t have to act. "I’m holding back as much as I can. But if a rocket falls and kills tens of civilians or more, I cannot prevent our response" (Ahimeir, October 31, 2016).

During the entire Second Lebanon War, Prime Minister Olmert feared that broad ground action would cause many casualties. "...The army tells me it will take a month and a couple of hundred will be killed. I’m telling you it will take more than two months and there will be about four hundred dead, and at the end we will achieve an agreement no better than the one we already have, perhaps worse "(Shelach and Limor, 2007, p. 345).
In conclusion, it can be said that the decision dynamics on the use of military force is highly dependent on the leader, his ability to withstand pressure from the defense establishment, his colleagues - the ministers - and his ability to see the "bigger picture". It also depends on his ability to direct the decision-making process in a way that will lead to the best outcome, even if the defense apparatus and ministers are divided on the path chosen and don’t think it will provide the best outcome. "Israel's Prime Minister has limited governing and implementation ability, but he decides on matters of war and peace. In practice, in the Second Lebanon War, everything the Prime Minister wanted to happen, happened" (Turbowicz, December 11, 2016). "In Israel, the Prime Minister’s wishes carry a lot of weight, and he can lead to the decision he is interested in" (Arens, July 27, 2015).

Decisions are actually made in the Decision Design Group (DDG), composed of two to three ministers and professional consultants. “Significant decisions were made in the past and will be made in the future in more intimate, informal groups. A classic forum is appointed by the Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of Staff. The cabinet ministers will go along grumblingly..." (Barnea, 2016, p. 4).

When there are Groupthink-Groupthink dynamics, the Decision Approval Group (DAG) - the Cabinet - becomes a "rubber stamp" for decisions, and no other alternatives are presented for discussion. The group is not presented with the full intelligence picture (for fear of information leakage) and at the end, it usually approves the Prime Minister’s recommendation. When the dynamic is of Polythink-Polythink, the Cabinet’s “weight” is greater, other opinions are heard, the Prime Minister’s position does not necessarily have full support, and the Prime Minister is required to mobilize support for his position by doing other things that lead to the approval and implementation of his recommended policy.

A dominant, determined leader understands the "bigger picture" and acts with an understanding of the capabilities, constraints and risks. He manages to "impose" the policies he believes in on the security establishment and his colleagues in Government/Cabinet, while overcoming opposition of some members of the government and the defense establishment. A less dominant, less determined leader who is not fully aware of the capabilities and constraints is "dragged" into an
alternative position of the security establishment, eventually leading his ministerial colleagues to support moves that he does not fully believe in.

“A predominant leader is ‘when a single individual has the power to make the choice concerning how a state is going to respond to a foreign policy problem, he or she becomes the decision unit and acts like a predominant leader’” (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 84).

Two-Group Decision Model

Decision Design Group

Decision Approval Group

Advisory Group (Defense Establishment)
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