



Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy
Institute for Policy and Strategy

Patriotism and Israel's National Security
Herzliya Patriotism Survey 2006

Working Paper

Uzi Arad
Gal Alon

Copyright © 2006 by the Institute for Policy and Strategy
P.O.Box 167, Herzliya 46150, Israel

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Printed in Israel.

Key Findings

The study and discussion of patriotism in Israel, as a conceptual whole and as a socio-political phenomenon, has long been shunted aside for various reasons, some of which derive from processes that Israeli society has undergone. In view of the fact that the Institute for Policy and Strategy and the annual Herzliya Conferences focus on assessing the balance of national strength and security, and since it is impossible to measure a country's strength without addressing the patriotic component among its citizenry, a direct examination of patriotism is required. Thus, we have taken it upon ourselves to study patriotism on various levels, mapping it via a specific and in-depth survey – which we aspire to conduct annually – through an analysis of all its aspects.

This document presents the first survey results in detail, as well as the questionnaire used in it. In preparing and conducting the survey, we built upon similar existing questionnaires and surveys undertaken by universities and research institutes in the U.S. and other countries. In addition, the document includes two conceptual discussions of patriotism in order to place it in the relevant context.

Our main interest focuses on the implications of the degree of patriotism in society on Israel's national security. Following are several significant findings in this vein:

- The citizens of Israel possess a large degree of Israeli patriotism according to two intrinsic criteria – willingness to fight for it (85%) and the desire to remain planted on its soil (87%). In comparison to other developed countries in the West, there is none that surpasses Israel in this declared readiness to fight for one's country.
- On the other hand, the pride of Israeli citizens in their country (77%) is low compared to other countries, and is certainly not “blind pride”. The main sources of pride for Israelis are the scientific and technological achievements of their country (97%) and its security forces (86%), while the lowest levels of pride are attributed to the way its democracy works (38%) and its social welfare system (22%).
- In general, it seems that the current spirit of Israeli patriotism – more than being fed by ideology or Israel's historic heritage, or utopian aspirations (to be “a light unto the nations”) – is anchored in a deep attachment to country and a sense of its being under threat.
- Most of the Israeli Arabs are not proud of their citizenship (56%), and are not ready to fight to defend the state (73%). But the rate of Arab Israelis who believe that Israel is better than most other countries (77%) is among the highest in the developed world with regards to this measure. Notably, the number of Arabs who are proud of the welfare system (53%) is three times higher than that among Jews (17%).

- There are differences between the type and expression of patriotism among Jewish citizens of Israel and those of Arab citizens. Among the latter, patriotic feeling is subdued. When patriotic sentiment is given expression, twice as many Arabs define themselves as Palestinian patriots than as Israeli patriots.
- The patriotism of the Jewish citizens is stronger among the right than in the ranks of the left; stronger among the religious and traditional than among the secular; stronger among the more affluent than among the less affluent; stronger among older people than among younger ones; and stronger among those without university education than among those with academic degrees.
- Alienation is felt among low-wage earners in the Jewish public: They are hesitant in their willingness to fight, and about a tenth of them are not prepared to do so. Although their sense of attachment to the country is high, they are nonetheless reluctant to define themselves as ardent patriots.
- There is a noticeable "patriotic decline" through the generations. Unlike those born during the years of the state's establishment, among younger people the elements of patriotic sacrifice and rootedness have weakened. While refusal to fight was almost unheard of among older people, one in every seven young Jewish citizens claims that he is not willing to fight to defend his country (14%). Two in every five are prepared to leave the country if their standard of living would be significantly improved by moving abroad (44%).

The full findings of the survey warrant study and analysis. These are likely to yield lessons and conclusions which merit discussion. For example, the weakening of the patriotic spirit among the young Jewish generation, which is perhaps the most troubling finding in terms of the threat to the future strength of Israel, raises questions about the educational conclusions to be drawn – should the weaknesses be dealt with or should the strengths be further nurtured? Two different approaches towards the "patriotic deficit" can be identified. One approach, which is post-Zionist in essence, accepts the change and suggests adapting the state's values to the multicultural reality that is developing within it. The second approach, on the other hand, advocates weaving a new Zionism that preserves Israel's formative values as a Jewish state and aspires to adapt them to the agenda of the 21st century. Inasmuch as the responsibility for instilling and inspiring a spirit of patriotism rests with Israel's leaders and educators, it is their task to resolve the dilemma and cope with the challenge highlighted by this survey.

The Key Findings of this document, together with the chapter on "Patriotism and National Strength in Israel," were written by Prof. Uzi Arad. The survey findings, together with the chapter dealing with "Conceptual Outlines for Patriotic Affinity," was written by Mr. Gal Alon.

Prof. Ephraim (Efi) Yuchtman-Yaar served as an advisor to the Patriotism Project. Mr. Kalman Gayer assisted with the sampling process.

The taskforce that contributed to the survey analysis included Dr. Faisal Azaiza, Prof. Maoz Azaryahu, Dr. Amos Carmel, Mr. Amnon Lord and Ms. Ahuva Yanai. Complex statistical analysis was conducted with the assistance of Ms. Yasmin Alkalai.

Patriotism and National Strength

The expression “*hossen leumi*”, which cannot be translated accurately into English but connotes national strength and resilience, has become a widely used currency in Israeli public discourse, among other reasons, thanks to the *Annual Herzliya Conference Series on the Balance of Israel’s National Security*, the flagship of the Institute for Policy and Strategy’s year-long activities. In so doing, this expression extended its ambit beyond the traditional understanding of “national security”. Today, there is no disputing that “national security” transcends the purely military/security aspect to include other dimensions of strength relevant to the existence of the state – economic, political, international, social, and governmental elements. However, our intention in adopting the word “*hossen*” was to incorporate in it the more intangible and abstract dimensions, like national morale, a sense of national purpose, stamina, cohesion, and recognition of the justness of the national path, which are no less essential to the country’s vitality. It was Napoleon who said that in war, spiritual/moral considerations are of greater importance than material ones. The link between material and spiritual strength is therefore what we intended when we adopted the expression “*hossen leumi*”.

It is a short step from here to a consideration of what is known in English to be “patriotism”. This concept is in effect directed at precisely the same emotion that expresses the bond and identification of citizens with their country and their commitment to it, to the extent of a willingness to defend it against an enemy even at the cost of self-sacrifice. There is no question that this emotion is essential to any substantive discussion of “*hossen leumi*”, and so any discussion of Israeli “*hossen leumi*” must consider the patriotic dimension as well.

Yet in Israeli public discourse, replete with expressions related to the world of “*hossen*” (strength and resilience), where everyone takes from the word whatever they need, any direct consideration of patriotism is almost taboo. The term itself, which in other western democracies is not in the least bit objectionable, is considered unsavory in Israel and is not on the public, academic, media, or political agenda. It has even been said that to the average Israeli, the word “patriot” is a type of anti-aircraft or anti-missile system, not an expression of a political reality deeply rooted in western history.

On one pretext or another, the subject is bypassed in Israel in “correct” intellectual circles. Samuel Johnson’s gibe that “patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel” is the first refuge of those who avoid any discussion of it. Others choose to slide from the original meaning of the word to the closely related concept of “nationality/nationalism” and from there to “nationalistic” with its extremist overtones, thus providing an excuse for having nothing to do with this troublesome expression.

In comparison, classical philosophers were adept at describing the essence of patriotic feeling and distinguishing it from nationality and nationalism. John Stuart Mill explained that it was a matter of “sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation ... a feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the community shall not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part ... that evil to any of their fellow countrymen is evil to themselves, and do not desire selfishly to free themselves...” Alexis de Tocqueville was more concrete. For him, it was “an attachment to the land, which arises from that instinctive, disinterested and indefinable feeling which connects the affections of man with his birthplace ... a taste for ancient customs and a reverence for traditions of the past ... those who cherish it love their country as they love the mansion of their fathers”. Niccolò Machiavelli used to say that he had a duty to serve his country at all times, even when it meant putting his life at risk—and this because a man has no greater obligation than the one he has to

his country. Love of country has therefore always been considered a civic virtue, and Samuel Johnson's cynical gibe is not representative of the general historical view on the subject.

The standard encyclopedia definition of patriotism examines the word etymologically. Its roots are in Greek and Latin, the cradle of western civilization; in Greek, the meaning revolves around "father" and "fatherland," while its Latin derivative is associated with countrymen, and by extension, staunch family solidarity that unites citizens into a national entity. In European languages, derived from "patria," it relates to unifying ethnicity and to the "motherland" or native country. Patriotism in Hebrew evokes "land of our fathers" and "our fathers' heritage."

Beyond the etymological aspects, the qualities normally attributed to patriotism are those of loyalty, commitment, and love of country. The ethnic-tribal basis of patriotism is latent in the principle "charity begins at home"; a man's family comes first and by extension, his tribe. The close conceptual similarities between family and patriotism were described concisely by Cicero: "Patria est communis omnium parens" (our country is the common parent of all). But it is only natural that patriotism is called into service during times of hardship and turmoil. The call to serve and sacrifice is explained by saying that the good of the community when it is under threat justifies the sacrifice of the individual. As an unattributed author once said referring to loyalty to one's homeland even in dire circumstances: "Our country, however bound."

However, sacrifice is an extreme expression of patriotism. More common expressions are a feeling of pride in belonging and a willingness to act for the good of the overall community, sometimes at the cost of personal interest. Patriotism, in conclusion, stems from a feeling - a feeling of loyalty and commitment to one's country, and pride in its history and accomplishments. The family-tribal feeling that is at the nucleus of patriotism is what leads to a distinction between groups of humans and to the sense of commonality among members of a specific political entity, generally based upon shared language, culture, history and ethnic kinship. Patriotism in its classical and commonly accepted sense is not universal but particular. It is defined by what brings together those who share it and separates them from those who do not share it.

One cannot ignore the fact that contemporary philosophy also features deviations from this conceptualization of patriotism. Individualistic approaches maintain that the community takes no precedence over the individual, and thus the patriotic commitment to the homeland is less significant. Whereas Machiavelli owes his greatest debt to the country that gave him identity, education and culture, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas envisages a relocation of this feeling from the country to the global cosmopolitan arena. However, as long as the international structure is one of national entities within specific territorial boundaries, and it matters not if these are the Greek "polis" or modern nation-states, then these entities, rather than others, attract a sense of pride and belonging.

It is not only globalization and cosmopolitanism that have somewhat undermined the sense of patriotism, but also the phenomenon of minorities that inhabit some nation-states. It is possible, ostensibly, to conceive of an abstract patriotism that is not rooted in the legacy of ethnic kinship, for instance in the United States where the commitment is to a political-constitutional order and a certain way of life. This order is already ingrained in history and in a considerably deep tradition and heritage. In countries where an attempt was made to identify unifying forces that are not necessarily ethnic or cultural, yet which bind men to their fellows and compatriots, the blurring of the majority culture in order to include the minority naturally diluted the internal logic of patriotism - the commonality of those who share the same "fathers' heritage."

It is noteworthy that while in Israel, many people tend to identify patriotism with nationalism, there is a fairly sharp divide in academic literature between these closely related phenomena. George Orwell made a clear distinction between nationalism, which he identified with a desire for power, and patriotism, which in his view was “devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other people.” The main difference is that patriotism is naturally reflexive and defensive: a feeling that is directed towards oneself and one's fellows, by nature a positive feeling of attachment, empathy, solidarity, pride, and commitment to one's compatriots. In contrast, nationalism can be offensive if it is directed against the different and the other, to the extent of xenophobia. Nationalism comes across as negative, arrogant, reserved, and even hostile, in comparison with patriotism, which in itself is in no way offensive. However, even nationalism can be expressed in entirely non-violent terms (self-determination), although on some occasions it can lead to violent international conflict. In effect, both these phenomena are likely to be intertwined: modern history is replete with examples of the manipulative exploitation of patriotic feelings by rulers who were prejudicial to the good of their nations and fanned the flames of destructive and aggressive nationalism at the cost of harm to other nations.

It may be that because of these associations, some Israelis have been disinclined to deal with the phenomena of patriotism, even in its positive sense of building and unifying. But the shunning of the subject in Israel is unusual in comparison with other enlightened nations who could also be expected to have reservations about aggressive nationalistic mindsets. It is possible to learn about the level of disaffection in Israel from one of the few books that deals with the subject directly, *Patriotism: Homeland Love*. One of its two editors, Daniel Bar-Tal, maintains that patriotism is a destructive force, since, in his view, without the emotional power of patriotism it is impossible to sustain a protracted and violent conflict and continue to enlist the population. For this reason, in his opinion, patriotism is no more nor less than the firepower that incites conflicts. What can be understood of the phenomenon in Israel, when patriotism is defined in the education department of a well-known university in such an extreme way and in a manner so removed from classical literature on the subject?

A separate question deals with the factors that led to such a marked deviation of the understanding of patriotism in Israeli political and academic culture. Some would argue that the fad or trend of relativism, post-modernism, and post-Zionism, which blows through the corridors of Israeli academia and political circles, has eroded the vitality of Zionism and basic patriotism. There are also those who point to the spirit of privatization, that is, the tendency to elevate the individual above the community, as having contributed to this process in Israel over the last twenty years. It is also possible to discern feelings of guilt that have pervaded Israeli society since the Six Day War and even regarding the circumstances surrounding the settlement of the Land of Israel since the first Aliyah (Jewish wave of immigration to the Land of Israel) in the late 19th century. Feelings of national guilt and pride cannot co-exist. Furthermore, there is a conspicuous element of self-flagellation and self-hate of the kind that was identified long ago among Jews and Israelis. Even if this trait, insofar as it exists, is the result of Jewish historical circumstances, it certainly erodes national pride and the pure, wholesome sense of patriotism.

Yet none of these prove any lack of patriotic feeling in Zion. Quite the contrary. Since it is an instinctive feeling, expressions of patriotism in Israel are unarguably broad and deep. Bar-Tal's approach attests only to a recoiling from the subject, to the extent of denial among Israeli scholars and educators. This is precisely the lacuna in Israel – providing public thematic, scholarly and academic articulation and salience to patriotism. Thus, the most severe lack is that leaders and mentors in Israel do not refer to or manifest patriotism. It is a desperate need, because beyond the raw existence of the feeling, leaders and mentors, as well as intellectuals and even writers and poets, are those who regularly fan such emotions. Who, if not leaders, are required to express the mood and give inspiration? Pericles' speech on pride in

Athenian democracy, President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Churchill's writings and speeches, and President Kennedy's inauguration speech were all landmarks in leadership that appealed to the constructive and defensive emotion of patriotism. In Israel, it seems that our leaders are wary of patriotic inspiration, unless they are justifying the sacrifice of the fallen at commemorations in Israel or soliciting donations from abroad.

Some thought must be given to the generic term "Zionism" which, like nationalism, also incorporates some elements of patriotism. The word comes from the Jewish national movement that was directed at the establishment of an autonomous and independent Jewish state in the Land of Israel. The word was synonymous with Aliyah (immigration to Israel), the founding of a state and its development. In time, the word became a catch-all insofar as its meaning included everything—Jewish patriotism, fulfillment, the extolling of the State of Israel and the like. Yet even this word has been diluted over time, and there are those who relegate it as belonging to the past. Post-Zionism is not merely historical revisionism. It reflects, among other things, a disassociation from patriotic values that were part and parcel of the founding ethos of the State of Israel. Beyond the fact that it is a loaded expression, Zionism is not a convenient term for comparative analytical purposes since it is unique to Israeli reality. Since our concern is with a trait that in itself is not specifically Israeli, and since it is our intention to examine it comparatively—it is more correct to use the internationally accepted term and not the local one that has no precise counterpart.

The Jewish nature of the State of Israel also requires attention in an examination of Israeli patriotism. Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), discusses the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The pillars established by this law -Jewish; democratic; state- anchor Israeli patriotic sentiment in values that are inherent in the Jewish tradition. While democratic principles are undoubtedly equally entrenched in the nation's character, the core value of the "Jewishness" of the state has remained an unwavering tenet among the Israeli public. There are now, as there have been in the past, fringes of Israeli society that reject the idea of Israel as the Jewish nation-state, and extol principles like dual nationality, multi-nationality, and multiculturalism. However, what is instructive is the fact that the prime Zionist drive—the establishment of a Jewish state as a country for Jews in the Land of Israel—was and remains entrenched in all aspects of Israeli society. This drive is as powerful now as in the past. The justification for the Disengagement Plan—the removal of Israeli settlements from the Territories—is explained by the necessity of preserving the State of Israel as a fundamentally Jewish one. Hence, the dominant sense of patriotism among the majority in Israel centers on its existence and future, first and foremost, as the country of the Jewish nation.

This does not negate and deny the existence of patriotic feelings among national minority groups in Israel. Clearly, there is a collision between patriotism towards the Israeli state among the Jewish majority and the patriotism towards the Palestinian Authority among the Arab minority. However, this is an anomaly stemmed from a prior anomaly related to the status of the Jewish State as reflected by the Palestinian people and the Arab states. When Israel's status in the region is normalized, it is reasonable to expect that the internal conflicts will be normalized as well. Until this change occurs, the tension between the two spheres of patriotism is unavoidable, and should be acknowledged. In such circumstances, one has no other option but to manage the civil aspects of Israeli life by democratic principles, while hoping for and pursuing an end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One can uphold the pillars of Jewish; democratic; state as the anchors of the Israeli patriotic sentiment. The accurate character of a Jewish State, as well as the precise nature of a democratic state, is a matter for the Israeli political arena to determine.

Conceptual Outlines for Patriotic Affinity

The etymological roots and historical foundations of the term “patriotism” have not prevented a reexamination during the past century of the patriotic affinity and the channels to which this affinity is directed. Cynics will argue that post-modern interpretations, which seek to shift the focus away from particularism in patriotism in favor of humanistic and humanitarian values, aim to resolve the debate over the morality of the phenomenon, which already arose in Greece during the 4th century B.C.E. (Stewart 1917). Those who rejected patriotism in its classic sense already argued at that time that valuing the state more than the human race is not only irrational, but is based on selfishness that sanctifies, in a primitive way, a piece of land, blood relations and mother tongue. Arguing against them were those who claimed that “love of country”, beyond its merits and advantages, is an inborn feeling and that there is no need to repress or deny it. While classic patriotism served as a subject of reference for supporters and for those harboring reservations, the delving into the recesses of patriotic sentiment distinguishes between at least two additional affinities, each one addressing a different world of content.

John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville and George Orwell, whose ideas were quoted earlier in this document, are among those who addressed the classic conception of patriotism. One of the prominent representatives of this perspective is Maurizio Viroli, whose book “For Love of Country” faithfully represents the principles of republican patriotism and discusses the roots of the term, which are embedded in the fatherland. However, Abraham Lincoln describes a different type of bond in his writings and speeches, an affinity that is not necessarily based on a piece of land but is rather connected to a way of life, the constitution, and the government. Lincoln believed that “Americans, a motley gathering of various races and cultures, were bonded together not by blood or religion, not by tradition or territory, not by the calls and traditions of a city, but by a political idea” (Schaar 1973). In his view, a more appropriate term for this phenomenon is “covenanted patriotism” because of the importance of the political covenant and the formative values that unify the nation’s people. Herbert L. Stewart even suggested that in certain cases, this was the bond that forged the Athenian patriotic sentiment, since “the Athenian loved Athens, less because it had been the home of his fathers than because it was the home of his own ideals... If he had persuaded himself, as Plato did regarding Sparta, that some other state was better, his loyalty was open to change” (1917, p. 621).

The third perspective, located on the left side of the spectrum of ideas, was presented by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who aimed in his philosophy to completely break away from the sentiment of local attachment, be it to a territory or formative values, in favor of sanctifying universalism. The patriotic conception defined as “constitutional patriotism” or “cosmopolitan patriotism” represented, in fact, the call to replace the bond between a nation and its homeland and between members of a nation and their formative values, in favor of a commitment to a liberal complete democracy regime and humanistic values. Habermas’ approach, which is far from being widespread among the public, turns patriotism into a phenomenon, which is cosmo-political in essence and which is not necessarily grounded in time or place. The supporters of this approach regard it as the way to establish a clear and absolute distinction between the patriotic affinity and the nationalistic sentiment, by strengthening universal values and making them the unifying force that binds different groups and nations (Canovan 2000, Markell 2000).

Even though disagreements over the character of the bond that underlies patriotic sentiment do exist, it seems that there is no dispute about the national advantages inherent in patriotism and the central role of patriotic sentiment in building a country's resilience. However, the assumption that patriotic sentiment is completely altruistic already encountered criticism from George Washington, who argued, "whoever builds upon [patriotism] as a sufficient basis for conducting a long and bloody war, will find themselves deceived in the end... a great and lasting war can never be supported on this principle alone. It must be aided by a prospect of interest or some reward [for those who fight]" (quoted in Grodzins 1956, p. 3). On the other side, the rationalist perspective, which says a patriot will be ready to fight for his country because of the hope for a better future, is also liable to be found lacking. Technological progress, whose results the world witnessed in World War II, is now liable to create such great destruction that it will debilitate the rationalistic argument that justifies going to battle (Somerville 1981).

The willingness to fight, like the connection between patriotism and the political arena (Taylor 1990, Sullivan et al 1992), is not the only expression of the sentiment under discussion. As the in-depth academic study of this issue has grown during recent decades, a much broader meaning has been given not only to the **affinity** individuals feel toward their spheres of attachment, but also to the various **channels** to which this affinity is directed. Schatts & Stauc (1997), followed later by Parker (2003), identified three prevalent types of patriotism among various groups in the United States. They called the first "symbolic patriotism" that is based on "an emotional bond to American symbols and to America itself." The second was defined as "constructive patriotism" that represents the rational dimension of the phenomenon channeled via constructive criticism of the government and its conduct. The third was identified as "blind patriotism" that is driven by an irrational dimension and in essence represents "extreme loyalty that cannot be questioned" (Parker 2003, p. 14-15).

Sullivan and others examined the effect of patriotism on the presidential elections in the U.S. in 1988 and also describing five different types of patriotism (1992) by checking the correlation of responses to 49 different statements. "Iconoclastic patriots" rejected the symbolic connection, which they perceived as something dangerous, and channeled their love for country into critical engagement in civic society. "Environmental patriots" sanctified the environment and land more than the flag and anthem, and regarded as traitors those who pollute the environment in their pursuit of profit. "Capitalistic patriots" viewed the giants of the American economy as models for emulation and believed that economic growth is, in fact, the realization of the American patriotic vision. "Symbolic patriots" showed a strong and uncritical emotional affinity for the state. "Nationalistic symbolic patriots" demonstrated more extreme views in rejecting the possibility that America could sometimes err and in placing the United States "at the top of God's current order" (pp. 209-214). Eventually, each of the five defined types represents views shared by a relatively large number of respondents.

In an effort to scrutinize the Israeli patriotic affinity through concrete statements and questions, the questionnaires used in the studies cited above were examined, together with international studies (ISSP & WVS) and dozens of additional questions that explored the various dimensions of American patriotism during recent decades (AEI 2005). From this knowledge base, four main dimensions relevant to the phenomenon of local patriotism were identified: the dimension of sacrifice, the dimension of rootedness, the dimension of pride, and the dimension of symbolism. Each dimension represents a unique aspect of the phenomenon of patriotism and brings together a collection of questions and statements that are likely to reflect its nature indirectly.

However, in the Israeli context, the research challenge is broader than merely characterizing “patterns” of patriotism because it is also inseparably connected to the definition of “spheres” of patriotism that are relevant to this discussion. Ambiguity around the object of patriotic affinity, together with the existing conflict of identity in Israeli society, make it necessary to clarify the various circles toward which the respondents channel their patriotic affinity. After considering this issue, it seemed that the spheres of patriotism mainly align with civic national identity. Thus, three separate spheres were defined: the Israeli sphere, the Palestinian sphere and the foreign citizenship sphere, which is relevant to those residing abroad and those who live in the country but hold foreign citizenship.

It is worth noting that the nature of patriotic affinity and the various ways it is channeled have been explored and analyzed in academic literature, but a discussion of the spheres of patriotism in general and the case of multi-patriotism in particular has not fully developed. Thus, the definition of patriotism as “a bond created between individuals, the nation to which they belong and the land in which they reside” (Bar-Tal and Ben-Amos 2004, p. 15) is liable to fail in the test of reality: It is very possible for an Israeli who emigrated from the country and a Jew who never lived in Israel to both maintain a clear Israeli patriotic affinity that successfully meets the various operative criteria of patriotism. It is precisely in the Jewish Zionist context that the patriotic bond is likely to become one that is not dependent on time or place, and which has the power to unify broad groups around a piece of land, kinship or shared values.

The Patriotism Survey

Methodology

The patriotism survey is based on dozens of surveys conducted by research institutes and organizations that are world leaders in their fields. After selecting the questions and adapting them to the Israeli reality, the questionnaire was translated into Arabic and Russian, and its validity was checked by re-translating them to Hebrew. The sampling and interviews were conducted by the Statistics Department at Haifa University in early December 2005, among a random sample of about 800 people, comprising a representative sample of the adult population in Israel.

The questionnaire, which is attached as an appendix to this document, included about thirty questions and statements, which can be divided into five main sections. The first deals with levels, spheres and subjective perspectives of patriotism; the second with the willingness to sacrifice; the third with the strength of the roots connecting a person to his or her country; the fourth with the extent of national pride; and the fifth with the attitude towards national symbols. The results of the survey will also be presented in this order, after presenting the international comparisons derived from the figures.

Two events formed the background for conducting the survey – the plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip and the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Israeli Professor Israel (Robert) Aumann. There is no doubt that the first event left its stamp on the views of some of the respondents, and the criticism voiced about the state of democracy might be connected to the “democratic deficit” phenomenon, which various groups in the public believed to have been created surrounding the disengagement. It is also possible that the esteem for the security forces among the Arab public is related to their evacuation of the settlements. At the same time, the pride in the scientific and technological achievements of Israel, a pride shared by all of the country’s population, may have received a boost by the Nobel Prize award. This award, which followed another Israeli Nobel award last year, displayed particularly high scientific and technological achievements.

The sample

As stated above, the sample numbered about 800 adult Israeli citizens, including about 150 Muslims and about 20 Christian Arabs. During the survey, the types of communities in which the Arab and Jewish respondents reside were monitored in order to ensure a high level of representativeness of the adult population in Israel. After the sample was conducted, the weight of the various groups was correlated with their patterns of voting in 2003. The weight of the Arab population in the final sample is 11.8%, compared to 86.2% for the Jewish population.

On many questions, the data from the Jewish public was separated from that of the Arab public due to a significant gap in the various views. In these cases, the Arab population includes Muslims and Christians who define themselves as Arabs. When the separation is according to the economic variable, the family income reported by the respondents is weighted in correlation to the size of the household, using the same method applied by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

The analysis

After receiving the raw results of the survey, a special taskforce convened and assisted in analyzing the data and drawing the main insights from it. Statistical regression analyses and tests of correlations between various variables helped to bring the data into focus and identify main factors of influence, as well as the key questions, in each of the different dimensions that were examined. The clarifications and insights of the members of the team, together with the statistical conclusions derived from the survey, constitute the basis of this document.

Comparisons between states and time periods

Would you be willing to fight for your country?




Figure 1: Willingness to fight for the state: Israel [IPS 2006] relative to OECD countries [WVS 2000/2001]

The willingness of Israelis to fight for their country if needed is the highest among other developed countries where this question was presented. 85% of the adult population in Israel said they would be willing to fight in a war to protect the country, compared to 75% who expressed this willingness in 2001. This figure includes the Arab public, whose readiness to fight is significantly lower (27%) than the Jewish public (94%). Citizens of Japan (16%) and Germany (32%) are very reluctant to go to battle for their countries. Both of these countries bear a military history that does not at all constitute a source of pride. Finland (83%) is at the top of the list (after Israel), and the United States is far behind (63%).

How proud are you of being a citizen of your country?




Figure 2: Pride in being a citizen of the state: Israel [IPS 2006] relative to OECD countries [ISSP 2003]

While the citizens of Israel are at the forefront in their willingness to defend the country, their pride in the state and its achievements is lower than that of other developed countries. 83% of the Jewish citizens of Israel are proud of their state, compared to about 99% of citizens of Ireland and the United States. Notably, the percentage of respondents who said they are “very proud” to be Israeli is relatively high (52%). The pride of Arabs in being Israeli is among the lowest in the Western world, though it is worth noting that the data does not address the level of pride expressed by minorities living in various countries.

My country is better than most other countries




Figure 3: Belief that the state is better than others: Israel [IPS 2006] relative to OECD countries [ISSP 2003]

The level of esteem for the state expressed by Israeli Arabs is among the highest in the developed world, contrary to the Jewish public’s more critical view. Three of every four Arabs (77%), compared to two of every three Jews (66%) agree that “generally speaking, Israel is a better country than most other countries”. In both sectors, the percentage of those who “strongly agree” with this statement (38%) is among the highest in the world. Australia, Japan and the United States are again at the top of the list, while the citizens of Germany, Poland and Switzerland relegate their countries to the bottom of it.

I would rather be a citizen of my country than of any other country in the world




Figure 4: Preference for being a citizen of the state: Israel [IPS 2003] relative to OECD countries [ISSP 2003]

The Jewish public is indeed less proud of its state and less confident of its advantages, but the roots that connect it to the country are especially strong and it is strongly opposed to leaving it for another state. The absolute majority of the Jewish citizens of the state would prefer their Israeli citizenship to any other (88%), the highest rate of any developed country except for the U.S. (90%). Despite the lack of pride and lack of willingness to fight, the Arab minority is also very strongly connected to its Israeli citizenship (82%), placing it on par with the Irish (82%) and the Finns (83%).




Figure 5: Strength of patriotism and justification for refusal in Israel [IPS 2006] and the US [Gallup 2005, PRSA 2005]

More Americans define themselves as "very patriotic", but in Israel the rate of those who consider themselves "extremely patriotic" is higher (34% in Israel versus 26% in the U.S.). The comparison between the two states also indicates that the percentage of Israelis, including the Israeli Arabs, who regard themselves as "not especially patriotic" is three times higher than in the U.S. (15% versus 5%). On the question of whether it is "acceptable to refuse to fight in a war you believe is morally wrong," **the Israeli public is more cautious and the majority justifies refusal in cases involving ethical dilemmas (54% versus 46%).**




Figure 6: Comparing the level of esteem and preference for Israel between the years 1995, 2003 and 2006

A moderate increase in the level of Israeli pride among the Jewish public occurred during the years 1995-2003; there was a sharper increase in the pride of the Arab public and in their preference for Israel over other countries. While in 1995 two of every four Arabs (55%) agreed that Israel is "a better country than most other countries," three of four (77%) say this today. While 70% of Arabs preferred their Israeli citizenship to a foreign citizenship in 1995, this percentage rose to 82% in 2006. Among the Jewish public, the percentage agreeing that Israel is "a better country than most other countries" climbed from 56% in 1995 to 66% in 2006.

Subjective Levels and Spheres of Patriotism

The absolute majority of Israelis define themselves as patriots to some extent. Among the Jewish public, older and wealthier people, immigrants or children of immigrants, those who are not ultra-Orthodox and those who have right-wing views tend to attribute to themselves a higher level of patriotism. 61% of Jews say that they are “very patriotic” while only 15% say they are “not especially patriotic.” Only one in every four young people (25%) aged 18-29 defines himself as “extremely patriotic.” This compares to over half (57%) of those 60 years old and above. Among those whose standard family income stood at more than 15,000 shekels per month, the percentage of “extremely patriotic” responses was significantly higher than those whose family income was less than 4,000 shekels (72% versus 47%). The subjective patriotic affinity is stronger among those who placed themselves on the political right and center, and the same is true for those with only an elementary school education or less. On the other hand, among the ranks of the left and those with higher education, patriotism is viewed with more reserve, though only 9% of those belonging to these groups said they were not patriotic at all.




Figure 7: The strength of Israeli patriotism in the entire sample




Figure 8: The strength of Israeli patriotism according to age, income, level of education and political inclination among the Jewish public

Israeli, Jewish and Palestinian Patriotism (by nationality)




Figure 9: The strength of Israeli, Jewish and Palestinian patriotism in the entire sample

For every Arab who defines himself as "very patriotic" towards Israel (24%), two Arabs define themselves as "very patriotic" towards the Palestinian people (48%). An analysis of the spheres of patriotism by nationality indicates that the level of rejection of the definition "Israeli patriot" among the Israeli Arabs (41%) is almost twice the level of rejection of the definition "Palestinian patriot" (22%). It is possible that the conflict of identity among the Arabs leaves them exposed on both ends, because they find it difficult to unequivocally affiliate themselves with either one of the spheres.

Among the Jewish public in Israel, a greater number see themselves as part of the Jewish patriotic sphere than the Israeli patriotic sphere (70% versus 67%). An analysis of the statistical trends indicates that the tendency toward Jewish patriotism strengthens among the religious, right-wingers, those with lower levels of education and older people. The absolute majority of religious (97%) and ultra-Orthodox Jews (91%) define themselves as "very patriotic toward the Jewish world," while a substantial percentage of the secular population rejects this definition completely. Israeli patriotism peaks among those defining themselves as religious, while 64% of secular Israelis say they are "very patriotic."

Israeli and Jewish Patriotism (by level of religiosity)




Figure 10: The strength of Israeli and Jewish patriotism according to level of religiosity, among the Jewish public




Figure 11: The strength of Israeli and Jewish patriotism according to age and education, in the Jewish public

Those who are in their fifties and sixties are more likely to describe themselves as Israeli patriots, though the difference is relatively small. Over 80% of those 60 years of age and older defined themselves as “very patriotic” Israelis, compared to 60% of the other age groups in the Jewish public. The gap between the generations is larger when comparing the numbers of those who defined themselves as “extremely patriotic.” **The percentage of ardent patriots in the oldest age group is over twice that of the youngest group (57% versus 25%).** An examination of the correlation between patriotism and education clearly indicates that the higher the level of education, the lower the level of Jewish patriotic affinity. While 93% of those with only primary education defined themselves as very patriotic Jews, only 62% of those with university education chose to define themselves in this way.

Among the Arab public, the gap between the levels of Israel and Palestinian patriotism is largest in the middle-age groups and among those with higher education. Among those in their thirties and forties, about 55% define themselves as “very patriotic” in regard to the Palestinian Authority compared to only 10% who define themselves as Israeli patriots. A significant gap of 30% exists in the group of those with high school and university education. The trend reverses among those 50 years old and above and among those with low levels of education.



Figure 12: The strength of Israeli and Palestinian patriotism according to age and education, among the Arab public

Contrary to the Jewish population, Israel Arabs do not perceive the willingness to fight for the country as an important part of Israeli patriotism. They do however attach great importance to physically living in the state and the love of the land. Religious respondents ranked the Jewish components of Israeli patriotism at a higher level than secular respondents, who stressed civilian aspects such as displaying the flag and voting in the elections.

The Sacrifice Dimension

Nearly all of the Jewish public (94%) is willing to fight for Israel's defense, but among the Arab minority the readiness to defend the state's existence is low (27%). Most of the Arab public would *definitely* not agree to fight (63%) or would *almost certainly* refuse to do so (10%). On the other hand, the percentage of Jews who said they would not fight to defend the state is among the lowest in the world (6%). A statistical analysis of trends indicates that among the Jews, the willingness to fight tends to rise among older people, right-wingers, the wealthy and those who are not ultra-Orthodox (in this order). The data shows that one in every seven Jews in their twenties will almost certainly refuse to fight in the next war.




Figure 13: The willingness to fight for the state, in the entire sample




Figure 14: The willingness to fight for the state, according to nationality




Figure 15: The willingness to fight for the state, according to age, among the Jewish public

The hesitancy to fight for the state is higher among those in their forties and younger, while the percentage of those refusing to fight is highest among those in their twenties. One in every seven Jews in their twenties will almost certainly refuse to fight if another war breaks out (14%). On the other hand, those 60 years of age and above would all fight for the state, without exception (100%). The turning point is among those in their forties, who were born in the 1960s. The highest proportion of those hesitant to fight can be found in this group: 33% said they would fight, but qualified this as “almost certain.” The level of doubt is lower among younger Israelis, but this is not due to an increase in the readiness to fight. Rather, this is because more have crossed the line and responded that they almost certainly would not agree to defend the state (6% of those 30-39 years old said they almost certainly would not fight, compared to 14% of those 18-29 years old).




Figure 16: The willingness to fight for the state, according to level of religiosity and political inclination, among the Jewish public




Figure 17: The willingness to fight for the state, according to income and level of education, among the Jewish public

Among the Jewish public, the willingness to fight is lowest among those with low incomes: 9% said they would not agree to fight for the state if the need arises, while 27% qualified their answers by saying that they would “almost certainly” fight. The gap between those with elementary education and those with higher education is also significant: While the former responded unanimously that they would certainly agree to fight (100%), the latter were more doubtful and about a quarter of them qualified their readiness (24%). Most of the ultra-Orthodox would be willing to fight for the state if another war were to erupt. While the levels of consent to fight among the right-wing public (97%), the traditional public (96%), and the religious public (99%) are higher, 87% of the ultra-Orthodox respondents answered affirmatively to this question. On the other hand, some leftists (15%) and secular (8%) Israelis say they would refuse to fight.

Is it acceptable to refuse to fight in a war you believe is morally wrong?




Figure 18: The justification for refusing to fight in an immoral war, in the entire sample

Half of Israeli society justifies the refusal to fight in a war that is considered by them to be immoral (55%), compared to a quarter that strongly reject this option (25%). Among the Jewish public, the tendency to justify refusal on moral grounds is higher among women, the secular, the poor and those with left-wing views. In general, the levels of justification for refusal are higher within the Arab public (70%) compared to the Jewish public (51%). Among the Jewish public, secular people (57%) and leftists (68%) justify this to a relatively high extent. Most women (61%) believe that it is justified to refuse to fight in a war that they regard as immoral, compared to a minority of men (40%) who share this belief. On the other hand, some 36% of Jewish men and 27% of the overall Jewish population completely reject the option of refusal to fight on moral grounds. The proportion of those who absolutely reject refusal is higher among the ultra-Orthodox (43%) and traditional (37%) population. Among the political right, this proportion stands at 33%.




Figure 19: The justification for refusing to fight in an immoral war, according to nationality and gender, political inclination and level of religiosity, in the Jewish public

The Rootedness Dimension

Most Israelis reject the possibility of leaving the country (59%), but one in every four would be willing to do so if this led to a substantial improvement in their standard of living (24%). Among those in their twenties, the situation is even more troubling: Two of every five young people would leave the state if a better standard of life were promised to them (44%). While 82% of Israelis sixty years old and above strongly rejected the possibility of emigrating from Israel, among those in their thirties only 47% are certain they would not opt to emigrate, and among those in their twenties this percentage drops to 38%. The absolute majority of those with low education levels said that they are sure they would not leave (91%). In regard to income, 57% of middle class respondents were opposed to emigrating, about twice the rate of those from the upper class (29%). **Israeli Arabs are more resolute in rejecting the possibility of leaving the state (70%) than the Jewish public (58%).**

Would you like to go and settle in another country if it would significantly raise your standard of living?






Figure 20: The readiness to emigrate from Israel in return for an improved standard of living, in the entire sample


Would you like to go and settle in another country? (Jews)



Would you like to go and settle in another country? (Arabs)



Would you like to go and settle in another country?



Would you like to go and settle in another country?




Figure 21: The readiness to emigrate from Israel in return for an improved standard of living, according to nationality in the entire sample, and age and income level, among the Jewish sector

I will encourage my children to live in Israel





Figure 22: The readiness to encourage the young generation to live in Israel, in the entire sample


The weakening of the dimension of rootedness among the young generation is also evident in the responses to the statement: “I will encourage my children to live in Israel, even though there are more secure and prosperous places they could live in.” **Most Israelis (67%), including the Arabs in Israel (58%) are certain that they would encourage their children to stay in their homeland, but among those in their twenties, less than half said they “strongly agree” that they would do so (48%).** A review of the distribution according to income indicates that the percentage of Israelis who believe they would invest efforts to keep the young generation in Israel is lowest among those with standard family incomes of lower than 8,000 shekels per month (81%-83%).

While all of the ultra-Orthodox respondents, without exception, would encourage their children to live in Israel, one in ten secular Israelis is certain that he or she would not do so (13%). As a result, the percentage of secular Israelis who would encourage their children to live in Israel (79%) is lower than that of traditional (94%) and religious (84%) Israelis. Significant gaps are evident between the genders: More women than men would like to see their children living in Israel (90% versus 79%).


I will encourage my children to live in Israel




I will encourage my children to live in Israel



I will encourage my children to live in Israel



I will encourage my children to live in Israel



Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

Figure 23: The readiness to encourage the young generation to live in Israel by age, income, gender and level of religiosity, among the Jewish public

I would rather be a citizen of Israel than of any other country in the world




Figure 24: The level of preference for Israeli citizenship, in the entire sample




Figure 25: The level of preference for Israeli citizenship, according to education, age, country of origin and level of religiosity, among the Jewish public

More than two thirds of Israelis are certain that they would prefer their Israeli citizenship to any other citizenship in the world (68%), but only half of those in their twenties are sure of this (50%). A relatively low percentage of certainty in preferring Israeli citizenship is evident among native-born Israelis (“sabras”) whose father was also born in Israel (56% are sure they would prefer their Israeli citizenship), secular Israelis (61%) and those with higher education (64%). A low percentage of preference for Israeli citizenship also characterizes those born in the Soviet Union or whose father was born there: Only 62% of them “strongly agree” that they would prefer to be an Israeli citizen. The Arab minority displays much more skepticism about Israeli citizenship, but 82% of the state’s Arab citizens would ultimately prefer to be citizens of Israel, compared to 88% of the state’s Jewish citizens.

To summarize the rootedness statements, it seems that the young and the secular are the least rooted among all groups within the Jewish public. On the other hand, those with an elementary level of education, the ultra-Orthodox and the elderly have, on average, the deepest roots in their homeland.

The Pride Dimension

The gap between the Jewish and Arab citizens of the state is greatest on the question of pride in being Israeli: While 52% of the Jewish public is "very proud" to be Israeli, this figure drops to only 13% among the Arabs in Israel. One in every three Israeli Arabs is not proud of his or her citizenship (36%), compared to one in every five Jews (17%). Nonetheless, the findings show a complete disparity between pride in being Israeli and belief that Israel is better than most other countries. The positive assessment of the state is higher among the Arab public (77%), despite the fact that this is not translated into higher levels of pride.

How proud are you of being Israeli?






Figure 26: The pride in being Israeli, in the entire sample


The pride in being Israeli (Jews)



The pride in being Israeli (Arabs)



Israel is better than most other countries (Jews)



Israel is better than most other countries (Arabs)




Figure 27: The pride in being Israeli and the perception of Israel as better than most other countries, according to nationality




Figure 28: The pride in being Israeli, according to gender, among the Jewish public

The tendency to be proud of the state is stronger in the Jewish sample among women, the wealthy and those with a low level of education. The proportion of women who are proud of being Israeli (87%) is higher than that of men (79%) and the number of men who responded that they are “not at all proud” of being Israeli (13%) is four times higher than the corresponding number of women (3%). In regard to income, every single high-income respondent said that he or she was proud to be Israeli, while the highest percentage of those who said they were not at all proud of their citizenship (14%) was among the respondents with the lowest income. A high level of education also lowers the extent and intensity of pride: Only four out of every ten respondents with academic degrees are “very proud” of the state (42%), compared to seven out of ten of those with only basic education (70%).

Contrary to the tendencies identified in statements about rootedness, the level of pride among those in their forties and younger (85% on average) was slightly higher than among those in their fifties and above (80% on average). In the political context, the highest level of pride was measured among those who affiliate themselves with the political center (88%), while the percentage of those who are “very proud” was highest among those with right-wing views (63%).




Figure 29: The pride in being Israeli, according to the level of education, political inclination, income and age, among the Jewish public




Figure 30: Components of national pride, according to nationality (in percentages)




Figure 31: Components of national pride in the Jewish and Arab public (average of responses)

A closer look at the question of Israeli pride reveals that **60% of Israeli Arab are proud of the Israeli security forces to some extent** (compared to 89% among the Jewish public). While the levels of pride are generally lower among the Arab public, **the main pride of Jews and Arabs in Israel is directed toward identical areas; the state’s scientific and technological achievements constitute the leading source of pride**. 99% of the Jews are proud of these achievements, compared to 86% of Arabs. Equality also exists in the extent of the lack of pride related to Israel’s “fair and equal treatment of all groups in society” – 81% of Arabs and 83% of Jews are not proud of the state’s conduct in this area.

The most significant difference between Jews and Arabs lies in the pride felt by each group towards the state’s social welfare policies. The number of Arabs who are proud of Israeli welfare policy (53%) is three times higher than the number of Jews who take pride in this (17%). While nearly half of the Jews said they were “not proud at all” in the welfare system (44%), less than a fifth of the Arab sample (19%) gave this response. A comparison of the data also indicates that **Arabs in Israel are prouder than Jews in the way democracy functions in the state, though this is only by a relatively low margin (43% versus 37%).**

Components of National Pride (by income)





Figure 32: Components of national pride, according to income level

The pride in the Israeli security forces is significantly lower among those with low incomes. Only 72% of those whose standard family income is less than 4,000 shekels per month are proud of the defense establishment, compared to 100% of those whose family income is over 30,000 shekels per month. While pride in the state’s sports achievements is inversely proportionate to income level, pride in Israel’s economic achievements is lowest among the poor: 72% of the low-income respondents are not proud of the Israeli economy, compared to 45% of the families that earn 8,000-30,000 shekels per month.

The public in Israel, and especially the religious and ultra-Orthodox, give low grades to the way democracy operates in Israel: Two out of every three Jews are not proud of the way Israel’s democracy works (63%). In the political context, those in the center of the spectrum express the highest levels of pride in Israeli democracy, but even among this group, only 46% said they are proud of the way it works. **A salient finding is that the religious and ultra-Orthodox are not proud of the state’s fundamental values:** 97% of the ultra-Orthodox Jews and 52% of the religious Jews are not proud of what is defined as the “Jewish character” of Israel.

A review of the average assessment given to areas of pride by respondents with various educational levels and political views indicates that in all of the cases, the main areas of greatest pride are Israel’s scientific and technological achievements, its security forces, and its achievements in the arts and literature. It is worth noting again in this context that the survey was conducted in early December 2005, when Professor Israel (Robert) Aumann won the Nobel Prize in Economics.

Components of National Pride (by political inclination)



Components of National Pride (by level of religiosity)




Figure 33 : Components of national pride, according to the level of religiosity and political inclination, among the Jewish public

The Symbolic Dimension

Israeli society in general is very sensitive about its symbols, even if some groups, for their own reasons, do not see a problem with scorning these symbols. Three out of every four Arabs (76%) and two out of every four ultra-Orthodox Jews (42%) do not feel angry “when people show contempt for the Israeli flag.” Nonetheless, even when including these two groups, a large majority of Israelis agree that “wearing the uniform of the IDF is a great privilege” (78%). A similar percentage of citizens feel angry “when people do not stand up when sirens are sounded at national commemoration days such as Memorial Day” (80%) or “when people show contempt for the Israeli flag” (79%).

The correlation of the respondents’ attitude toward the various symbols is very high, and this reflects positively on the academic validity of the questions. An examination of the statistical trends among the Jewish public pointed toward several groups that have a greater sensitivity to national symbols in general and to the importance of the flag in particular. Among others, this includes older Israelis, those who are not ultra-Orthodox, right-wingers, women, the wealthy, those who were not born in Israel (or whose parents were immigrants) and those with a low level of education.




Figure 34: The attitude toward national symbols, in the entire sample






Figure 35: The attitude toward national symbols, in the Arab public

The survey indicates that **secular Israelis are the most sensitive to honoring the siren on Memorial Day**. 93% of them feel angry when people do not honor the siren, compared to 84% of religious Jews and 43% of ultra-Orthodox Jews. On the other hand, **traditional Jews are the most sensitive to honoring the national flag**. 93% of them feel angry when the flag is scorned, compared to 86% of secular Jews who feel this way. The Israeli left is more moderately upset by scorn for the flag (24% are “not angry at all” about this), but it is **not indifferent to the failure to stand for the siren on Memorial Day**. While this disrespect for the siren makes 83% of right-wingers angry, this figure rises to 92% among the left. In regard to discrepancies between the genders, **women become angrier when the flag or siren is scorned**. 91% of women said they would become angry in such situations, compared to 83% of men.

Attitudes toward the flag and Memorial Day sirens



Attitudes toward the flag and Memorial Day sirens (by political inclination)



Attitudes toward the flag and Memorial Day sirens (by level of religiosity)





Figure 36: The attitude toward the flag and commemoration sirens, according to gender, level of religiosity, and political inclination, in the Jewish public

The discrepancies between the generations are also significant in relation to national symbols, including the IDF uniform. **On average, one in every four Israelis aged 18-39 does not regard wearing the uniform of the IDF as a great privilege (about 24%), while this opinion is voiced by only a negligible number of respondents who are at least 60 years old (about 2%).** Level of education also has a consistent impact on the attitude toward the IDF uniform. Only 57% of those with academic degrees agree that wearing the uniform is a great privilege, compared to 100% of those with only elementary education.

Wearing the uniform of the IDF is a great privilege



Wearing the uniform of the IDF is a great privilege




Figure 37: The attitude toward the IDF uniform, according to age and education, in the Jewish sector

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Willingness to fight for the state: Israel [IPS 2006] relative to OECD countries [WVS 2000/2001]	10
Figure 2: Pride in being a citizen of the state: Israel [IPS 2006] relative to OECD countries [ISSP 2003]	11
Figure 3: Belief that the state is better than others: Israel [IPS 2006] relative to OECD countries [ISSP 2003].....	12
Figure 4: Preference for being a citizen of the state: Israel [IPS 2003] relative to OECD countries [ISSP 2003].....	13
Figure 5: Strength of patriotism and justification for refusal in Israel [IPS 2006] and the US [Gallup 2005, PRSA 2005]	14
Figure 6: Comparing the level of esteem and preference for Israel between the years 1995, 2003 and 2006	14
Figure 7: The strength of Israeli patriotism in the entire sample	15
Figure 8: The strength of Israeli patriotism according to age, income, level of education and political inclination among the Jewish public.....	15
Figure 9: The strength of Israeli, Jewish and Palestinian patriotism in the entire sample	16
Figure 10: The strength of Israeli and Jewish patriotism according to level of religiosity, among the Jewish public.....	16
Figure 11: The strength of Israeli and Jewish patriotism according to age and education, in the Jewish public.....	17
Figure 12: The strength of Israeli and Palestinian patriotism according to age and education, among the Arab public	17
Figure 13: The willingness to fight for the state, in the entire sample	18
Figure 14: The willingness to fight for the state, according to nationality.....	18
Figure 15: The willingness to fight for the state, according to age, among the Jewish public	18
Figure 16: The willingness to fight for the state, according to level of religiosity and political inclination, among the Jewish public.....	19
Figure 17: The willingness to fight for the state, according to income and level of education, among the Jewish public.....	19
Figure 18: The justification for refusing to fight in an immoral war, in the entire sample	20
Figure 19: The justification for refusing to fight in an immoral war, according to nationality and gender, political inclination and level of religiosity, in the Jewish public	20
Figure 20: The readiness to emigrate from Israel in return for an improved standard of living, in the entire sample	21
Figure 21: The readiness to emigrate from Israel in return for an improved standard of living, according to nationality in the entire sample, and age and income level, among the Jewish sector.....	21
Figure 22: The readiness to encourage the young generation to live in Israel, in the entire sample.....	22
Figure 23: The readiness to encourage the young generation to live in Israel by age, income, gender and level of religiosity, among the Jewish public.....	22
Figure 24: The level of preference for Israeli citizenship, in the entire sample	23
Figure 25: The level of preference for Israeli citizenship, according to education, age, country of origin and level of religiosity, among the Jewish public.....	23
Figure 26: The pride in being Israeli, in the entire sample	24
Figure 27: The pride in being Israeli and the perception of Israel as better than most other countries, according to nationality	24
Figure 28: The pride in being Israeli, according to gender, among the Jewish public.....	25
Figure 29: The pride in being Israeli, according to the level of education, political inclination, income and age, among the Jewish public.....	25
Figure 30: Components of national pride, according to nationality (in percentages).....	26
Figure 31: Components of national pride in the Jewish and Arab public (average of responses).....	26
Figure 32: Components of national pride, according to income level	27
Figure 33 : Components of national pride, according to the level of religiosity and political inclination, among the Jewish public.....	27
Figure 34: The attitude toward national symbols, in the entire sample.....	28
Figure 35: The attitude toward national symbols, in the Arab public	28
Figure 36: The attitude toward the flag and commemoration sirens, according to gender, level of religiosity, and political inclination, in the Jewish public	29
Figure 37: The attitude toward the IDF uniform, according to age and education, in the Jewish sector	29

Bibliography

"Patriotism", in: **International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences**, Editors in Chief: Smelser, N.J. Baltes P.B. Volume 16, 2001, Amsterdam, Elsevier.

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), 2005, **Polls on Patriotism and Military Service**, [Available on <http://www.aei.org/publicopinion9>].

Arian, A. 1997, **The Second Republic: Politics in Israel**, Tel Aviv, Haifa University Press & Zmora-Bitan Publishers (Hebrew).

Ben-Amos, A. Bar-Tal, D. (eds.) 2004, **Patriotism: Homeland Love**, Tel Aviv, Dyonon (Hebrew).

Berns, W. 2001, **Making Patriots**, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Burbank, H. 2005, "German National Identity: Patriotism and Stigma", **Stanford Undergraduate Research Journal**, 4, pp. 8-12. [Available on <http://www.stanford.edu/group/journal/2003/pdfs/GermanIdentity.pdf>].

Canovan, M. 2000, "Patriotism is not Enough", **British Journal of Political Science**, 30, pp. 413-432.

Dror, Y. 1997, **Refounding Zionism**, Jerusalem, Publishing House of the World Zionist Organization (Hebrew).

Gavison, R. 1999, **Can Israel be Both Jewish and Democratic: Tensions and Prospects**, Jerusalem, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute / Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House (Hebrew).

Gilbert, D. 2003, **Hamilton College Patriotism Poll: Eleven Key Findings**, New York, Hamilton College. [Available on <http://www.hamilton.edu/Levitt/surveys/patriotism/>]

Grodzins, M. 1956, **The Loyal and the Disloyal: Social Boundaries of Patriotism and Treason**, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

Institute for Social Research, 26/10/2005, **How Americans Responded?**, <http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/har/> (University of Michigan).

Janowitz, M. 1982, "Patriotism and the U.S. All-Volunteer Military", **Air University Review**, January-February.

Jewish Agency for Israel, 2003, **Minds Across Israel**, Tel Aviv, Lamiskal (Hebrew).

Markell, P. 2000, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy?: On 'Constitutional Patriotism'", **Political Theory**, 28, 1, pp. 38-63.

Moya, M. Morales-Marente, E. 2005, "Psycho politic reactions to March 11 terrorist attacks", **Revista dr Psicologia Social**, 20, 3, pp. 331-350.

Oz, A. 1998, **All Our Hopes: Essays on the Israeli Condition**, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House.

Parker, C.S. 2003, **Shades of Patriotism: Group Identity, National Identity, and Democracy**, Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Pennsylvania. Available on: http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/parker/workingpapers/shades_of_patriotism.pdf.

Schaar, J.H. 1973, "The case for patriotism", **New American Review**, 17, pp. 59-99.

Schatz, T.R. & Stauc, E. 1997, "Manifestations of Blind and Constructive Patriotism: Personality Correlates and Individual-Group Relations", In D. Bar-Tel, Staub, E. (eds.), **Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations**, Chicago, Nelson Hall, pp. 229-245.

Segev, T. 2001, **The New Zionists**, Jerusalem, Keter Publishing House (Hebrew).

Smith, T.W. Jarkko, L. 2001, **National Pride in Cross-National Perspective**, University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Centre [Available on <http://www.norc.uchicago.edu/new/part1.pdf>].

Somerville, J. 1981, "Patriotism and War", **Ethics**, 91, 4, pp. 568-578.

Sprinzak, E. 2003, **The Israeli Arabs: From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Management**, Herzliya, Interdisciplinary Center (Hebrew).

Stewart, H.L. 1917, "Is Patriotism Immoral", **The American Journal of Sociology**, 22, 5, pp. 616-629.

Sullivan, J.L. Fried, A. Dietz, M.G. 1992, "Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Elections of 1988", **American Journal of Political Science**, 36, 1, pp. 200-234.

Taylor, M. 1990, "Patriotism, History and the Left in Twentieth-Century Britain", **The Historical Journal**, 33, 4, pp. 971-987.

Tocqueville, A. 1835/1997, **Democracy in America**, Oxford, Penguin Classics.

Viroli, M. 1995, **For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism**, Oxford, University Press.

Yuchtman-Ya'ar, E. Peres, Y. 2000, **Between Consent and Dissent**, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield.

Research Centers:

CPPS – California Patriotism Pilot Study

ISR – Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (www.isr.umich.edu/)

NES – National Election Survey at the University of Michigan (www.umich.edu/~nes/)

NORC – National Organization of Research at the University of Chicago (www.norc.uchicago.edu/)

PEW – Research Center for the People and the Press (www.people-press.org/)

PRSA – Public Relations Society of America (www.prsa.org/)

WVS – World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

Appendix: The Patriotism Questionnaire

1. How proud are you of being an Israeli?

- (a) extremely proud; (b) very proud; (c) moderately proud;
 (d) only a little proud; (e) not at all proud

2. How proud are you of Israel in each of the following:

	(a) Very Proud	(b) Somewhat Proud	(c) Not very proud	(d) Not proud at all
2a. Its security forces				
2b. The way its democracy works				
2c. Its economic achievements				
2d. Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society				
2e. Its scientific and technological achievements				
2f. Its achievements in arts and literature				
2g. Its achievements in sports				
2h. Its Jewish character				
2i. Its ethical and cultural heritage				
2j. Its social security system				
2k. Its social solidarity				

3. How patriotic are you?

- (a) extremely patriotic; (b) very patriotic;
 (c) somewhat patriotic; (d) not especially patriotic.

4. (Arabs) How patriotic are you towards the Palestinian Authority?

- (a) extremely patriotic; (b) very patriotic;
 (c) somewhat patriotic; (d) not especially patriotic.

5. (Jews) How patriotic are you towards the Jewish world?

- (a) extremely patriotic; (b) very patriotic;
 (c) somewhat patriotic; (d) not especially patriotic.

6. Israeli Patriotism means many things to many people. I am going to read a number of activities that some people believe are important parts of patriotism. For each one, I would like you to say if you agree or disagree that it is an "important part of patriotism".

	(a) Strongly Agree	(b) Agree	(c) Disagree	(d) Strongly Disagree
6a. Donating money to a community organization that helps those in need				
6b. Displaying the Israeli flag				
6c. Raising one's voice in opposition to prevailing public opinion in times of national crisis if what one believes is the future of the country is at stake				
6d. Willingness to fight for the country				
6e. Buying Israeli products ("blue-white")				
6f. Establishing a new village in the Negev				
6g. Voting in the General Elections				
6h. Living in Israel				

7. Patriotism might also be correlated to values and expressions. I am going to read a number of terms some people believe are related to Israeli patriotism. For each one, I would like you to say if you agree or disagree that it has to do with patriotism.

	(a) Strongly Agree	(b) Agree	(c) Disagree	(d) Strongly Disagree
7a. Zionism				
7b. Love of the land of Israel ("Ahavat Haaretz")				
7c. The Prophets of Israel				
7d. The Bible ("Sefer Hasfarim")				
7e. Social justice				
7f. The Ingathering of the Exiles				

8. Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?

(a) yes; (b) no

9. Would you like to go and settle in another country if it would significantly raise your standard of living?

(a) yes; (b) no

10. I am going to read you a number of statements. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them?

(after each statement, ask whether the interviewee strongly agrees/disagrees).

	(a) Strongly Agree	(b) Agree	(c) Disagree	(d) Strongly Disagree
10a. I would rather be a citizen of Israel than of any other country in the world.				
10b. I will encourage my children to live in Israel, even though there are more secure and prosperous places they could live in.				
10c. It's acceptable to refuse to fight in a war you believe is morally wrong.				
10d. Generally speaking, Israel is a better country than most other countries.				
10e. Wearing the uniform of the IDF is a great privilege.				
10f. When I hear Hatikva, I feel proud to be Israeli.				

11. How angry does it make you feel when people show contempt for the Israeli flag?

(a) extremely angry; (b) very angry; (c) not very angry; (d) not angry at all

12. How angry does it make you feel when people do not stand up when sirens are sounded on national commemoration days such as Memorial Day?

(a) extremely angry; (b) very angry; (c) not very angry; (d) not angry at all

13. How would you define your outlook? Are you –

(a) post-Zionist; (b) Zionist; (c) anti Zionist; (d) none of the above