A Theory of Socially Responsible Investment *

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Abstract

We characterize conditions under which socially responsible investors can impact firm behavior. Impact requires a sufficient relaxation of financing constraints for clean production, which can only occur if socially responsible investors internalize social costs irrespective of whether they are investors in a given firm. Socially responsible and financial investors are complementary: jointly they can achieve higher welfare than either investor type alone. Scarce socially responsible capital should be allocated based on a social profitability index (SPI) that captures not only on a firm’s social status quo but also the counterfactual social costs produced in the absence of socially responsible investors.

Keywords: Socially responsible investing, ESG, SPI, capital allocation, sustainable investment, social ratings.

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In recent years, the question of the social responsibility of business, famously raised by Friedman (1970), has re-emerged in the context of the spectacular rise of socially responsible investment (SRI). Assets under management in socially responsible funds have grown manifold,¹ and many traditional investors consider augmenting their asset allocation with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) scores (Pedersen et al., 2019). From an asset management perspective, this trend raises immediate questions about the financial performance of such investments (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009, Chava, 2014, Barber et al., 2018). However, if socially responsible investing is to generate real impact, it must affect firms’ production decisions. This raises additional, fundamental questions: Under which conditions can socially responsible investors impact firm behavior? And how should scarce socially responsible capital be allocated across firms?

Answering these questions requires taking a corporate finance view of socially responsible investment. To this end, we incorporate socially responsible investors and the choice between clean and dirty production into an otherwise standard model of corporate financing with agency frictions, building on Holmström and Tirole (1997). The model’s main results are driven by the interaction of financing constraints (leading to underinvestment in socially desirable clean production) and negative production externalities (which can lead to overinvestment in socially undesirable dirty production).

We find that socially responsible investors can indeed push firms to adopt clean production. They optimally do so by raising a firm’s financing capacity under clean production beyond the amount that purely profit-motivated investors would provide. The resulting increase in clean production raises welfare, even compared to the scenario where all capital is held by socially responsible investors. However, increasing clean production beyond the scale that profit-motivated investors would fund is only possible if socially responsible make financial losses. Therefore, a necessary condition for socially responsible investors to break even, in social terms, on their impact investments is that they follow a

¹ For example, the Global Sustainable Investment Alliance (2018) reports sustainable investing assets of $30.7tn at the beginning of 2018, an increase of 34% relative to two years prior.
broad mandate, in the sense that they internalize social costs generated by firms regardless of whether they are investors in these firms. When faced with an investment decision across many heterogeneous firms, scarce socially responsible capital should be allocated according to a social profitability index (SPI). One key feature of this micro-founded ESG metric is that avoided social cost (and not only the level thereof) is relevant for ranking investments. Hence, investments in “sin” industries are not necessarily inconsistent with the mandate of being socially responsible.

We develop these results in a parsimonious model, initially focusing on the investment decision of a single firm. The firm is owned by an entrepreneur with limited wealth, who has access to two constant-returns-to-scale production technologies, dirty and clean. Dirty production has a higher per-unit financial return, but entails significant social costs. Clean production is financially less attractive but socially preferable, because it generates lower (although not necessarily zero) social costs. Production under either technology requires the entrepreneur to exert unobservable effort, so that not all cash flows are pledgeable to outside investors. The firm can raise funding from (up to) two types of outside investors. Financial investors behave competitively and, as their name suggests, care solely about financial returns. Socially responsible investors, on the other hand, care also about external social costs generated by the firm. Socially responsible investors act in a coordinated fashion, so that they are most easily interpreted as a large (sovereign wealth) fund.\footnote{This assumption allows to avoid a free-rider problem that arises when infinitesimal socially responsible investors take the firm’s investment decisions as given.}

As a benchmark, we initially consider a setting in which only financial investors are present. Because of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem, the amount of outside financing and, hence, the firm’s scale of production are limited. However, because it is financially more attractive, financial investors offer better financing terms for the dirty production technology, enabling a larger production scale than under the clean technology. As a result, the entrepreneur may adopt the socially inefficient dirty production
technology, even if she partially internalizes the associated externalities due to an intrinsic preference for clean production.

We then analyze whether and how socially responsible investors can address this social inefficiency. We show that the optimal way to achieve impact (i.e., induce a change in the firm’s production technology) is to relax financing constraints for clean production, thereby enabling additional value creation. One way the firm can implement the resulting financing agreement by issuing two bonds, a green bond purchased by socially responsible investors and a regular bond purchased by financial investors. However, because financial investors are not willing to provide this scale on their own, the extra financing must involve a financial loss to socially responsible investors. Therefore, the green bond is issued at a premium, consistent with evidence in Baker et al. (2018) and Zerbib (2019).

Our results highlight a complementarity between socially responsible and financial investors. Because of this complementarity, welfare (which, in our model, is equivalent to the total scale of clean production) is generally higher when both types of investors are present. The complementarity between socially responsible and financial investors arises from the respective comparative advantage of each investor type. Compared to socially responsible investors, financial investors are more aggressive in providing financing as they view a project (under either technology) as more profitable, thereby alleviating the underinvestment problem that results from agency frictions. However, because of their disregard for externalities, financial investors facilitate the adoption of the socially inefficient dirty technology, creating scope for socially responsible investors to guide the firm’s choice of technology. In doing so, the threat of dirty production relaxes the participation constraint of socially responsible investors and, thereby, acts like a quasi-asset to the entrepreneur that allows the financing of the clean technology. Therefore, the presence of financial investors is instrumental to unlocking the additional capital socially responsible investors provide for the clean technology.

Our analysis identifies three necessary conditions for this complementarity to arise.
First, socially responsible investors need to follow a broad mandate. This means that they must care unconditionally about external social costs of production, whether or not they are investors in the firm that produces them. If socially responsible investors follow a narrow mandate, in that they only care about social costs generated by their own investment, they cannot impact production decisions, since dirty production will then simply be financed by financial investors. Second, the clean technology must be subject to financing constraints, so that additional clean scale is socially valuable. Third, socially responsible capital needs to be in sufficient supply to be able to discipline the threat of dirty production. If this is not the case, dirty production is not merely an off-equilibrium threat but occurs in equilibrium.

While socially responsible capital has seen substantial growth over the last few years, it is likely that such capital remains scarce relative to financial capital that simply chases financial returns. This raises the question of how scarce socially responsible capital is invested most efficiently. Which firms should impact investors target? A multi-firm extension of our model yields a micro-founded investment criterion for scarce socially responsible capital, the Social Profitability Index (SPI).

Similar to the profitability index, the SPI measures “bang for buck”—i.e., value created for socially responsible investors per unit of socially responsible capital consumed. However, unlike the conventional profitability index, the SPI not only reflects the (social) return of the project that is being funded, but also the counterfactual social costs that a firm would have generated in the absence of investment by socially responsible investors. For example, investment metrics for socially responsible investors should include estimates of carbon emissions that can be avoided if the firm adopts a cleaner production technology. Because avoided externalities matter, it can be efficient for socially responsible investors to invest in firms that, in an absolute sense, generate a high level of social costs even under clean production. Accordingly, investments in sin industries (see Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)) can be consistent with socially responsible investing.
The SPI also rationalizes why environmental, social, and governance issues are often bundled into one ESG score. In our model, a connection between these distinct aspects of corporate behavior arises naturally, because the severity of the manager’s agency problem determines the financing constraints the firm faces with respect to both financial and socially responsible investors. The SPI reflects these financing constraints because they interact with the externalities generated by the firm. Therefore, the SPI incorporates all three ESG elements.

Throughout the paper, we abstract away from government intervention. One way to interpret our results is therefore as characterizing the extent to which the market can fix problems of social cost before the government imposes regulation or Pigouvian taxes. Another interpretation is that our analysis concerns those social costs that remain after the government has intervened. For example, informational frictions and political economy constraints may make it difficult for governments to apply Pigouvian taxes or ban dirty production.\(^3\) However, even if government intervention is possible, a surprising implication of our analysis is that text-book regulation in the form of Pigouvian taxes or regulation may result in lower welfare than the market solution achieved by the co-investment of financial and socially responsible investors. While Pigouvian taxes or bans on dirty production would certainly ensure the adoption of the clean technology (even when financing is provided by financial investors only), such regulation also eliminates the threat of dirty production, which is necessary to unlock additional capital by socially responsible investors. The broader point is that regulation that targets one source of inefficiency (externalities) but does not address the other source (financing constraints) can be less effective than the market solution characterized in our paper.

**Related Literature.** Despite the growing interest in socially responsible investing (see, e.g., Landier and Nair, 2009), the theory literature on this topic is still relatively

\(^3\) Examples of social costs for which government intervention is likely to be particularly difficult include those where the relevant externality is global in nature, as is the case for carbon emissions or systemic externalities caused by large financial institutions.
small. In a pioneering contribution, Heinkel et al. (2001) show that firms that are excluded by socially responsible investors suffer a reduction in risk-sharing among their investor base. The resulting increase in the cost of capital can induce firms to clean up their activities.\(^4\) Hart and Zingales (2017) characterize the objective of a firm with prosocial investors, who dislike social costs if they feel directly responsible for them. They argue that firms should maximize shareholder welfare instead of shareholder value. Socially responsible investors in our model are similar to prosocial investors, with the important difference that they care about externalities regardless of whether they are directly responsible for them. Chowdhry et al. (2018) study the financing of a firm that cannot commit pursuing social goals. A common theme with our paper is that the firm can monetize the socially-minded investors’ social preference. However, their analysis focuses on how socially-minded investors can blunt a firm’s profit motive (in the spirit of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001)) thereby allowing the firm to commit to emphasize social goals. In contrast, we focus on the ability of socially responsible investors to impact firms by relaxing financial constraints for clean production. While in our model socially responsible investors must necessarily make a financial loss, Gollier and Pouget (2014) provide a model in which a large activist investor can generate positive abnormal returns by reforming firms and then selling them back to the market. Finally, while our analysis assumes that socially responsible investors are able to coordinate to reduce social costs, Morgan and Tumlinson (forthcoming) provide a more detailed analysis of potential free-rider problems among investors and show how those can be overcome.

1 Model Setup

Our model builds on the canonical model of corporate financing in the presence of agency frictions laid out in Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2006). The main innovation

\(^4\) However, as Davies and Van Wesep (2018) point out, divestment can also have unintended consequences, for example, by inducing firms to prioritize short-term profit at the expense of long-term value.
is that the firm has access to two different production technologies, one of them “clean” (i.e., associated with low social costs) and the other “dirty” (i.e., associated with larger social costs).

**The entrepreneur, production, and moral hazard.** Our setting considers a risk-neutral entrepreneur who is protected by limited liability and endowed with initial liquid assets of $A$. The entrepreneur has access to two mutually exclusive production technologies $\tau \in \{C, D\}$, each with constant returns to scale. The technologies are identical in terms of revenue generation. Denoting firm scale (capital) by $K$, the firm generates positive cash flow of $RK$ with probability $p$ (conditional on effort by the entrepreneur, see below) and zero otherwise. Where the technologies differ is with respect to their production cost and the social costs they generate. In particular, the dirty technology $D$ generates a non-pecuniary negative externality of $\phi_D > 0$ per unit of scale and requires an upfront investment $k_D$ per unit of scale. The clean technology, on the other hand, results in a lower per-unit social cost $0 < \phi_C < \phi_D$, but entails a higher variable production cost $k_C > k_D$. The entrepreneur internalizes a fraction $\gamma^E \in [0, 1)$ of social costs, capturing (potential) intrinsic motives not to cause social harm. Since we do not model government intervention, the two technologies can be interpreted as those available to the firm after potential government intervention or regulation has taken place.\textsuperscript{5} Alternatively, our analysis can be interpreted as establishing what market forces (in the form of socially responsible investors) can achieve before government intervention takes place.

To generate a meaningful trade-off in the choice of technologies, we assume that the ranking of the two technologies differs depending on whether it is based on financial or social value. Denoting the per-unit financial value by $\pi_\tau := pR - k_\tau$ and the per-unit social value (welfare) by $v_\tau := \pi_\tau - \phi_\tau$, we posit that the dirty technology has a higher financial return, $\pi_D > \pi_C$, but clean production generates higher social welfare, $v_C > 0 > v_D$.

\textsuperscript{5}Because regulation or intervention is usually subject to informational or political economy constraints, it seems reasonable that the social costs of production cannot be dealt with by the government alone, creating a potential role for socially responsible investors.
The final inequality implies that the social return of the dirty production technologies is negative, meaning that the externalities caused by dirty production outweigh the financial value. The assumption that the dirty production technology has a negative social return is not necessary for our results, but it simplifies the exposition.

As in Holmström and Tirole (1997), the entrepreneur is subject to an agency problem. In particular, while the investment pays off with probability \( p \) if the entrepreneur exerts effort \( (a = 1) \), this probability is reduced to \( p - \Delta p \) when the entrepreneur shirks \( (a = 0) \), where \( \Delta p > 0 \). Shirking yields a per-unit non-pecuniary benefit of \( B \) to the entrepreneur, for a total private benefit of \( B \). A standard result (which we will show below) is that this agency friction reduces the firm’s unit pledgeable income by \( \xi := \frac{B}{\Delta p} \), the per-unit agency cost. A high value of \( \xi \) can be interpreted as an indicator of poor governance, such as large private benefits or weak performance measurement. We make the following assumption on the per-unit agency cost:

**Assumption 1** For each technology \( \tau \), the agency cost per unit of capital \( \xi := \frac{B}{\Delta p} \) satisfies

\[
\pi_\tau < \xi < pR - \frac{p}{\Delta p} \pi_\tau. \tag{1}
\]

This assumption states that the moral hazard problem, as characterized by the agency cost per unit of capital \( \xi \), is neither too weak nor too severe. The first inequality implies a finite production scale. The second inequality is a sufficient condition that rules out equilibrium shirking and ensures feasibility of outside financing. To streamline notation, our definitions of \( \pi \) and \( v \) are defined conditional on the relevant case, in which the entrepreneur exerts effort.

**Outside investors and securities.** The entrepreneur can raise financing from (up to) two types of risk-neutral outside investors \( i \in \{F, SR\} \), financial investors and socially responsible investors. Both investor types care about expected cash flows, but only socially responsible investors internalize social costs of production. Regardless of whether
the entrepreneur raises financing from both investor types or just one, it is without loss of
generality to restrict attention to financing arrangements in which the entrepreneur issues
securities that pay out a total repayment amount of \( X := X^F + X^{SR} \) upon project success
and 0 otherwise, where \( X^F \) and \( X^{SR} \) denote the payments promised to financial and
socially responsible investors, respectively. As usual, given that the firm has no resources
in the low state, this security can be interpreted as debt or equity. In our baseline
specification, we assume that the entrepreneur’s technology choice is contractible.

Then, the entrepreneur’s (net) utility as a function of the investment scale \( K \), total re-
payment \( X \), effort decision \( a \), upfront consumption by the entrepreneur \( c \), and technology
choice \( \tau \in \{C, D\} \) is given by

\[
U^E(K, X, \tau, c, a) = p(RK - X) - (A - c) - \gamma^E \phi_{r} K \\
+ \mathbb{1}_{a=0} [BK - \Delta p (RK - X)].
\]

The first term of this expression, \( p(RK - X) - (A - c) \), represents the net financial
payoff of the project under high effort, where \( A - c \) can be interpreted as the upfront
coinvestment made by the entrepreneur. The second term, \( \gamma^E \phi_{r} K \), measures the social
cost internalized by the entrepreneur. The third term, \( BK - \Delta p (RK - X) \), captures
the incremental payoff conditional on shirking. Exerting effort is incentive compatible if
and only if \( U^E(K, X, \tau, c, 1) \geq U^E(K, X, \tau, c, 0) \), which limits the total amount \( X \) that
the entrepreneur can promise to repay to outside investors to

\[
X \leq \left( R - \frac{B}{\Delta p} \right) K,
\]

so that the entrepreneur’s unit pledgeable income is given by \( pR - \xi \). The resource
constraint at date 0 implies that the capital expenditures, \( Kk_{\tau} \), must equal the total
investments made by the entrepreneur, \( A - c \), financial investors, \( IF \), and socially re-
sponsible investors, $I^{SR}$, so that

$$Kk_\tau = A - c + I^F + I^{SR}. \quad (2)$$

The respective (net) utility functions of outside investors, given an incentive-compatible financing arrangement, are given by:

$$U^F = pX^F - I^F, \quad (U^F)$$

$$U^{SR} = pX^{SR} - I^{SR} - \gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau K. \quad (U^{SR})$$

Here, $\gamma^{SR} \leq 1 - \gamma^E$ captures the degree to which socially responsible investors internalize externalities.\(^6\) This payoff function highlights two important features. First, socially responsible investors are affected by externalities $\gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau K$ as determined by the scale $K$ and technology choice $\tau$ regardless of whether they invest in the firm or not (we discuss this in more detail in Section 2.3). Second, their payoff function is distinct from maximizing the social value of the project, $v_\tau K$, even if they fully account for the externalities ($\gamma^{SR} = 1$). The reason is that socially responsible investors internalize neither the value of the cash flows that accrue to the entrepreneur, $p(RI - X^{SR} - X^F) - (A - c)$, nor those accruing to financial investors, $pX^F - K^F$.

We are interested in a setting in which deep-pocketed financial investors behave competitively. However, to abstract from free-rider issues, we assume that socially responsible investors allocate their capital in a coordinated fashion.\(^7\) One interpretation of this assumption is that socially responsible capital is directed by one large fund.\(^8\) While for the

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\(^6\) The sum $\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR}$ represents the fraction of externalities that are taken into account by agents in the model. When $\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR} < 1$, some externalities (e.g., those imposed on future generations) are not taken into account by anyone.

\(^7\) Morgan and Tumlinson (forthcoming) provide a framework in which shareholders of a company value public good production but are subject to free-rider problems.

\(^8\) Coordinated behavior is a natural assumption when socially responsible capital is deployed by large agents, such as sovereign wealth funds. In addition, there is also increasingly evidence for coordination among smaller players. One such example is the establishment of the Poseidon Principles, an initiative by eleven major to promote green shipping, see Nauman (2019).
partial equilibrium, single-firm analysis of Section 2 we assume that socially responsible capital is abundant relative to the capital needed by the firm, the subsequent multi-firm setting presented in Section 3 considers a general equilibrium analysis with limited social capital.

2 The Effect of Socially Responsible Investment

In this section, we investigate whether and how socially responsible investors can impact the firm’s investment choice. To do so, in Section 2.1, we first solve a benchmark case without socially responsible investors. This benchmark shows that, in the absence of socially responsible investors, the dirty technology may be chosen even when the entrepreneur has some concern for the higher social cost generated by dirty production (i.e., $\gamma^E > 0$). In Section 2.2, we add socially responsible investors to the model and characterize conditions under which their presence has impact, in the sense that it leads to the adoption of the clean production technology.

2.1 Benchmark: Only Financial Investors

We initially consider the benchmark setting in which the entrepreneur can only borrow from competitive financial investors. This setting corresponds to the special case of $I^{SR} = X^{SR} = 0$.

The entrepreneur’s objective is to choose a financing arrangement (consisting of scale $K \geq 0$, repayment $X^F \in [0, R]$, upfront consumption by the entrepreneur $c \geq 0$, and, technology choice $\tau \in \{C, D\}$) that maximizes the entrepreneur’s utility $U^E$ subject to the entrepreneur’s IC constraint and financial investors’ IR constraint, $U^F \geq 0$.

As a preliminary step, it is useful analyze the financing arrangement that maximizes the scale for a given technology $\tau$. Following standard arguments (see Tirole (2006)), this agreement requires the entrepreneur to co-invest all her wealth (i.e., $c = 0$) and that
the entrepreneur’s IC constraint as well as the financial investors’ IR constraint bind. The binding IC constraint ensures that the firm optimally leverages its initial resources $A$, whereas the binding IR constraint is a consequence of competition among financial investors.

When all outside financing is raised from financial investors, the maximum firm scale under production technology $\tau$ is then given by

$$K^F_\tau = \frac{A}{\xi - \pi_\tau}.$$  

This expression shows that the entrepreneur can scale his initial assets $A$ by a factor that depends on the agency cost per unit of investment, $\xi = \frac{h_B}{\Delta p}$, and the financial return under technology $\tau$. As $\xi > \pi_D$ (see Assumption 1), the maximum investment scale is finite under either technology.

The key observation from Equation (3) is that the maximum scale that the entrepreneur can finance from financial investors is larger under dirty than under clean production,

$$K^F_D > K^F_C.$$  

The reason for this difference in scale is that dirty production has a higher financial value than clean production, $\pi_D > \pi_C$ and that financial investors only care about financial returns.

The following Lemma 1 highlights that the technology choice of the entrepreneur is driven by a trade-off between scale and her concern for externalities. Of course, if the entrepreneur completely disregards externalities ($\gamma^E = 0$), there is no trade-off and she will always choose dirty production, given that $K^F_D > K^F_C$.

**Lemma 1 (Benchmark: Financial Investors Only)** When only financial investors
are present, the entrepreneur chooses

$$\bar{\tau} = \arg \max \tau (\xi - \gamma^E \phi_{\tau}) K^F_{\bar{\tau}}.$$  \hfill (5)

The firm operates at the maximum scale that allows financial investors to break even, $K^F_{\bar{\tau}}$. The entrepreneur's net utility is given by

$$\bar{U}^E = (\xi - \gamma^E \phi_{\bar{\tau}}) K^F_{\bar{\tau}} - A.$$  \hfill (6)

Maximum scale is optimal because, under the equilibrium technology $\bar{\tau}$, the project generates positive surplus for the entrepreneur and financial investors.

From equation (6), we see that the entrepreneur adopts the dirty technology whenever

$$(\xi - \gamma^E \phi_D) K^F_D > (\xi - \gamma^E \phi_C) K^F_C.$$  \hfill (7)

Given that the maximum scale is larger under the dirty technology, $K^F_D > K^F_C$, this is the case whenever $\gamma^E$ lies below a strictly positive cutoff $\tilde{\gamma}^E$. One particular interesting implication is that the entrepreneur may adopt the dirty technology even if, judging by project payoffs alone, he prefers the clean technology, $\pi_C - \gamma^E \phi_C > \pi_D - \gamma^E \phi_D$. In this sense, the financing terms offered by financial investors can corrupt socially responsible entrepreneurs.

**Corollary 1 (Financial Investors Can Corrupt Ethical Entrepreneur)** When only financial investors are present, the entrepreneur is corrupted by the markets whenever $\gamma^E \in (\tilde{\gamma}^E, \bar{\gamma}^E)$, where

$$0 < \tilde{\gamma}^E := \frac{\pi_D - \pi_C}{\phi_D - \phi_C} < \gamma^E := \frac{\xi (\pi_D - \pi_C)}{\phi_D (\xi - \pi_C) - \phi_C (\xi - \pi_D)} > 0.$$  Entrepreneurs in this interval strictly payoff-prefer the clean technology but, given funding terms available from financial investors, adopt the dirty technology.

Therefore, if the entrepreneur’s concern for social costs lies below the cutoff $\tilde{\gamma}^E$, the entrepreneur adopts the dirty production technology because it can be run at a larger
scale. As a result, outside investors that are driven purely by financial returns can induce even an ethical entrepreneur ($\gamma^E > 0$) to abandon principle and adopt dirty production.

2.2 Equilibrium with Socially Responsible Investors

We now analyze whether and how the financing arrangement is altered when socially responsible investors are also present. Because the entrepreneur could still raise financing exclusively from financial investors, the utility under the financing arrangement with financial investors only, $\bar{U}^E$, now takes the role of an outside option to the entrepreneur.

2.2.1 Optimal Financing with Socially Responsible Investors

Due to their unconditional concern for externalities, socially responsible investors are affected by the social costs of production regardless of whether they have a financial stake in the firm or not. In particular, if socially responsible investors do not engage with the firm, their (reservation) utility is given by

$$\bar{U}^{SR} = -\gamma^{SR}\phi_\tau K^F < 0,$$

which reflects the social costs generated when the entrepreneur raises financing from financial investors only.

To improve their payoff above and beyond this status quo, socially responsible investors can engage with the entrepreneur. Because socially responsible investors act in a coordinated fashion, they make a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer that specifies the technology $\tau$, scale $K$ as well as the required financial investments and payoffs for all investors and the entrepreneur. This contract solves the following maximization problem:

Problem 1 (Maximization problem faced by socially responsible investors)

$$\max_{I^F, I^{SR}, X^{SR}, X^F, K, c, \tau} pX^{SR} - I^{SR} - \gamma^{SR}\phi_\tau K$$

(9)
subject to IR of the entrepreneur:

\[ U^E (K, X^{SR} + X^F, \tau, c, 1) \geq \bar{U}^E \]

as well as the entrepreneur’s IC constraint, the resource constraint (2), the financial investors’ IR constraint \( U^F \geq 0 \), and the non-negativity constraints \( K \geq 0, c \geq 0 \).

The key difference relative to the previous section is that the financing agreement is now chosen to maximize the socially responsible investor’s utility subject to the constraint that the entrepreneur is weakly better off than her outside option of raising financing exclusively from financial investors (IR\(^E\)). We note that this formulation permits the possibility of compensating the entrepreneur with sufficiently high upfront consumption \( c > 0 \) in return for smaller scale \( K \), possibly even shutting down production completely. However, (at a minimum) the clean production technology generates positive joint surplus for the entrepreneur and socially responsible investors, the optimal financing arrangement rewards the entrepreneur with (weakly) larger scale than what could be funded by financial investors alone for the chosen technology, as shown in Theorem 1.

**Theorem 1 (Financing with Financial and Socially Responsible Investors)** Let 
\[ \hat{v}_\tau := \pi_\tau - (\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR}) \phi_\tau \geq v_\tau \] denote the joint surplus, per unit of scale, accruing to all investors and the entrepreneur. Then, in any optimal financing arrangement, production is characterized by

\[ \hat{\tau} = \arg \max_\tau \frac{\hat{v}_\tau}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau}, \quad (10) \]

\[ \hat{K} = \frac{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_{\hat{\tau}}} K^F_{\hat{\tau}} \geq K^F_{\hat{\tau}}. \quad (11) \]

The entrepreneur consumes no resources upfront, \( \hat{c} = 0 \). The total date-0 investment by both investors is \( \hat{I} = \hat{K} k_{\hat{\tau}} - A \) and the total payout to both investors satisfies \( \hat{X} = \left( R - \frac{B}{\Delta \rho} \right) \hat{K} \). The set of optimal co-investment arrangements, can be obtained by tracing...
out $x^F \in [0, \bar{X}]$ and setting $\bar{X}^F = x^F$, $\bar{X}^{SR} = \bar{X} - \bar{X}^F$ as well as $\bar{I}^F = p\bar{X}^F$ and $\bar{I}^{SR} = \bar{I} - \bar{I}^F$. The utility of socially responsible investors satisfies:

$$\hat{U}^{SR} = (\pi_{\bar{\tau}} - \xi) \hat{K} + A - \gamma^{SR} \phi_{\bar{\tau}} \hat{K}. \quad (12)$$

The optimal choice of technology maximizes total joint surplus, which is governed by the joint surplus that is created per unit of capital, $\hat{v}_{\bar{\tau}}$, and a term, $\frac{1}{\xi - \gamma^{E} \phi_{\bar{\tau}}}$, that reflects the optimal scale $\hat{K}$ (see Equation (11)). An immediate implication is that if the entrepreneur and the socially responsible investors jointly internalize all externalities, $\gamma^{E} + \gamma^{SR} = 1$, production will always be clean, since in this case $\hat{v}_{\bar{\tau}}$ coincides with social welfare $v_{\bar{\tau}}$ (and dirty production generates negative social welfare). Another implication of Theorem 1 is that the optimal financing arrangement rewards the entrepreneur entirely with scale, in the sense that the optimal capital stock $\hat{K}$ is chosen so that the entrepreneur obtains the same utility as in her outside option $\bar{U}^{E}$. Intuitively, any upfront consumption by the entrepreneur is suboptimal in the presence of a moral hazard problem that gives rise to capital rationing and, consequently, underinvestment.

While the optimal financing arrangement uniquely pins down the production side (i.e., technology choice and scale), there exists a continuum of feasible co-investment arrangements between financial and socially responsible investors that implements this outcome. Intuitively speaking, this is the case because any increase in the cash flow stake of financial investors $\hat{X}^F$ is reflected competitively in a higher upfront investment $\hat{I}^F$. Because also the entrepreneur remains at her reservation utility, the payoff to socially responsible investors as well as aggregate surplus remains unchanged.

We now compare the optimal arrangement to the benchmark case presented in Lemma 1. Of course, if the engagement by socially responsible investors does not result in a change in production technology compared to the benchmark case occurs (i.e., $\hat{\tau} = \bar{\tau}$), we obtain the same level of the capital stock and same utility for all agents in the economy.
This occurs either if the entrepreneur adopts the clean production technology even in the absence of investment by socially responsible investors, or if the entrepreneur adopts the dirty technology irrespective of whether socially responsible investors provide funding.

The interesting case is the one in which the optimal financing arrangement described in Theorem 1 induces a change in the production technology from dirty to clean. In this case, engagement by socially responsible investors has real impact. Specifically, socially responsible investors facilitate additional scale under the clean technology (relative to the case with only financial investors) to induce the entrepreneur to adopt the clean technology. When the entrepreneur does not internalize any of the social costs ($\gamma^E = 0$), this requires that the production scale under the clean technology is the same as when financial investors fund the dirty technology (i.e., $\hat{K} = K^F_D > K^F_C$). Intuitively, when the entrepreneur does not care about social costs of production, socially responsible investors have to completely make up for “lost scale” that results from the switch to the clean technology. When the entrepreneur internalizes some of the social costs of production ($\gamma^E > 0$), partially making up for lost scale is sufficient, because the entrepreneur is compensated in part for the switch to clean production by an increase in intrinsic utility (i.e., $K^F_D > \hat{K} > K^F_C$).

By engaging with the firm, socially responsible investors increase their utility relative to the case in which they remain passive,

$$\Delta U^{SR} := \hat{U}^{SR} - \bar{U}^{SR} = \hat{v}_C \hat{K} - \hat{v}_D K^F_D > 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

However, even though socially responsible investors increase their (overall) payoff by engaging with the company, they never break even when looking purely at financial returns, as stated in the following corollary.

**Corollary 2 (Socially Responsible Investors Make a Financial Loss)** Any induced switch in the production technology from $\bar{\tau} = D$ to $\hat{\tau} = C$ requires that socially respon-
sible investors make a financial loss. That is, in any optimal financing arrangement, as characterized in Theorem 1,
\[ p\hat{X}^{SR} < \hat{I}^{SR}. \] (14)

Intuitively, to induce a change from dirty to clean production, socially responsible investors need to enable a scale for the clean technology that is greater than that offered by financial investors in isolation. Because competitive financial investors just break even at the scale of production they are willing to finance in isolation, it must be the case that socially responsible investors make a financial loss when they finance an expansion in scale of the clean technology above and beyond what is offered by financial investors. Nevertheless, socially responsible investors are willing to provide financing because this financial loss, \( p\hat{X}^{SR} - \hat{I}^{SR} \), is outweighed by the utility gain from reduced social costs, \( \gamma^{SR}(\phi_D K^F_D - \phi_C \hat{K}) \), which generates the net gain in utility in Equation (13). It is important to note that our model predicts that this financial loss, \( p\hat{X}^{SR} - \hat{I}^{SR} \), occurs when the firm seeks financing in the primary market. That is, if socially responsible investors were to sell their cash flow stake \( \hat{X}^{SR} \) to financial investors after the firm has financed the clean technology, our model does not predict a price premium in the secondary market (i.e., in the secondary market we would observe \( p\hat{X}^{SR} = \hat{I}^{SR} \)).

2.2.2 Complementarity between Financial and Social Capital

To highlight the economic mechanism behind Theorem 1, this section provides a more detailed investigation of the case, in which socially responsible investors have impact (i.e., the entrepreneur would have chosen the dirty technology at scale \( K^F_D = \frac{A}{\xi - \pi_D} \) in the absence of socially responsible investors). The key insight of this section is that the counterfactual pollution under the dirty technology (which is enabled by financial investors) acts like a quasi asset to the firm, thereby raising the financing capacity from socially responsible investors. This quasi asset, in turn, is instrumental in generating a complementarity between financial and social capital, which we highlight in Proposition
social surplus is higher when both financial and socially responsible investors deploy capital, relative to cases where all capital is allocated by either financial or socially responsible investors.

To illustrate this complementarity, it is instructive to first consider a setting in which only the clean technology is available and to compare the maximum feasible scale of operation that can be sustained with either type of capital. While the maximum clean scale under financial capital is given by Equation (3) the maximum feasible clean scale under socially responsible capital, $K_{SC}^{SR}$, is obtained analogously from binding IC of the entrepreneur and binding IR of socially responsible investors. As is immediate from the following equation, financial capital can sustain a strictly higher clean scale:

$$K_C^F = \frac{A}{\xi - \pi_C} > K_C^{SR} = \frac{A}{\xi - \pi_C + \gamma^{SR} \phi_C}. \quad (15)$$

Intuitively, financial investors alleviate capital rationing that results from the entrepreneur’s agency problem. They do so precisely because they do not internalize negative externalities and, hence, perceive each unit of the project as more valuable (by $\gamma^{SR} \phi_C$). Since clean production suffers from an underinvestment problem, higher scale is socially valuable so that, conditional on the clean technology being adopted, welfare in an economy with only financial capital is strictly higher than in an economy with only social responsible capital,

$$v_C \left( K_C^F - K_C^{SR} \right) > 0. \quad (16)$$

Hence, for a given technology with positive social value, financial investors are more efficient at funding the firm than socially responsible investors.

However, this “aggressive” investment style of financial investors can have negative social implications with regards to technology adoption. In particular, if the dirty pro-

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$K_C^{SR}$ is the maximum scale at which socially responsible investors would just break even. Note, however, that, as discussed below, coordinated socially responsible investors will generally not fund up to this scale.
duction technology is also available, then financing from financial investors only can lead to dirty rather than clean production (recall from Corollary 1 that this happens when \( \gamma^E < \bar{\gamma}^E \)). Therefore, financial investors can induce overinvestment (from a social perspective) in the dirty production technology with negative social value.

Finally, consider an economy with both production technologies and both financial and socially responsible capital in ample supply and consider the case \( \gamma^E < \bar{\gamma}^E \), so that dirty production would occur in the absence of socially responsible capital. Now the presence of financial investors implies that the entrepreneur has the outside option of adopting the dirty production technology. Because this outside option generates negative externalities, the socially responsible investors’ participation constraint is relaxed, i.e., their payoff in \((U^{SR})\) must now exceed \(-\gamma^{SR}\phi_D K^F_D\). This relaxation of the participation constraint, in turn, raises the financing capacity from socially responsible investors and enables a scale increase relative to \(\bar{K}^C_{SR} \). The maximal feasible total scale with both types of investors, \(\bar{K}^F_{C+SR} \), satisfies

\[
\bar{K}^F_{C+SR} = \frac{A + \bar{A}}{\xi - \pi_C + \gamma^{SR}\phi_C}.
\]

Equation (17) highlights that the counterfactual social cost \(\bar{A} := \gamma^{SR}\phi_D K^F_D > 0\) enters the maximum scale in the same way as the entrepreneur’s financial assets \(A\). Hence, it acts like a quasi asset to the entrepreneur. Since the privately efficient arrangement with competitive financial investors maximizes scale (see Lemma 1) it, therefore, maximizes the value of this quasi asset. The following proposition shows that this effect unlocks sufficient additional investment from socially responsible investors so that this maximum feasible scale not only exceeds \(\bar{K}^C_{SR} \), but also \(K^F_C \).

**Proposition 1 (Financial and Social Capital Are Complementary)** Suppose that \(\gamma^E < \bar{\gamma}^E \) and \(\hat{\tau} = C\), then financial capital and socially responsible capital are complements: The maximum feasible scale under the clean technology in the presence of both
financial and socially responsible capital, $K_{FC+SR}^F$, is larger than the maximum scales attainable with only one investor type,

$$K_{FC+SR}^F > \hat{K} > K_{FC}^F > K_{SR}^C. \quad (18)$$

Under the maximum feasible scale, $K_{FC+SR}^F$, socially responsible investors would just break even. This implies that socially responsible investors will generally not provide financing up to this scale. Because socially responsible investors make a financial loss on each unit they finance and because they act in a coordinated fashion, the equilibrium scale $\hat{K}$ is just sufficient to induce the entrepreneur to switch to the clean technology, thereby keeping the entrepreneur at her outside option of running the dirty technology at scale $K_{FD}^F$. By revealed preference, this equilibrium scale $\hat{K}$ also has to exceed $K_{FC}^F$: The entrepreneur could have always chosen to run the firm in clean mode at scale $K_{FC}^F$ when relying on financial investors only but, given $\gamma^E < \bar{\gamma}^E$ chose not to do so. Perhaps surprisingly, in the presence of both financial and socially responsible investors, equilibrium welfare $v_{C\hat{K}}$ is therefore larger than in an economy in which the dirty technology is not available (e.g., due to government regulation).

Of course, an important assumption underlying the scale and concomitant welfare increase is that socially responsible capital is available in sufficient amounts to ensure adoption of the clean production technology. When this is not the case (i.e., when socially responsible capital is scarce) the presence of financial capital can move firms toward the adoption of dirty production technologies, leading to a social loss. In Section 3, we consider an economy with multiple firms and limited aggregate socially responsible capital. This analysis will shed further light on how the composition of investor capital (and not just the aggregate amount of capital) matters.
2.3 Broad vs. Narrow Socially Responsible Investment

A key assumption in our analysis is that socially responsible investors care unconditionally about external social costs, irrespective of whether they are complicit in the generation of these costs through investment in the company that is responsible for them. To illustrate the importance of this assumption, we briefly consider an alternative setting in which socially responsible investors follow a narrow mandate that is determined only by social costs that are a direct consequence their own investments. Under such a narrow mandate, socially responsible investors continue to internalize the social cost generated by their own investments, but not the social costs that are generated when they not investors themselves. In this case, the participation constraint for socially responsible investors becomes

\[ U_{SR} = pX_{SR} - I_{SR} - \gamma_{SR} \phi \tau K \geq 0. \] (19)

In this case, there is no quasi asset \((\bar{A} = 0)\) and socially responsible investors cannot increase the scale of the clean production technology above and beyond what financial investors are willing to offer. Therefore, a narrow mandate that focuses only on the direct consequences of the funds invested by socially responsible investors themselves does not allow for an increase in scale of the clean technology beyond what financial investors are willing to fund, and is therefore not sufficient for effective impact investment.

3 The Social Profitability Index

Based on the results presented in Section 2, we now extend the model to a multi-firm setting in order to derive a micro-founded investment criterion to guide scarce socially responsible capital. We denote by \(\kappa\) the aggregate amount of socially responsible capital (and continue to assume that financial capital is abundant).

We consider an economy with a continuum of infinitesimal firms grouped into distinct firm types. Firms that belong to the same firm type \(j\) are identical in terms of all relevant
fundamentals of the model, whereas firms belonging to different types differ according to at least one dimension, with Assumption 1 satisfied for all types. Let \( \mu(j) \) denote the distribution function of firm types, then the aggregate social cost in the absence of socially responsible investors is given by

\[
\int_{\gamma^E_j < \bar{\gamma}^E_j} \phi_D(j) K^{F}_{D,j} d\mu(j) + \int_{\gamma^E_j \geq \bar{\gamma}^E_j} \phi_C(j) K^{F}_{C,j} d\mu(j).
\] (20)

The first term of this expression captures the social cost generated by firms that, in the absence of socially responsible investors, choose the dirty technology \( (\gamma^E_j < \bar{\gamma}^E_j) \), whereas the second term captures firm types run by entrepreneurs that have enough concern for external social costs that they choose the clean technology even in absence of socially responsible investors \( (\gamma^E_j \geq \bar{\gamma}^E_j) \).

Given this aggregate social cost, how should socially responsible investors allocate their limited capital? One direct implication of Theorem 1 is that any investment in firm types with \( \gamma^E_j \geq \bar{\gamma}^E_j \) cannot be optimal. For these firms, socially responsible investors cannot induce a change in the adopted technology, such that any social capital used on those firms would be wasted from a social perspective. For the remaining “reformable” firm types, the payoff to socially responsible investors from reforming a firm of a given type \( j \) is given by:

\[
\Delta U^S_{j} = (\pi_{C,j} - \xi_j) \hat{K}_j + A_j + \gamma^S \left[ \phi_D(j) K^{F}_{D,j} - \phi_C(j) \hat{K}_j \right].
\] (21)

The first term captures the project’s financial return, net of the agency cost that is necessary to incentivize the entrepreneur, scaled by the (optimal) scale \( \hat{K}_j \). The second term captures the (internalized) change in social cost that results from inducing a firm of type \( j \) to adopt the clean production technology.

Given that socially responsible investors with limited capital may not be able to reform all firms, they should prioritize investments in firm types that maximize the impact per
dollar invested. This is achieved by ranking firms according to a variation on the classic profitability index, the social profitability index, which divides the change in payoffs to socially responsible investors, $\Delta U^{SR}_j$, by the amount socially responsible investors need to co-invest to impact the firm’s behavior, $I^{SR}$. By Theorem 1, the required co-investment depends on the fraction of cash-flow rights $X$ that socially responsible investors receive. In the polar cases of a zero cash-flow stake ($X^{SR} = 0$) and a full cash-flow stake ($X^{SR} = \hat{X}$), their required co-investment is given by

$$I^{SR}_{\text{min},j} = (\xi_j - \pi_{C,j}) \hat{K}_j - A_j, \quad (22)$$

$$I^{SR}_{\text{max},j} = \hat{K} j k_{C,j} - A_j, \quad (23)$$

respectively.

As shown by Chowdhry et al. (2018), if the technology change is fully contractible, then the minimum co-investment, $I^{SR}_{\text{min},j}$, is optimal when socially responsible capital is scarce. However, in characterizing the SPI we want to allow for the realistic situation, in which socially responsible investors do receive cash flow rights. This could be the case because the entrepreneur cannot commit to the adoption of the clean technology. In this case, a cash-flow stake for socially responsible investors and blunt the entrepreneur’s profit motive or may allow socially responsible investors to enforce appropriate technology adoption, for example via voting rights. Alternatively, socially responsible investors may be subject to an institutional constraint that requires them to deliver a certain fraction of their returns in terms of financial rather than nonpecuniary form.

To capture these considerations in a simple fashion, we introduce the parameter $\lambda_j \in [0, 1]$ which denotes the fraction of cash flow rights that socially responsible investors require in order to be willing to invest. We can then write the SPI as follows.

**Proposition 2 (The Social Profitability Index (SPI))** Socially responsible investment should be guided by the social profitability index $SPI_j$, which for any firm type $j$ is
given by the weighted harmonic mean of polar SPIs,

\begin{equation}
SPI_j := 1_{\gamma_j^E < \tilde{\gamma}_j^E} \frac{1}{\frac{\lambda_j}{SPI_{\min,j}} + \frac{1 - \lambda_j}{SPI_{\max,j}}}.
\end{equation}

where \(SPI_{\max,j} := \frac{\Delta U_{SR}^{j}}{I_{\min,j}}\) and \(SPI_{\min,j} := \frac{\Delta U_{SR}^{j}}{I_{\max,j}}\). There exists a threshold level \(SPI^*(\kappa) \geq 0\) such that socially responsible investors with scarce capital \(\kappa\) should invest in all firms for which \(SPI_j \geq SPI^*(\kappa)\).

According to Proposition 2, the optimal investment strategy for socially responsible investors is to first rank firms according to the social profitability index and then invest into these ranked firms until no funds are left, which will occur at the cutoff \(SPI^*(\kappa)\). Social capital is scarce if and only if the amount \(\kappa\) is not sufficient to fund all firm types with \(SPI_j > 0\).

The welfare change relative to the counterfactual case without socially responsible investors, \(\Delta \Omega\), results purely from the set of reformed firms, i.e., firms for which \(\gamma_j^E < \tilde{\gamma}_j^E\) and \(SPI_j \geq SPI^*(\kappa)\). That is,

\begin{equation}
\Delta \Omega = \int \left( v_{C,j} \tilde{K}_j - v_{D,j} K_{D,j} \right) d\mu(j).
\end{equation}

Clearly, if social capital is abundant and \(\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR} = 1\), then the partial equilibrium results of Proposition 1 still apply. Welfare is strictly higher than in an economy where all capital is held exclusively by either financial or socially responsible investors. However, when social capital is scarce, there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the set of reformed firms contributes towards higher welfare as before. On the other hand, the set of unreformed “dirty” firms may exhibit overinvestment in the dirty technology due to the presence of competitive financial capital without regard for externalities. This trade-off leads to the following Proposition, which highlights the importance of a balance between social and financial capital.
Proposition 3 (Balanced Capital) Fix the aggregate amount of capital in the economy. Welfare is higher compared to the case in which no capital is held by financial investors if and only if the amount of social capital exceeds a threshold.

To examine how the SPI guides capital allocation by socially responsible investors, let us consider which types of firms rank highest according to this metric. In performing these comparative statics it is instructive to first consider the special case in which \( \gamma^E = 0 \) and \( \gamma^{SR} = 1 \). Denoting the difference in social costs by \( \Delta \phi := \phi_D - \phi_C \) and the difference in (financial) profitability by \( \Delta \pi := \pi_D - \pi_C \), we obtain that:

\[
SPI_j = \mathbb{1}_{\gamma^E_j < \bar{\gamma}^E_j} \frac{\Delta \phi_j - \Delta \pi_j}{\Delta \pi_j + \lambda_j (p_j R_j - \xi_j)}.
\]  

(26)

This expression illustrates an important feature of the SPI: it reflects not only the social costs \( \phi_C \) produced by the firm under the clean technology (i.e., conditional on impact investing), but also the counterfactual social costs that would have occurred in the absence of engagement from impact investors, \( \phi_D \). This means that optimal capital allocation by socially responsible investors can include investments in firms that generate significant social costs (e.g., because of heavy reliance on fossil fuels) if these firms would have generated much larger social costs in the absence of engagement by socially responsible investors. Of course, the reform potential, as summarized by the relevant difference in \( \Delta \phi_j \), has to be traded off against the costs, as measured by the resulting reduction in financial profits \( \Delta \pi_j \). Moreover, intuitively, firm types that require a higher cash-flow stake \( \lambda_j \) to ensure a technology change rank lower.

In the general case (allowing for \( \gamma^E > 0 \)), we obtain the following comparative statics:

Proposition 4 (SPI Comparative Statics) As long as \( \gamma^E_j < \bar{\gamma}^E_j \), the SPI is increasing in \( \Delta \phi \), \( \xi \), and \( \gamma^E \) and decreasing in \( \Delta \pi \) and \( \lambda \).

Thus, as long as \( \gamma^E_j < \bar{\gamma}^E_j \) firm types with more socially minded entrepreneurs are cheaper to invest in, as a smaller scale is needed to convince the entrepreneur to reform.
However, as soon as the entrepreneur internalizes enough of the externalities so that she chooses the clean technology even if financed by financial investors ($\gamma_j^E > \bar{\gamma}_j^E$), the SPI drops discontinuously to zero. That is, socially responsible investors should not invest in these types of firms (or should divest in the case of pre-existing ownership). Finally, the SPI is (perhaps surprisingly) increasing in the agency cost $\xi$. On the one hand, higher agency costs imply that, per unit of scale, a larger fraction of cash flows needs to go to the entrepreneur. On the other hand, higher agency costs reduce the counterfactual scale the entrepreneur can finance from financial investors under the dirty technology. This reduces the entrepreneur’s outside option, making it cheaper for socially responsible investors to reform the firm. The latter effect dominates in our setup.

4 Conclusion

One of the major trends facing the investment management industry is a growing demand for “socially responsible” investing. How should the investment industry respond to this demand? Does this trend represent meaningless certification that allows investors to feel better about their investments? Or does it capture an actual demand for impact, such as changes in corporate policies that reduce carbon emissions, systemic risk, and other social costs?

This paper develops a parsimonious model to answer these questions. Conceptually, our analysis shows that co-investment by socially responsible investors can indeed have real impact, in the sense that it can induce firms to adopt cleaner production technologies, even when profit-motivated (financial) capital is abundant. Based on this conceptual analysis, our main practical contribution is the development of an investment criterion to optimally guide scarce socially responsible capital in an economy, the social profitability index (SPI).

The SPI summarizes the interaction of environmental, social and governance (ESG)
aspects. Importantly, the SPI not only reflects the (social) return of the project that is being funded, but also the social costs or externalities that would have occurred in the absence of engagement by socially responsible investors. Accordingly, it can be optimal to invest in firms that generate relatively low social returns (e.g., a firm with significant carbon emissions), provided that the potential increase in social costs, if only financially-driven investors were to invest, is sufficiently large. This contrasts with many common ESG metrics that focus on firms’ “social status quo” (i.e., on how green the company is at the moment). Most current ESG ratings are therefore not suited to achieve maximum impact.

The importance of counterfactual pollution in inducing changes in corporate policies implies that socially responsible fund need to follow a broader mandate than the maximization of returns subject to excluding polluting firms. As long as there is a large supply of competitive, profit-motivated capital, such a narrow mandate implies zero real impact on excluded firms (and poorer diversification for fund investors). The flip side of this insight is that, if socially responsible funds follow a broad mandate that unconditionally accounts for externalities, they must make a loss in financial terms (negative alpha). If this were not the case, competitive profit-motivated investors would have already funded these operational changes.

From a macro perspective, we uncover a complementarity between financial and socially responsible capital. Welfare is generally highest in an economy in which there is a balance between financial and socially responsible capital. The presence of profit-motivated financial capital alleviates underinvestment for a given production technology, precisely because financial investors do not internalize the negative externalities of production. However, this disregard for externalities can come at the cost of socially inefficient technology choice. The role of socially responsible investors is then to guide technology choice via co-investment. As a result, the composition of investor capital, not just its aggregate amount, matters in our setting.
A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. The Proof of Lemma 1 follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 1 given below. First, set $\gamma^{SR} = 0$ (so that socially responsible investors have the same preferences as financial investors). Second, to obtain the competitive financing arrangement (i.e., the agreement that maximizes the utility of the entrepreneur subject to the investors’ participation constraint) one needs to choose the utility level of the entrepreneur $u$ in (A.10) such that $\hat{v}_\tau K_\tau (u) - u = 0$.\footnote{Note that $\hat{v}_\tau = \pi_\tau - \gamma^E \phi_\tau$ in the special case when $\gamma^{SR} = 0$.}

Proof of Corollary 1. The entrepreneur payoff-prefers the clean technology if $\pi_C - \gamma^E \phi_C > \pi_D - \gamma^E \phi_D$, which is the case when $\gamma^E > \tilde{\gamma}^E := \frac{\pi_D - \pi_C}{\phi_D - \phi_C}$. The entrepreneur adopts the dirty technology whenever $(\xi - \gamma^E \phi_D) K_D^F > (\xi - \gamma^E \phi_C) K_C^F$, which is the case when $\gamma^E < \tilde{\gamma}^E := \frac{\xi (\pi_D - \pi_C)}{\phi_D (\xi - \pi_C) - \phi_C (\xi - \pi_D)}$. To show that $\gamma^E < \tilde{\gamma}^E$, rewrite $\tilde{\gamma}^E = \frac{\pi_D - \pi_C}{\phi_D - \phi_C + \phi_C \phi_D - \phi_D \pi_C}$ and note that $\pi_C - \phi_C > \pi_D - \phi_D$ and $\xi > 0$ imply that $\frac{\phi_C \pi_D - \phi_D \pi_C}{\xi} < 0$, so that $\gamma^E < \tilde{\gamma}^E$.

Proof of Theorem 1. The Proof of Theorem 1 will make use of Lemmas A.1 to A.5.

Lemma A.1 In any solution to Problem 1, the IR constraint of financial investors, $p X^F - I^F \geq 0$ must bind,

$$p X^F - I^F = 0.$$ \hfill (A.1)

Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there was an optimal contract for which $p X^F - I^F > 0$. Then, one could increase $X^{SR}$ while lowering $X^F$ by the same amount (until (A.1) holds). This perturbation strictly increases the objective function of socially responsible investors in (9), satisfies by construction the IR constraint of financial investors, whereas all other constraints are unaffected since $X = X^{SR} + X^F$ is unchanged. Hence, we found a feasible contract that increases the utility of socially responsible investors, which contradicts that the original contract was optimal. \blacksquare
Lemma A.2 There exists an optimal financing arrangement with $I^F = X^F = 0$.

Proof: Take an optimal contract $(I^F, I^{SR}, X^{SR}, X^F, K, c, \tau)$ with $I^F \neq 0$. Now consider the following “tilde” perturbation of the contract (leaving $K, c$ and $\tau$ unchanged). Set $\tilde{X}^F$ and $\tilde{I}^F$ to 0 and set $\tilde{I}^{SR} = I^{SR} + I^F$ and $\tilde{X}^{SR} = X^{SR} + X^F$. The objective of socially responsible investors in (9) is unaffected since

$$p\tilde{X}^{SR} - \tilde{I}^{SR} - \gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau K = pX^{SR} - I^{SR} + p\underbrace{X^F - I^F}_{0} - \gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau K$$

$$= pX^{SR} - I^{SR} - \gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau K,$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.2)

where the second line follows from Lemma A.1. All other constraints are unaffected since $\tilde{X}^F + \tilde{X}^{SR} = X^F + X^{SR}$ and $\tilde{I}^F + \tilde{I}^{SR} = I^F + I^{SR}$.

Lemma A.2 implies that we can phrase Problem 1 in terms of total investment $I$ and total repayment to investors $X$ in order to determine the optimal consumption $c$, technology $\tau$, and scale $K$. However, to make the proof most instructive, it is useful to replace $X$ and $I$ as control variables and instead use the expected repayment to investors $\Xi$ and expected utility provided to the entrepreneur $u$, which satisfy

$$\Xi := pX,$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.4)

$$u := \left(pR - k_\tau - \gamma^E \phi_\tau\right) K + I - pX.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.5)

Then, using the definition $\hat{v}_\tau := \pi_\tau - \left(\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR}\right) \phi_\tau \geq v_\tau$, we can write Problem 1 as:

Problem 2

$$\max_{\tau} \max_{u \geq 0} \max_{K, \Xi} \hat{v}_\tau K - u$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.6)
subject to

\[ K \geq 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.7)
\[ \Xi \leq (pR - \xi) K \]  \hspace{1cm} (IC)
\[ \Xi \geq - (A + u) + (pR - \gamma^E \phi_t) K \]  \hspace{1cm} (LL)

Here, the last constraint \( (LL) \) can be interpreted as a limited liability constraint, since it refers to the constraint that upfront consumption is weakly greater than zero (using the aggregate resource constraint in (2)). As the problem formulation suggests, it is useful to sequentially solve the optimization in 3 steps to exploit the fact that \( \Xi \) only enters the linear program via the constraints \( (IC) \) and \( (LL) \), but not the objective \((A.6)\).

As is obvious from Problem 2, only a technology that delivers positive surplus to investors and the entrepreneur (i.e., \( \hat{v}_\tau > 0 \)) is a relevant candidate for the equilibrium technology.\(^{11}\) Now consider the inner problem, i.e., for a fixed technology \( \tau \) with \( \hat{v}_\tau > 0 \) and a fixed utility \( u \geq \bar{U}^E \) we solve for the optimal vector \( (K, \Xi) \) as a function of \( \tau \) and \( u \).

**Lemma A.3** For any \( \tau \) with \( \hat{v}_\tau > 0 \) and \( u \geq \bar{U}^E \), the solution to the inner problem, i.e., \( \max_{K, \Xi} \hat{v}_\tau K - u \) subject to \((A.7)\), \((IC)\) and \((LL)\), implies maximal scale, i.e.,

\[ K_\tau (u) = \frac{A + u}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_t} > 0. \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.8)

The expected payment to investors is:

\[ \Xi_\tau (u) = (pR - \xi) K_\tau (u). \]  \hspace{1cm} (A.9)

**Proof:** The feasible set for \((K, \Xi)\) as implied by the three constraints \((A.7)\), \((IC)\) and

\(^{11}\) Note that \( \hat{v}_C \) is unambiguously positive whereas \( \hat{v}_D \) could be negative or positive depending on whether the sum \( \gamma^E + \gamma^{SR} \) is sufficiently close to 1.
Figure 1. Feasible set of the inner problem: The set of feasible solutions is depicted in orange and forms a polygon. The objective function is represented by the red line and the arrow: The red line is a level set of the objective function of socially responsible investors, and the arrow indicates the direction in which we are optimizing.

(LL) forms a polygon (see orange region in Figure 1). The upper bound on \( \Xi \) in (IC) is an affine function of \( K \) through the origin (i.e., linear in \( K \)) whereas the lower bound in Equation (LL) is an affine function of \( K \) (with negative intercept \(- (A + u)\)). The slope of the lower bound in Equation (LL) is strictly greater than the slope of the upper bound in Equation (IC) since

\[
(p R - \gamma^E \phi_\tau) - (p R - \xi) = \xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau
\]

\[
> \pi_\tau - \gamma^E \phi_\tau
\]

\[
> \pi_\tau - (\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR}) \phi_\tau = \hat{\nu}_\tau > 0,
\]

where the second line follows from the finite scale that is implied by Assumption 1 (i.e., \( \xi > \pi_\tau \)). Therefore, the intersection of the upper bound (IC) and the lower bound in (LL) defines the maximal feasible scale of \( K \). Choosing the maximal scale \( K_\tau (u) \) is optimal, since for any given \( \tau \) with \( \hat{\nu}_\tau > 0 \) and any fixed \( u \geq \bar{U}^E \), the objective function
\( \hat{v}_\tau K - u \) is strictly increasing in \( K \) and independent of \( \Xi \). The expression for \( K_{\tau}(u) \) in Equation (A.8) is obtained from \((pR - \xi) K = -(A + u) + (pR - \gamma^E \phi_\tau) K\).

Given the solution to the inner problem, \((K_{\tau}(u), \Xi_{\tau}(u))\), we now turn to the optimal choice of \( u \) which maximizes \( \hat{v}_\tau K_{\tau}(u) - u \) subject to \( u \geq \bar{U}^E \).

**Lemma A.4** In any solution to Problem 2, the entrepreneur obtains her reservation utility \( u = \bar{U}^E \).

**Proof:** It suffices to show that the objective is strictly decreasing in \( u \). Using \( K_{\tau}(u) = \frac{A + u}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau} \) and \( \hat{v}_\tau = \pi_\tau - (\gamma^E + \gamma^{SR}) \phi_\tau \), we obtain that:

\[
\hat{v}_\tau K_{\tau}(u) - u = \hat{v}_\tau \frac{A}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau} - \frac{\xi + \gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau - \pi_\tau}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau} u
\]

(A.10)

Since \( \xi > \pi_\tau \) and \( \xi > \gamma^E \phi_\tau \) (both by Assumption 1), both the numerator and the denominator of \( \frac{\xi + \gamma^{SR} \phi_\tau - \pi_\tau}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau} \) are positive, so that Equation (A.10) is strictly decreasing in \( u \).

Given that \( u = \bar{U}^E \) the optimal payoff to socially responsible investors for a given \( \tau \) is given by:

\[
U^{SR} = \hat{v}_\tau K_{\tau}(\bar{U}^E) - \bar{U}^E.
\]

(A.11)

We now turn to the final step, i.e., the optimal technology choice.

**Lemma A.5** The optimal technology choice is given by:

\[
\hat{\tau} = \arg \max_{\tau} \frac{\hat{v}_\tau}{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_\tau}.
\]

(A.12)

**Proof:** In the relevant case where \( \hat{v}_D > 0 \), we need to compare payoffs in (A.11). The clean technology is chosen if and only if \( \hat{v}_C K_C(\bar{U}^E) > \hat{v}_D K_D(\bar{U}^E) \), which simplifies to (A.12). If \( \hat{v}_D \leq 0 \), then A.12 trivially holds as only \( \hat{v}_C > 0 \).

Lemmas A.3 to A.5, thus, jointly characterize the solution to Problem 2, which, in turn, allows us to retrieve the solution to the original Problem 1. That is, substituting
the expression for $\bar{U}E$ in Equation (6) into $\hat{K} = K\hat{\tau}(\bar{U}E)$ yields Equation (11). Moreover, since $(LL)$ binds, we obtain that $\hat{c} = 0$. The aggregate resource constraint in (2) then implies that total investment by both investors must satisfy $\hat{I} = \hat{K}k\hat{\tau} - A$, whereas (IC) implies that $\hat{X} = \left(R - \frac{B}{\Delta p}\right)\hat{K}$. Since any agreement must satisfy $X^F + X^{SR} = \hat{X}$ and $I^F + I^{SR} = \hat{I}$, we can trace out all possible agreements using the fact that financial investors break even (Lemma A.1), meaning that $pX^F - I^F = 0$ and $X^F \in [0, R]$.

**Proof of Proposition 1.** See discussion in main text.

**Proof of Proposition 2.** The social profitability index is defined as:

$$SPI = \frac{\Delta U^{SR}}{I^{SR}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.13)

Using Theorem 1, we obtain that the maximum investment by socially responsible investors is given by

$$I^{SR}_{max} = \hat{K}k - A.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.14)

The minimum investment that is sufficient to induce a change in production technology is given by

$$I^{SR}_{min} = I^{SR}_{max} - p\hat{X} = (\xi - \pi C)\hat{K} - A.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.15)

This implies that $SPI \in [SPI_{min}, SPI_{max}]$ where $SPI_{min} = \frac{\Delta U^{SR}}{I^{SR}_{max}}$ and $SPI_{max} = \frac{\Delta U^{SR}}{I^{SR}_{min}}$. Now suppose that socially responsible investors require a cash flow share of $\lambda$, then

$$I^{SR} = I^{SR}_{max} - (1 - \lambda)p\hat{X} = \lambda I^{SR}_{max} + (1 - \lambda)I^{SR}_{min}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (A.16)

This yields expression (24) in Proposition 2.

**Proof of Proposition 3.** See discussion in main text.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** As a first step, we calculate the polar cases $SPI_{max}$ and
SPI_{\text{min}}$. For $\text{SPI}_{\text{max}} = \frac{\Delta U^{SR}_{\text{SR}}}{\Delta U^{SR}_{\text{SR}}}$ we obtain that:

$$\text{SPI}_{\text{max}} = \gamma^{SR} \frac{\Delta \phi}{\Delta \pi - \frac{\gamma^E}{\xi} (\Delta \phi (\xi - \pi_C) + \Delta \pi \phi_C)} - 1 \quad (A.17)$$

which is increasing in $\Delta \phi$, $\xi$, and $\gamma^E$ and decreasing in $\Delta \pi$ and $\lambda$.

For $\text{SPI}_{\text{min}} = \frac{\Delta U^{SR}_{\text{SR}}}{\Delta U^{SR}_{\text{SR}}}$ we obtain

$$\text{SPI}_{\text{min}} = \frac{\gamma^{SR} \Delta \phi - \Delta \pi + \frac{\gamma^E}{\xi} (\Delta \phi (\xi - \pi_C) + \Delta \pi \phi_C)}{\Delta \pi + (pR - \xi) \frac{\xi - \gamma^E \phi_C}{\xi} - \frac{\gamma^E}{\xi} (\Delta \pi \phi_C + \Delta \phi k_C)} \quad (A.18)$$

which is increasing in $\Delta \phi$, $\xi$, and $\gamma^E$ and decreasing in $\Delta \pi$ and $\lambda$.

Finally, from the definition $\text{SPI} = \frac{1}{\text{SPI}_{\text{min}} + \frac{1}{\text{SPI}_{\text{max}}}}$, it is immediate that the SPI is decreasing in $\lambda$. 

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References


